Analyzing Events from the Life of Alexander the Great Using 21st Century Theories of Strategy

The event we have chosen to analyse in the life of Alexander the Great is the Battle of Hydaspes. This battle is the most insightful to Alexander’s subtle, indirect approach to warfare. Throughout our research, we believe 21st century management theories such as Mintzberg and Waters and Porter's 5 forces model are most suitable for analysing this battle. We performed our own SWOT analysis on the most suitable deliberate and emergent strategies to analyse. SWOT analysis helps Organisations identify opportunities and threats, both internally and externally, which helps with the formulation of strategic plans. We felt that the consensus strategy would be inappropriate as Alexander’s troops were often operating under his control. We also felt that the umbrella and process strategies were quite weak in the sense they couldn’t best capture Alexander’s capabilities. Our essay will comprise of analysing this battle and making recommendations where we think he could have improved. To give some context, Alexander was keen on conquering more land after he had conquered Persia. He entered the Punjab region of the Indian south continent where he ordered the nobles of the region to bend a knee to their new king. Most nobles bowed, besides Porus, who had a considerable army and a strong land border, the Hydaspes River. Porus was keen on defending his land and was waiting on the left bank of the Hydaspes River when Alexander arrived to confront him. It is necessry to mention that this was the first battle where Alexander had to adapt his traditional tactical approach. Alexander could not use the Clausewitzian approach, which focuses on the mass mobilisation of forces for reasons which will be explored in this essay.

Alexander faced many obstacles when trying to cross the Hydaspes River. The first, most notable one was the river. Significant weather events such as the monsoon and melting snow raised water levels that made the river impassable. Events were further complicated as Porus had assembled roughly 30,000 foot soldiers, 4,000 cavalry, 300 chariots and 200 elephants at main crossing points. Alexander’s horses were spooked by the elephants and so would not cross the river. Alexander the Great had to engineer a situation so he could deceive Porus. Before speaking about the battle itself, we are going to analyse his pre-battle approach through the lens of Mintzberg and Waters and Porter. The former highlight how strategies can be imposed from outside the organisation, not just the intentions of the organisation itself. Registering this in today's world in the automobile industry, Tesla developed an electric car which revolutionized the car industry. This forced legacy car manufacturers to develop an electric car of their own. For example, Honda introduced the Hybrid in 2014 and are further introducing the Urban EV Concept in response to this. This highlights imposed strategies can be successful, although they may emerge quite slow. In terms of applying this to Alexander, he was keen on conquering more land, while Porus was valiantly defending his territory. The very fact that Porus was waiting across the river forced Alexander to perform a “balancing act”. Mintzberg and Waters further highlight how an external individual with a great deal of control may impose a strategy. In essence, Alexander had to co-operate with external forces since they seldom preempt all choice, nor do they offer unlimited choice. Although Alexander had a planned strategy to conquer more land, his behavior in this battle was quite emerging, as his parts of his plan developed “en-route”. Applying the theory of Porter, barriers to entry were significant facing Alexander and his army. He was facing the barrier of the weather, the army and importantly too, the elephants. Porter outlines in his article in the Harvard Business Review, how if distribution channels are limited, threat of entry is unlikely. However, this is not the case with Alexander the Great. He received food supplies to last him 7 months so he could plan to cross Hydaspes.

In terms of the crossing itself, Alexander split his army in to two. Craterus was the holding force with some back up. Alexander marched forces along the riverbank and employed a look alike with Craterus’ force to deceive Porus into believing they were crossing. Alexander went upstream and chose to cross where there was a cape. Alexander crossed during a thunderstorm one night so his troops would not be heard. Porus faced a dilemma of where to concentrate his efforts. Alexander eventually came head to head with Porus. Elephants were dispatched at Porus’ front line to disrupt the cohesion of Alexander’s troops. Alexander and his army attacked Porus from either side so they were trapped. Meanwhile, Porus ordered his troops to shift “left”, which Alexander had planned for. Once the Macedonian army started to attack the elephants, they retreated, signaling victory for Alexander the Great. The key outcome was that Alexander admired Porus for not giving up and granted him control of 7 tribes and 2,000 cities. Applying the lens of Mintzberg and Waters again, external forces influenced his choices, including the weather. This can also be seen as a barrier to entry, according to Porter. Applying Porter’s barriers to entry to modern day, Tesla again are an excellent example. They had to overcome huge barriers such as high cost of set up and infrastructure. Using his entrepreneurial spirit, Elon Musk entered the car industry, with a “direct feedback loop” that could accelerate development. There is a sense of creativity in this, something we believe Alexander pursued in earnest and shows that barriers are still possible to overcome. The elephants were seen as a huge barrier to Alexander. He managed to turn the imposed strategy in to an entrepreneurial one. By granting Porus leadership, Alexander could use him as an Allie to stabilize the local environment. Mintzberg and Waters paper describes how strategies can be deliberate or emergent. Imposed strategies are always emergent. Alexander crafted a strategy to deceive Porus by employing a look alike, what Mintzberg refers to as a fluid process of learning through which creative strategies evolve. Alexander executed “light deft touch” management precisely, directing to realize intentions and focusing on strategic learning responding to unfolding patterns of action.

