Comparison Of Counter-Terrorism Efforts In Dealing With Isis And Al-Qaeda
Introduction
Terrorism according to Hoffman is the “violence -or the threat of violence-used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim. ” Also, Louise Richardson believes that terrorism is “deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes. ” In this research, we will discuss the counter-terrorism efforts that have been taking to counter two terrorist groups; which are: ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The aim of this research is to compare between these CT efforts and detect the similarities and differences between them. Al-Qaeda started in 1979, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while ISIS started in 2003, after the US invasion of Iraq and in 2011, after the eruption of the civil war in Syria. Obama claimed before that ISIS is a “terrorist organization, pure and simple”, but actually this is mistaken. Despite the fact that ISIS uses terrorism as a tactic, it is not a terrorist organization at all. Terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not hold territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. Isis, on the other hand, boasts some 30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations. Scholars argue that ISIS is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. Hence, the counterterrorism and counter insurgency strategies that greatly diminished the threat from al Qaeda will not work against ISIS. The first part of this research will be discussing the differences in ideology between ISIS and Al-Qaeda because differences in their ideologies imply different counter-terrorism methods to deal with them. Second, we will discuss the global counter-terrorism efforts and US efforts in particular. This part will be divided into two main sub-parts; which are: counter-Al-Qaeda strategies and counter-ISIS strategies. Finally, the last part will state the similarities and differences between the CT strategies of dealing with both Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Differences in ideology between ISIS and Al-Qaeda
There are three main differences between ISIS and AL-Qaeda in their doctrines. The first one is about the concept of Jihad, the second one is about identifying the enemy and finally, their strategies of practicing al-wala' wa al-bara'.
The Concept of Jihad
Both ISIS and Al-Qaeda differ in their views on the concept of “Jihad”. ISIS prioritizes the consolidation of power while Al-Qaeda places more emphasis on hurting the enemy. In 2014, Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani, ISIS’ spokesperson, denounced Al-Qaeda as a deceiving organization and that is because according to him, Al-Qaeda lacks a coherent purpose and it is unwilling as a group to establish an Islamic State. He challenged the legitimacy of Al-Qaeda because it does not possess territory. By this we can understand that according to ISIS, territory is perceived as a very important means of gaining legitimacy. Al-Maqdisi explained that Jihad takes two main forms according to the purpose of the fighting: Qital Al-Nikaya and Qital Al-Tamkin. The first one is about hurting the enemy and his interests, while the second one is about consolidating one’s presence within a territory. Al-Qaeda focused more on Qital Al-Nikaya, while ISIS focused on Qital Al-Tamkin. According to an ISIS combatant in an interview with the New York Times, the main difference is that 'al-Qaeda is an organization and we are a state” and hence, equating both groups as terrorist would be imprecise. ISIS is a more complex organization which ultimately aimed to reconfigure the Levant's borders. It is no coincidence that there have recently been debates interested in determining what would be the best denomination for ISIS: 'a hybrid and insurgent terrorist organization' or a 'quasi-state sponsor of terrorism”.
Identifying the Enemy
The second difference between ISIS and AL-Qaeda is about their identification of the enemy. The differences between the near enemy versus the far enemy. Al-Qaeda focuses on the far enemy, while the distinction according to ISIS is blurred, with more focus on the near enemy. But who is the near enemy and the far enemy? According Fawaz Gerges in 2005, he said that the near enemy is the Muslim apostate governments while the far enemy is the occupying powers such as the US. According to ISIS, the enemy is the one who is directly related to their goal which is the consolidation of power and the creation of an Islamic state. Hence, the focus of its jihad is on defeating any enemy that impedes its objective, be it the near or far enemy. The enemy for ISIS runs along the same lines put forward by Al-Maqdisi. He argued that the apostasy of Muslim rulers is considered worse than the original unbelievers. To support his argument, he used a verse from the Quran says: “O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let them find in your harshness. And know that Allah is with the righteous- 9:123”. That is according to him, means that the nearest enemy is the first to be attacked. While the ideas put forward by Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab Al-Suri stand in direct contrast with the arguments of Al-Maqdisi. Ayman Al-Zawahiri was under the influence of Bin Laden, who strongly urged the Mujahideen worldwide to abandon religious nationalist camps and refocus their attention towards fighting the far enemy instead of the near enemy.
