Catalonia And Bavaria: National Identity And European Identification
Introduction
In the time of globalization, the nation state seems to be dying away. Especially in Europe, sub-state regional legislatures and governments were established across the European Union, as an outcome of decentralisation which empowers regional government to enhance economic competence in the new global context. Decentralisation has become a major embedding factor in contemporary political life in Europe and the region is becoming a major player in global setting. Besides, a range of states’ competences have been transferred to the supranational EU level. Via the decades of integration, the EU goes far beyond the understanding of intergovernmentalism, now known as ‘Brussels Monster’. The state caught in the middle seems to be stripped of its power from below and locked-in from above.
Processes of decentralisation of powers and bottom-up regional political movement for autonomy does not only concerns economic development within the territories but also raises the question about identities issue. The build of ‘meso-level’ regional governments fuels to preserving their territorial identities and some regional governments e.g. Catalonia, Scotland and Bavaria have been active in in promoting the production and reproduction of their own substate identities through cultural, educational, linguistic, and media policies.
‘’The gradual obsolescence of the hierarchical and command-and-control model of the state may have modified state’s capacity to generate social solidarity across national boundaries, undermining the extent to which those citizens with a dual national identity continued to identify with and give consent to both state and sub-state dimensions,’’ which could be proofed by Moreno’s finding: ‘’the more the pre-Union ethnoterritorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands for political autonomy.’’ And the empirical evidences we have seen in recent years are separatist movement in some European regions, such as Scotland, Catalonia and Bavaria. While the first two are firmly pro-European, a scent of Euroscepticism could be detected in Bavaria’s discourse. This essay therefore aims to explore the relation of substate national/regional identity and European identity and investigate potential factors to account or the regional difference.
Positive correlation between sub-state national identities and European identities
Identity concerns a sense of belongingness, comprising civic part and cultural part. One question has been debated for a long time, whether the European identity has emerged or not. According to Habermas (1992), ‘’institutions altogether have the power to create a citizenship that will be strong enough to generate a feeling of bonding between the members of a community and sufficient allegiance to the political system’’, we can claim the emergence of European identity given the common institutional tie inherent to the process of Europeanization such as The European Court of Justice, the Schengen Agreement as well as common policy-making represented by the Euro currency, etc.
The EU supra-state framework has empowered regions from its supportive regional policies and institutional arrangement. The EU’s regional policy are delivered through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund, subsidiarity principles as well as other policies. The empowerment indeed results in the reinforcement of sub-state identities. In terms of institutional arrangement, the EU as a multi-level governance system, with establishment of European Committee of the Regions (CoR) representing Europe's regional and local authorities, provides the strong sub-state regions networking opportunity and negotiation platform between agencies and actors from different levels with different competencies. Furthermore, the regional policy’s implementation could be better guaranteed by regional governments and administrations than central state government. Besides, so far various EU culture programs are helping to emphasize older regional identities to the detriment of the national identities. Stateless nations therefore look like a natural beneficiary from European integration and therefore the stateless regions and the EU seem to be natural ally counterbalancing national sovereign states.
In terms of multi identities and the constellation among them, both the concentric theory of political identities and Moreno question confirm the possibility of coexistence. Whereas the competition and conflict between sub-state identities (especially in regions with high levels of self-identification as a nation) and state recognition is noticeable, which was unveiled by the Moreno survey conducted in 1980s. According to his findings, though citizens in European democracies seem to conciliate sub-state, state and supra-state identities, which ‘sovereigntist’ majority and minority nationalisms often tend to polarise in a conflictive manner. For instance, Spain [today] is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities’ and the role of these self-governing institutions in the production and reproduction of, for example, Basque, Catalan, Scottish or Welsh identities has been very important.
A positive correlation can be instead observed between European identities and substate national identities , as Michael Bruter found substate identities and European identities ‘far from being contradictory, identities are complementary and that stronger national and regional identifiers should also be stronger European identifiers, since Europe represents a ‘positive’ identity grounded in the perception of a common civilisation….positive correlations are strongest between closest territorial levels, that is, between European and national identities (0.17, significant at 0.014).’
He also points out that people with high levels of subnational identities, particularly of national identity, show a stronger tendency to identify with Europe. Based on his observation, Catalonia and Scotland can be viewed as an empirical proof, whereas Bavaria seems to be an exceptional case. In the next section, I would like to selectively examine to which extent the European identification reflects itself in these two European regions: Catalonia and Bavaria and the factors via comparison.
