Analysis Of Putin’s Goals For Russia Between His Election In 2000 And The End Of His Second Presidential Term In 2008

Introduction

As Boris Yeltsin’s term as President of Russia came to an end, he made it clear that he wanted power to be transferred to a supporter of Russia’s elite class. The Yeltsinite group chose Vladimir Putin as his successor, attempting to secure the position of the Yeltsin family as an elite power. As Putin began his first term of presidency, Russia was certainly facing an identity crisis and struggling to overcome the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Evans, 2008). In December 1999, just before Putin replaced Yelstin as president, he declared that while he was not suggesting totalitarianism, it was necessary for Russia to have strong state power. He wanted to transform Russia from a powerless state back into the strong, successful state that he had grown up in. Putin began intent on ensuring a better system was put in place in post-Soviet Russia than what had been developed by his predecessor (Di Leo, 2008). While Putin might have started out with deep values and goals, his terms gradually turned extremely contradictory and regressive. Richard Sakwa describes Putin’s leadership as an example of Karl Polanyi’s view that states will naturally become defensive against the market if there is impending damage which can in turn remove crucial elements that make civilised life exist. He saw the need to cut ties between the government and large corporations. During his campaign and the State of the Nations address on 8 July 2000, Putin spoke about the importance of phasing out this relationship and reducing the power of the oligarchs, just as Joseph Stalin had aimed to do in 1929. Putin also rebuilt Russian politics into a more organized and managed system, but in doing this he also removed all political pluralism, turning Russia into a ‘managed democracy’. Because of the unfortunate position that Russia was in, many people were optimistic and expected a great future with Putin as their leader (Nemt︠s︡ov and Milov, 2008).

Russia as a strong state

One of Putin’s main goals during his presidency was transforming Russia into a strong state and returning it to a powerful position in the world arena. At the start of his first term, Putin was devoted to rebuilding the Russian state. In his ‘Russia at the Turn of the Millennium’ statement in 1999, Putin showed that his plans were to improve the standards of living to equal the West by establishing a dynamic and capitalist economy. The Russian economy was in turmoil at the beginning of Putin’s presidency. Between 1999 and 2007, Putin’s two terms as Russian President, Russia’s GDP (gross domestic product) had increased by 69% and Russian people were richer than they had ever been before. Most Russians give thanks to Putin for this reversal. From 2000 to 2003 his main focus was to create and maintain enticing conditions for domestic and foreign capital. Putin concentrated on this to affirm the rights and privileges of the central state and to shield the regime from attack by other. Aleksi Makarkin claims that Putin’s regime from 2000 to 2003 gave exclusive power to those at the top and the bureaucracy only. This meant that any and all hardship and responsibility was confined within the regime, leading to high tensions and animosity between factions. In Putin’s first speech to the Federal Assembly, he declared that it was time that the government has the right to expect state norms to be respected and that all Russians must start paying attention to the state laws. Putin aimed to unify Russia, as he believed people had become subjects of their individual regions instead of citizens of one united country.

Putin and the Oligarchs

Putin claimed an oligarch should not be used for all big business representatives in Russia, but it is a person who used their special position to steal money from the state. In a Spanish media interview in early 2006, Putin claimed that oligarchs; ‘people who fuse power and capital’, acted as an alternative for the government in the 1990s used their position to campaign for laws that would favour and contribute to businesses and hinder society. However, the Kremlin’s siege on the oligarchs commenced just months after Putin’s election in 2000. They decided to modify the ‘social contract’ between businesses and the government as they believed that the capitalist rule of the oligarchs was over and in the new Russian state, the economy would be managed by the government. They began with Vladimir Gusinsky. The Media-Most offices of Russian independent television station NTV were stormed on 11 May 2000. The raid resulted in the arrest of Gusinsky on the 13 June before he then fled into exile. This was then followed by inquisitions into the taxes and deals made by Russia’s largest businesses such as Gazprom, Lukoil, and Norilsk Nickel. Another major raid was on Boris Berezovsky, one of the highest in the group of oligarchs. Berezovsky was a “classic oligarch” by mixing finance, politics and the media to make profits. He was well known for decreasing the capitalisation of his businesses, for example; in 1995 Berezovsky took ownership of oil company Sibneft and somehow the capitalisation of competing company, Surgutneftegas was eleven time greater, despite Sibneft producing approximately 40% more oil than them. On 19 July 2000, Berezovsky abdicated his seat in the Duma and claimed that every person has broken the law, whether they wanted to or not. In November 2000, he then fled into exile in London where he was granted asylum. The next to feel the wrath of the Kremlin was Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos Oil Company. On 2 July 2003, Platon Lebedev, head of Menatep International Financial Association, was arrested for fraud in the procurement of shares worth US$280 million in Apatit in 1994. Menatep was one of Yukos’ largest shareholders. Khodorkovsky was then arrested on 25 October after his plane was raided. Plans for Yukos and Sibneft to unite and form one of the largest oil companies in the world were discontinued.