Concepts of Al-Wala’ w Al-Bara
The third difference is related to the groups’ strategies of practicing al-wala' wa al-bara' and winning the hearts and minds of the people. Actually, both groups agree on the necessity of implementing al-wala' wa al-bara' (loyalty and disavowal), but they diverge on how is it to be done. Al Qaeda prefers to remain more prudent and diligent, while ISIS advocates a more violent behavior, capitalizing on the eschatological narratives in order to gain the support of Muslim masses. Finally, to end this part, the following table which is made by the Brazilian Political Science Review is a summary for the differences between ISIS and AL-Qaeda in their objectives, methods of action strategy and finacing.
The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategies and US Strategies in Particular
According to the UN office of Counter-Terrorism, there are four main pillars of the UN global counter-terrorism strategy. The first pillar is addressing the conditions conductive to the spread of terrorism. The second pillar preventing and combatting terrorism. The third pillar is building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the UN. The fourth pillar is ensuring human rights and the rule of law. The fight against terrorism has always dominated the national security agenda in the US since Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in 9/11. The presidential administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama implemented a series of legislative, organizational, policy, and personnel reforms. The new administration under Donald Trump is continuing these efforts and has put particular emphasis on restricting the entry of and tightening the vetting process for refugees and immigrants.
Counter-Al-Qaeda Strategies
After the attacks of September 11 2011, the US removed the Taliban government in Afghanistan to eliminate Al-Qaeda’s sanctuary and training camps. By doing so, they broke an important link in the process that provided Al-Qaeda with a continuing flow of recruits. Al-Qaeda at this time constituted the most serious immediate threat to the security of the US and that is because it was presumed that the organization will continue its efforts to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD); that it will attack U. S. targets abroad where possible; and that it will attempt to mount attacks within the United States. It was presumed that al Qaeda will exploit all of its ability to cause catastrophic death and destruction — there will be no self-imposed limits to its violence. At that time, US’ goal was not to revenge for the September 11 attacks; also it is not the goal to bring individual terrorists to justice. But the goal is the destruction of a terrorist enterprise that threatens American security and, by extension, the security of the world. The September 11 attacks destroyed US’ sense of invulnerability and illustrated the limits of its intelligence infrastructure. It demonstrated that foreign terrorists were capable of mounting major attacks on U. S. soil without being detected. U. S. operations in al Anbar province provide a useful illustration of when military forces can be appropriate against terrorist groups. While politics and policing may be more effective in most cases, military force can be critical when facing a terrorist group involved in an insurgency. Such groups are often well equipped, well organized, and well-motivated, and police acting alone would be quickly overpowered. U. S. efforts from 2006 to 2008 illustrated how military forces might be used to counter terrorist groups involved in an insurgency.
The US Counter-Terrorism efforts at that time were guided by four core principles: Adhering the US core values: The United States was founded upon a belief in a core set of values that is written in their founding documents and woven into their society. Where terrorists offer injustice, disorder, and destruction the United States must stand for freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and opportunity. The power and appeal of their values enables the United States to build a broad coalition to act collectively against the common threat posed by terrorists, further delegitimizing, isolating, and weakening our adversaries. The adhering of the US core values will include the Respect for Human Rights, Encouraging Responsive Governance, Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights, Balancing Security and Transparency and finally, Upholding the Rule of Law. Building security partnerships: The United States alone cannot eliminate every terrorist or terrorist organization that threatens their safety, security, or interests. Therefore, they realized that they must join with key partners and allies to share the burdens of common security. This will include Accepting Varying Degrees of Partnership and Leveraging Multilateral Institutions, Applying CT Tools and Capabilities Appropriately: As the threat from Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents continues to evolve, the United States must continually evaluate the tools and capabilities that it uses to ensure that their efforts are appropriate and consistent with US’ laws, values, and long-term strategic objectives. This will include Pursuing a “Whole-of-Government” Effort; which means integrating the capabilities and authorities of each department and agency, ensuring that the right tools are applied at the right time to the right situation in a manner that is consistent with US’ laws. Also, this will include Balancing Near- and Long-Term CT Considerations.
Building a Culture of Resilience: To pursue their CT objectives, they must also create a culture of resilience that will allow the United States to prevent or respond to and recover successfully from any potential act of terror directed at their nation. This will include Building Essential Components of Resilience. Al-Qaeda believes that it can cause the United States to change course in its foreign and national security policies by inflicting economic and psychological damage through terrorist attacks. Denying success to al-Qaeda therefore means, in part, demonstrating that the United States has and will continue to construct effective defenses to protect their vital assets, whether they are critical infrastructure, iconic national landmarks, or the US’ population. Presenting the United States as a “hardened” target is unlikely to cause al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents to abandon terrorism, but it can deter them from attacking particular targets or persuade them that their efforts are unlikely to succeed. The United States also contributes to its collective resilience by demonstrating to al-Qaeda that US has the individual, community, and economic strength to absorb, rebuild, and recover from any catastrophic event, whether manmade or naturally occurring.