The strong European Identification in Catalonia
Catalonia is one of Spain's wealthiest and most productive regions and has a distinct history dating back around 1000 years. Before the Spanish Civil War, Catalonia already enjoyed broad autonomy but was suppressed under Gen Franco government. After the death of Franco, autonomy was restored in the region under the 1978 constitution and Catalonia prospered as part of the new, democratic Spain. A 2006 statute granted Catalonia even greater powers, boosting Catalonia's financial clout and describing it as a nation, the 2008 financial crash and Spanish public spending cuts fuelled local resentment and separatism. Spain's Constitutional Court reversed much of 2006 statute in 2010. The sentiment against central Madrid government and the reinforced conflicts between identities has been polarised into the Catalonia’s independence in 2016. As regards the independence, what is worse, the sight of Spanish national police beating voters, and senior politicians being jailed, revived disturbing memories of the Franco dictatorship and suppression from central state government, sharpening the existing identity conflicts.
Tough having great difficulty to identify themselves as Spaniards for Catalans, to be European (and more European than the Spaniards) has always been one of the distinctive marks of Catalanism. Most Catalans still pride themselves on possessing a high grade of Europeanness, even ahead of the Spaniards. Even the count for the EU’s support for independence was clearly failed, yet the Catalonia government still identify itself as an ardent European region. On the occasion of the commemoration of Catalonia’s national day, the representative of the Catalan government to the EU, Meritxell Serret hold a speech at the Delegation of the Catalan Government to the European Union, claiming almost 40 years of non-stop efforts to bring Catalonia closer to the European Union, and the EU closer to the Catalan people, affirming Catalonia’s willingness to contribute to a more effective, transparent, accountable European Union as a recognised delegation and identifying Catalan people, as a nation, and as European patriots who will always work to defend the European Union's values.
The existence of strong EU identification can accredit to the regional government’s consistent internal mobilisation and activeness in EU level. The CiU (CDU)-led governments led by Jordi Pujol for the 23 consecutive years have always tried to promote Europeanness, define Catalonia as a European region. Under his leadership, Catalonia was a leader of European Regionalism aimed at gaining constitutional recognition of region’s autonomy and extending regions’ competences to avoid the monopoly of power from the Spaniard central government. Jordi Pujol was the main lobbyists struggling for an institutional representation of the regions and their inclusion in the treaties, due to his effort since 2000, several Conferences of Regions with Legislative Powers were celebrated. In the year 2001, a group of seven constitutional regions signed a declaration claiming more participation in the European institutions and more consideration of the constitutional regions. Catalonia alongside Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Salzburg, Scotland, Walloonia and Flanders signed this declaration. The image as one of the most active European regions adds in turn a symbolic value for politics at home, per se a process of mobilisation. Consequently, Europeanism and the Catalan role as a region of Europe seems to be permissive, a consensus easily and broadly achieved by all parties in Catalonia, including in opposition. Opposition parties may censure Pujol’s intent to monopolize Catalan sentiment, but in terms of strategies of European policy, it is doubtful whether a socialist Catalan government would make much of a difference. Catalonia’s EU policy marks a high degree of consistency unexceptionally in the next successive governments.
The EU as a supra-sate political entity extoling and praising cultural diversity provides Catalonia a practical channel to defend its language and culture. The language, Catalan, is still the chief marker of Catalan national identity, though promoting Catalan learning is not prioritized on the agenda of Catalan foreign policy, yet in practice, the Catalan government arranges the language issue to softer forms of exterior activities in the EU, for example financing Catalan lectureships in universities, maintaining offices for cultural promotion, subsidizing organizations of Catalan emigrants in Europe.
In terms of economic development, the integrated EU single market, custom union, four freedoms, EU regional policy, of which the regional investment is the core, combined with Catalonia’s advantages as leading regional economy provide strong impetus for Catalonia’s to increase its competitiveness in the EU wide and beyond. And correspondingly the Catalan government’s EU policy is functional for the economic competition with other regions as well as inward investment and European fund money. Besides, under the framework of EU regional policy funding, regional programs and regimes have been set up to boost regional development through economic collaboration among the EU’s regions. For instance, the EGTCs (European Groupings for Territorial Cooperation) are a European entity set up to promote trans-border, trans-national and inter-regional cooperation across the EU. The EGTCs were established aimed at helping implement projects that are co-financed by the European Union and supporting actions driven by the regional or local authorities. In the case of Catalonia, the Euro-Mediterranean capital status Barcelona holds, with the presence of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, offers another opportunity or Catalonia to enhance its economic cooperation amongst countries and regions across the Mediterranean by achieving the potential of economy of scale and making most of its own comparative advantages.