A recommendation for this area would be the adoption of a persuasive approach rather than engaging in military conflict. However, we do believe that Alexander was deliberate and emergent at the appropriate times. He let events develop in the environment around him, whilst still focusing on his planned, intended strategy of conquering the land. It is difficult to obtain control in an emerging environment. From extensive reading, we believe that Alexander was always in control of his environment, perhaps another reason why he is referred to as “Alexander the Great”.

As mentioned in the above paragraph, once Alexander the Great had successfully crossed the Hypasdes River, the battle between him and Porus ensued. While Alexander displayed how an imposed strategy can be successful, he also demonstrates successful entrepreneurial strategies and their creative destructive effects throughout the battle. From the outset, Alexander the Great used an entrepreneurial strategy as he separated his cavalry into the two and lead the charge against Porus’ left flank. Upon seeing this, Porus ordered his right flank of cavalry and chariots to the left flank closest to the river. As Alexander witnessed this, he ordered his General Coenus to ride to the right flank to surround the Indian cavalry and chariots. The Indian chariots struggled in the muddy ground along the bank of the Hydaspes River and lost significant numbers. As the battle continued, Porus’ army were subject to substantial losses. As the rest of Alexander’s army crossed the river and came up behind the Indian army the battle was lost. The flanking manoeuvre demonstrated by Alexander at the beginning of the battle is a great example of an entrepreneurial strategy outlined by Mintzberg and Waters. As King of Macadone, Alexander had complete control over his army and the ability to impose his vision on the army, as a CEO would impose their vision on an organisation. Alexander had clear intentions of what he wanted to do and as Mintzberg & Waters state, clear intentions are needed for strategies to be perfectly realized. Another aspect of Alexander’s flanking manoeuvre that lends itself to the academic literature of Mintzberg and Waters is how his entrepreneurial strategy was flexible enough to adapt to opportunities presented to him. Flanking and surrounding the Indian cavalry and chariots on Porus’ left flank allowed him to take advantage of the muddy ground. Entrepreneurial strategies are usually implemented in Organisations when the external environment is co-operative, but this was not the case for Alexander. He was in the middle of a war and yet the strategy prevailed, showing the strength of his strategy. Alexander’s army was approximately 80,000 men. In today’s terms, this is a very large organisation. Such is the characteristics of entrepreneurial strategies that they are usually found in large Organisations in times of crisis which a war certainly is in Alexander’s case. Another 21st century management theory that applies to the first charge of Alexander’s men against Porus’ army is Porter’s 5 forces and one in particular which stands out is buyer power. Alexander the Great had significant buyer power as he paid his army, unlike Porus. Alexander had employed many soldiers and had deep treasuries that could afford such conquests. Alexander’s use of hoplites who were well trained, equipped military professionals in the charge against Porus’ elephants were decisive as they outmatched the Indian infantry in experience and skill. Although suffering some losses, Alexanders hoplites managed to injure the elephants enough to make them turn around, causing vast casualties to their own forces. Without the high buying power possessed by Alexander the Great, it would have been very difficult for his army to defeat the elephants of the Indians as paid soldiers are more likely to be highly motivated, accept more risk and follow their leader more faithfully.

Through our research, we have not found empirical evidence outlining Porus’ financial capabilities. This could have had a devastating effect on Alexander’s conquest if Porus was in a position to bribe his army. With that being said, if Porter’s 5 Forces model was around in them times, Alexander may have been more cautious about the threat of substitutes. In terms of a final recommendation in this space, entrepreneurial strategies can be either top down or bottom up. Applying this to Alexander, although the Battle was successful, he could have adopted a bottom up approach since lots of innovations in companies comes through intrapreneurship. His troops may have found a more efficient way to cross the river and in less time.