Counter-ISIS Strategies
US’ National Security Strategy of 2017 stated its priority actions in the following strategies: Disrupt terror plots: US declared that it will enhance intelligence sharing domestically and with foreign partners. They stated that they will give their frontline defenders (including homeland security, law enforcement and intelligence professionals) the tools, authorities and resources to stop terrorist acts before they take place. Take direct action: The U. S. military and other operating agencies will take direct action against terrorist networks and pursue terrorists who threaten the homeland and US’ citizens regardless of where they are. The campaigns against ISIS and Al-Qaeda and their affiliates demonstrate that the United States will enable partners and sustain direct action campaigns to destroy terrorists and their sources of support, making it harder for them to plot against us.
Eliminate terrorist safe havens: Time and territory allow jihadist terrorists to plot, so the US will act against sanctuaries and prevent their reemergence, before they can threaten the U. S. homeland. US will go after their digital networks and work with private industry to confront the challenge of terrorists and criminals “going dark” and using secure platforms to evade detection. Sever sources of strength: the US will disrupt the financial, materiel, and personnel supply chains of terrorist organizations. They will sever their financing and protect the U. S. and international financial systems from abuse. US will degrade their ability to message and attract potential recruits. This includes combating the evil ideology of jihadists by exposing its falsehoods, promoting counter-narratives, and amplifying credible voices. Share responsibility: the US’ allies and partners, who are also targets of terrorism, will continue to share responsibility in fighting these barbaric groups. They will help their partners develop and responsibility employs the capacity to degrade and maintain persistent pressure against terrorists and will encourage partners to work independently of U. S. assistance.
Combat radicalization and recruitment in communities: The United States rejects bigotry and oppression and seeks a future built on their own values as one American people. US will deny violent ideologies the space to take root by improving trust among law enforcement, the private sector, and American citizens. U. S. intelligence and homeland security experts will work with law enforcement and civic leaders on terrorism prevention and provide accurate and actionable information about radicalization in their communities.
The Similarities and Differences in the Counter-Terrorism Efforts
The similarities: in the two cases, the US and all other international actors such as the European Union and NATO believe that they need to cooperate together to eliminate the threats of these terrorist groups because no one country can handle these threats alone even if it is the US. In both cases, the US is depending on the military aspect because it knows very well that it can’t stand back in the background doing nothing and also because it is afraid that these terrorist groups may develop WMD.
The differences: In dealing with Al-Qaeda, the US directly intervened in Afghanistan to remove its government, while in dealing with ISIS, the US didn’t directly intervene. in dealing with Al-Qaeda, the US used its soft power like insisting on its core values like freedom, respect for human rights, Encouraging Responsive Governance, Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights, Balancing Security and Transparency and finally, upholding the Rule of Law. While in dealing with ISIS, we see more the dependence on sanctions to defeat ISIS financially and that is because ISIS was financing itself but Al-Qaeda was depending on other sources. In dealing with ISIS and due to the change of the world nowadays, US focused on the Digital networks of ISIS to prevent it from reemergence or from increasing the number of recruits. ISIS, unlike Al-Qaeda, is using the social media to declare their responsibility of the terrorist attacks and to spread their ideas hence, the current CT efforts saw that it is must to focus on the digital part. In dealing with ISIS, the US focused more in the refugees and immigrants who are entering the US homeland while In dealing with Al-Qaeda, they were not focusing on this issue that much.
Conclusion
Finally, ISIS is not Al-Qaeda. It is more like a pseudo-state and hence, it needs different counter-terrorism methods in dealing with it. Isis and Al-Qaeda differ in three main ideologies which are; the concept of Jihad, identifying the enemy and finally, their strategies of practicing al-wala' wa al-bara'. The differences in Ideologies imply differences in counter-terrorism efforts. The differences in dealing with them both are concluded in direct intervention in dealing with Al-Qaeda, unlike ISIS, using the US soft power in dealing with Al-Qaeda while in dealing with ISIS, it depends more on the financial aspect. Focusing on ICTs and digital aspect in dealing with ISIS, it wasn’t the situation while dealing with Al-Qaeda and finally, in dealing with the issue of the refugees and immigrants. Despite all these differences, but still there are similarities in dealing with them both. Depending on the military aspect and also the different international actors are depending on each other not working alone. At the end, terrorism is lesion of the contemporary global politics and hence, it always need our focus and developing always new ways to deal with them.