Identities once formed tends to be stable over time, which explains the failure of the regional government’s count for EU’s support for independence has not largely weakened Catalan government’s self-understanding as a devoted European region, which has been mentioned in the previous part. All in all, Catalonia is a net beneficiary from Europeanization and European integration for its growing competences in relation to central government and its enhanced economy competitiveness under the EU’s framework, the strong EU identification is therefore naturally in positive correlation with its assertive substate identity. Problem is, supranational as the EU is, the Council with intergovernmental nature still remains and will remain as the most powerful EU organ in a considerable time. Only member states sit and vote, Catalonia cannot be represented as it wishes. As legal statehood seems very unlikely inside of the EU, if the substate national identification fails to make reconciliation with Spanish state recognition and assuming that situation tends to be polarized even further, unfavourable policy or sanctions against Catalonia in the future cannot be excluded, which in the long run unavoidably could undermine Catalonia’s European identification.
Special case: the Eurosceptism in Bavaria
Historically Bavaria was once a kingdom full of mountain landscapes that held its own for centuries, only joining a larger German state in comparatively modern times. Bavaria has cultivated its own identity and culture throughout history, the distinct for many impenetrable dialect (Bayrisch), national dress (Dirndel and Lederhose) festivals and easily recognizable flag. As the Ksenia Kuleshova for The New York Times once commented on Bavaria: ‘’Nationalism comes easier to people in this former kingdom, which has nurtured a distinct culture over the centuries, more akin to neighbouring Austria than to its own nation’’. It is not surprising that Bavaria is called as Catalonia or Scotland in Germany especially given that one third of Bayer support for Bavaria’s independence. As the founding sate of the EU, German government poses itself as a firm EU advocator. Different from the pro-European stance of central government and the other two resembling regions Catalonia and Scotland, Bavaria has instead a relative sceptical and critical understanding towards the European Union. The positive correlation between sub-state identities and European identities plus the finding that regions and the EU seems to be a natural ally cannot suitably applied to the case of Bavaria.
The research conducted by the University of Oslo finds out that the Eurosceptism is increasing and mobilized by the mainstream right, whereby critiques tend to be grounded in ‘’civic-political aspect rather than cultural and/or xenophobic opposition to EU integration. As regards mass-mediated public discourses, given the second order nature of European elections and the restricted development of a European transnational sphere of communication linking citizens and politics. Party contestation over Europe will be located within and generated by national party politics, each party set its own agenda to strategically manipulate the European integration issue to serve its own goals. The existence of the Christian Social Union (CSU)is a unique feature in Germany's political landscape, known as a separate Bavarian conservative party governing Bavaria since 1950s that sometimes complements, sometimes rivals and sometimes runs parallel to its nationwide conservative sister party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Party-level findings in the survey show pro-European stances strongly advanced by centre-left and liberal parties in relation to the centre-right, whereby the Euroscepticism is significantly mobilised by four right parties: the Swiss SVP, British Conservative Party, Italian Libertà, and CSU in Bayern.
In recent decade, CSU’s opposal against the EU’s stance is quite often to be found in discourse, from EU’s sanction against Austria’s far right and Russia these years, Euro price hikes to refugee crisis. Though these tend to be issue-specific, given the power status and public influence of CSU in Bavaria, Eurosceptic sentiment is expected to be mobilised, whereas Europeanness is a broad permissive consensus across Catalan parities. Except for political disputes with the EU, as an economically well-led region beyond the EU wide with the lowest unemployment rate across the EU, Bavaria is not a visibly beneficiary from EU’s regional policy as Catalonia, instead the EU turns out to be a double financial burden for Bavaria given that Bavaria is the largest net contributor to Germany’s budget. Besides, European integration and regionalism does not have the equal meaning for Bavaria as for Catalonia. In the case of Catalan autonomous government, it is a process of gradual empowerment, whereas for CSU as part of the Union aligned with CDU sitting more than a decade in German government, the sentiment of losing national sovereignty from EU supranationalisation might therefore come out stronger.
Conclusion
To sum up, regions have been generally empowered and benefited though Europeanisation and European regionalism, especially for sub-state regions with a strong self-identification. Positive correlation between sub-state national/regional identities and European identities can be observed, whereby sovereigntist majority and minority nationalisms might tend to polarise in a conflictive manner according to Michael Bruter’s research. Two empirical cases are analysed in detail, the first is Catalonia and the latter is Bavaria. The case of Catalonia provides strong evidence to proof and understand the positive relation between sub-state national identities and European identification for its political empowerment and enhanced economic competitiveness gained through Europeanization, Bavaria tends to show some Eurosceptic sentiment possibly due to the status of CSU in Bavaria.
References
- Michael Bruter (2005). Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. Chapter 7
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- Anthony D. Smith (1992). National Identity and the Idea of European Unity. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 68, No.1 (Jan. 1992), pp. 55-76
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