The attack on Yukos revealed the Kremlin’s ruthlessness in ending the reign of the oligarchs and big businesses in Russia and according to Stephen Fortescue, it was merely to show businesses who is boss. However, these attacks are an example of Putin’s controversial leadership. The decisions to raid these specific corporations aroused speculation that Putin’s alleged intentions of cracking down on the crime and corruption of oligarchs for the benefit of society were nothing but an opportunity to take down his critics and opponents. Berezovsky was an open and harsh critic of Putin. According to Russian commentator Vitaly Tretyakov, Gusinsky’s media empire was leading the criticism of Putin and the Kremlin even saw Media-Most as an opposition party hidden behind Khodorkovsky was a supporter of many political parties and it was also thought he was preparing himself to run for president in 2008. The victims of Putin’s purge of oligarchs were those who took advantage of their elite position and power. He used the few people and companies that he raided as an example for the rest of how he wanted them to behave and what would happen if they did not obey his rules. The attacks were also not carried out by an independent court, but by the MVD (Ministry of the Interior), the FSB (Federal Security Service; the KGB’s domestic successor), and the Prosecutor General which leads one to believe they were for Putin’s benefit. On 28 July 2000, twenty-one of Russia’s most elite business people met with President Putin to develop some rules between the authorities and businesses where the state would be appreciated. The business leaders suggested three points to the government; the Kremlin must temporarily prohibit any investigations from the last ten years and not redistribute property that once belonged to the state, businesses are obliged to obey the law, and the government have to dismiss all corrupt bureaucrats nor can businesses use bribery with the state.

Europe and Russia as a democracy

When Putin began his presidency, he was a devout Europeanist however he slowly became more Eurasian, even Asiatic, geographically and politically. Although he was a believer in Europeanism, he made it very clear that Russia would reach democracy and modernity on its own terms. Putin made it clear that Russia could not become a democracy by following the general principle of democracy (Sakwa, 2008). He resented judgement from outside countries on Russia’s political system and agenda, despite allegedly having the same goals; democracy. In 2005, Russia’s antipathy for the West became more evident from political leaders. They felt that Russia had moved up in the world and become more powerful, giving them the courage to finally speak against those who they felt were ‘looking down’ on their country. The government renounced Western claims of a concentration of power in Russia and have consistently denied the suggestions of the West in implementing a democracy similar to their ‘principles’. This poses the question as to why Putin considers Russia to be part of Europe as it is clearly not for their democratic values. Russian businessman Vladislav Surkov was the first to suggest a ‘sovereign democracy’ in 2006, however Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev and Putin were both sceptical about the term and dismissed the concept in 2007 (Evans, 2008). Putin has successfully had a disagreement with the majority of countries and has little to no friends or allies.

Conclusion

Sakwa describes Putin as a transitional leader; he built a contradictory state and left many issues unresolved therefore still needing a long-term plan after his term. However, while his resolutions were not perfect, he did help to bring about some political order (Sakwa, 2008). Many issues that existed after Stalin’s death still remain on the Russian agenda today; for example, the standards of living compared to the West and the need for an inclusive and sustainable welfare state. According to Masha Gessen, Putin became the president with a plan to implement a sort of subtle dictatorship. Independent scholar Vladimir Pastukhov claims that Putin did not remove arbitrariness from society but gave it an ‘organised character’. He came to power and convinced people that he was improving Russia by removing the oligarch’s power, boosting the economy, and reigniting some nationalism and patriotism into society however it was quite the opposite. While statistics show that many people feel Putin has improved the country, the level of inequality in Russia has risen above the United States since Putin came to power. He succeeded in bringing self-confidence back to Russia, but it no longer has any allies. His tough persona has created a sense of security and happiness in people; however, Russia now has a crime rate that is ten times higher than the United States, making it one of the most dangerous places in the world. Putin has created a state where the rich get richer and the poor stay poor (DeVries and Shekshnia, 2008). While Putin ‘removed’ corruption amongst the oligarchs who opposed him, it is now the case that the only people who benefit from his rule are the oligarchs in his circle. While Putin may have begun his presidency with goals and values, the contradictory nature of his rule shows the constant changing of his goals to suit himself and his ‘family’. Russia is not a democracy, but a puppet with the strings held by Vladimir Putin.

Bibliography

• DE VRIES, M. and SHEKSHNIA, S. (2008). Vladimir Putin, CEO of Russia Inc. Organizational Dynamics, 37(3), pp.236-253.
• Di Leo, R. (2008). Putin, Professional Politician. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 24(4), pp.573-584.
• Easter, G. (2008). The Russian State in the Time of Putin. Post-Soviet Affairs, 24(3), pp.199-230.
• Evans, A. (2008). Putin's Legacy and Russia's Identity. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(6), pp.899-912.
• Nemt︠s︡ov, B. and Milov, V. (2008). Putin - The Bottom Line: An independent expert report. United States.
• Sakwa, R. (2008). Putin and the Oligarchs. New Political Economy, 13(2), pp.185-191.
• Sakwa, R. (2008). Putin's Leadership: Character and Consequences. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(6), pp.879-897.
• Sakwa, R. (2014). Putin redux. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.