Analysis Of Arkansas Nuclear One Safety Failures

The construction of Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) in 1974 brought about a new age of employment opportunity and population growth in the River Valley area. However, in its 44 years of operation, the plant has had several mishaps that culminated in a column 4 ranking in 2015. Nuclear power plants in the US are divided into five columns based on performance (NRC ROP Framework). Plants placed in column five of the action matrix are no longer permitted to operate. A handful of incidents were responsible for changes in the public’s perception of the benefits of the plant.

An ill-advised gas release in 1980, macrofouling, a fatal accident in 2013 when a million-pound stator was dropped due to a faulty lift assembly, and inadequate flood protection are among just a few of the problems in ANO’s past. Every nuclear plant is required to undergo inspections by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). ANO’s column four ranking earned it approximately 10,000 hours of inspections in 2016, compared to the mere 3,500 hours a column one plant would be subjected to per year. (Smith, par. 2). These inspections insure that there are no lapses in proper operating conduct. Violations are ranked on a scale of four colors, each detailing the severity of potential consequences for the operation of the plant- white meaning little significance, with significance level increasing through green and yellow until the scale maxes out at red. The yellow findings due to the defective lift and poor flood protection were closed in March of 2018, detailed in Arkansas Nuclear One - NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (EA-16-124) Follow-Up Inspection Report 05000313/2018012 and 05000368/2018012, but the plant currently remains in column 4 of the action matrix. The first incident of consequence in the plant’s history was on May 10, 1980 when a ruptured seal allowed approximately 65,000 gallons of radioactive water to leak onto the floor of the reactor building. The facility was advised by Governor Bill Clinton and the Director of the Department of Health to allow a 48 hour period before venting the resulting gas. This period was intended to perform tests to ensure the gas was not harmful. The administration of the plant ignored the request and proceeded to vent the gas, primarily composed of xenon 133 and krypton 85, into the atmosphere (Matlack, par. 3).

While there were no discernable health consequences to the release, it made citizens of Russellville and surrounding areas question whether the plant could be trusted to make similar decisions. This event came a mere year after the infamous Three Mile Island (TMI) incident, which occurred on March 28, 1979. Like ANO, TMI was left with large amounts of radioactive air to vent, and the public of the affected area was incredibly wary of the radioactive consequences. “Local officials [. . . ] speculated that as many as one in five of the 135,000 area residents might flee” (Omang par. 20). It is likely the event at Three Mile Island made the citizens of Russellville and surrounding areas oppose the what could be called headstrong decision to vent. By far, the most unusual incident in the plant’s history occurred in 1980, when clams “forced the shutting down of the [. . . ] power plant by clogging the reactor’s internal cooling pipes” (Applebome 1). Asiatic clams (corbicula fluminea), the seemingly harmless invasive species that populate Lake Dardanelle, can spawn up to 400 juveniles a day (Global Invasive Species Database (2018) Species Profile: Corbicula Fluminea). The massive amount of clams in the lake made it virtually impossible to avoid such problems; however, the plant failed to take appropriate steps to ensure there would be no blockage in the cooling pipes. These clams managed to build up in the cooling pipes that fed off of Lake Dardanelle, macrofouling them to the point of forcing a shutdown. The most well known and the most detrimental accident to date at ANO occurred on March 31, 2013. It was one of two yellow findings that were responsible for the plant being ranked in column 4 of the action matrix. A stator was scheduled to be replaced during a refueling outage of Unit 1, and Entergy commissioned a company to construct a temporary crane to lift the million-pound component. Entergy was responsible for examining and approving the crane design. When the stator was in midair, the crane collapsed, dropping the stator and killing one person in the process. It also damaged a fire extinguisher system, allowing water to flood into critical areas.

An investigation by the US Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) concluded that the “primary cause of the collapse of the temporary overhead crane was the flaw in the structural design” (US Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Ayub 28). The stator drop led to the discovery of another yellow finding: inadequate flood protection. When the plant was being investigated for the drop, the NRC found that there were issues with over 100 flood protection measures such as barriers and seals (NRC: Additional NRC Oversight at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2). Many elements within the facility require protection from water to avoid failure or damage to the components. ANO failed to properly maintain, repair, or in some cases even install necessary flood protection features. Despite Arkansas Nuclear One’s rocky past with safety, the NRC is considering reclassifying the plant in the coming years. The proximate towns of Russellville and London have maintained steadily increasing populations, and this serves as a testament to the public’s trust in the plant’s operation. As of March 31, 2018, the plants has gone five years without being cited for yellow findings. While the plant’s safety has greatly improved, it is important to document previous errors to ensure they do not affect the facility in the future.