In relation to Alexander’s leadership roles, he had a “sheer desire to conquer and extend his dominion as far as the world could be known or tamed”. The Battle of Hydaspes presented a problem to Alexander and his forces. The Battle of Hydaspes had a lot of key issues including the river, elephants, the oncoming weather, but above all Porus and his ability to lead enemy forces. For Alexander, it was evident that his ability to use a planned approach when preparing for battle massively impacted his ability to defeat Porus. With regard to Porter’s 5 forces, there is strong evidence to suggest that Porus represents competition/rivalry at the highest tier. Porus was an obstacle, interfering and delaying the end goal of Alexander the Great and his colony. Alexander’s “clear and articulated intentions” were to capsize Porus’ army and continue conquering India but this obstacle made it difficult for Alexander to achieve. Applying this to Nike, they released a global growth strategy aimed at driving growth through market penetration. This would lead to growing the Nike brand to approximately $23 billion by the end of fiscal year 2015. In relation to Porter, “rivalry drives down an industry’s profit potential” and that is a notable point with similarities to Alexander’s conquest. If Porus was to accept defeat to Alexander, lives would have been saved, but he decided to fight for his territory which caused thousands of deaths. Porus’ leadership was built on charisma and, could be one of the reasons his army fought to the ends for him. Throughout the months of May/June 326, it is evident how Alexanders planned approach, along with dealing with the competition in an almost professional manner, helped him progress his expansion into India. Alexander was clear with what his army needed to avoid and presented a vague timeframe where avoiding these problems was a necessity. First of all, Porus had an ally Abisares and Alexander planned to attack Porus before Abisares could join forces. Similar to Porus, we would consider Abisares a competitor of Alexander due to the fact that he controlled land that Alexander was pursuing. Alexander’s planning to stop this alliance happening before battle, coupled with his ability to plan ahead of the monsoon and melting snows, showed us the remarkable strategic ability of Alexander.

What fascinated us the most after Alexander’s victory at the battle of Hydaspes was his ability to deal with the competitor/rival in a professional and courteous manner, even though the competitor was a component that led to deaths of many of Alexander’s men. Alexander almost used Porus as a pawn in his “divide and rule” approach. Alexander could see Porus’ leadership abilities and instead of executing the natural born leader, he restored Porus to his “sovereignty and even enlarged his realm”. This represents the “formal controls” in Alexander’s planned approach, as he knows that he will not be capable of controlling these lands while conquering new areas, so he creates a dominion who will do the work with loyalty for him. It is evident that through Alexander’s persuasive abilities, he turned Porus from a hostile enemy to a friendly Allie.

The two main recommendations we have concluded with are outlined in the paragraphs above. A possible recommendation for Alexander may be not to neglect one aspect of Porter’s 5 forces since the other 4 forces mainly influence the degree of competition intensity. If Alexander had the knowledge of a 21st century manager, we feel his persuasive ability would still have remained the same after defeating Porus. He saw valiance in Porus and knew that this alliance would be crucial for his continuation of conquering India. Alexander successfully eliminated competition through his planned approach but in the form of a strategic alliance rather than killing Porus (i.e. pushing the competing firm out of the market). Modern day managers would use this approach, but for Alexander, the theories were not formed back then.

In conclusion, Alexander the Great was an outstanding strategist. Throughout our essay we have explored various deliberate and emergent strategies which he pursued during the Battle of Hydaspes. When he fought the valiant Porus, an imposed strategy emerged as he had to implement a strategy immediately to cross the river. We think that Alexander was a noble man, who never rushed to decisions. He had to cooperate with certain forces when trying to cross the Hydaspes. His guile and skill enabled him to make such a crossing feasible. However, there was a more deviant, darker side to Alexander too. He implemented his planned strategy to give Porus the power to rule the land. This enabled Alexander to stabilize local tensions, while also gaining an Allie. The strength of his formulation of strategies is evident in the Battle of Hydaspes. Traditionally, Mintzberg and Waters highlight that entrepreneurial strategies are only implemented when the environment is co-operative. The fact that Alexander could move between deliberate and emergent strategies where required showcases his unique ability. Also, in relation to Porter’s 5 Forces, he was able to overcome certain barriers such as competition and barriers to entry. Our recommendation included looking at the theory holistically and not forgetting other aspects of Michael Porter's strategic tool. Furthermore, Alexander never shied to confrontation. However, when needed he could be a deceiving character. This is reflected throughout our answer as he implements various strategies such as employing a look alike and crossing the river during a thunderstorm. Overall, we believe Alexander warrants his name as Alexander the Great. Although it was quite abstract, we can most definitely see why he is studied and spoken about today.

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