Democracy By Default: In Defense Of Westlund’s Critique Of Epistocracy

In a 1947 speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Winston Churchill shared his view of democracy: “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms. ” Such a declaration suggests that democracy, while deeply flawed, prevails as an unideal necessity for governance. The “other forms” of government Churchill referenced might include epistocracy – a system in which the wise possess total political power. Scholocracy is a relatively democratic modification of epistocracy in which everyone gets at least one vote, but those who are more educated get multiple votes. Here I will consider, in the spirit of Winston Churchill, why these versions of epistocracy are inferior by corroborating David Estlund’s Why Not Epistocracy? argument.

First, I will summarize Estlund’s three-part analysis of epistocracy: the political value of education, scholocracy thesis, and demographic objection. I will then provide supporting evidence for Estlund’s demographic objection by highlighting unequal access to and stratification within educational institutions. Estlund’s argument. In his thesis, David Estlund posits that while it is generally acceptable that a well-educated population (as a whole) would govern more wisely, it is not true that a small group of educated people should necessarily get more votes than everyone else because of the “demographic objection. ” I will return to this shortly. Estlund’s Political Value of Education (PVE), Part I, argument rests on two premises: first, education lends itself to greater literacy and civic, historical, and economic familiarity; second, possessing such knowledge would lead that person to rule more wisely.

The resulting conclusion is that a well-educated population will rule more wisely. The PVE argument holds up; Estlund suggests that most reasonable citizens would agree, and I will not challenge the PVE in this paper. Part II of Estlund’s analysis, the scholocracy thesis, is a follow-up to the PVE argument: if there are educational disparities in a population, the better-educated should have more voting power (via additional votes) than the rest of the population. Estlund rejects this conclusion on the grounds of Part III, the demographic objection. The demographic objection is the cornerstone of Estlund’s argument: the better-educated subset of society might also have some other negative characteristic that offsets its positive potential for greater political power. Because the educated subset, in all likelihood, is not statistically representative, this negative characteristic is likely some form of bias (such as racism or sexism). Estlund argues that giving the educated more votes only intensifies the effect of those biases. Furthermore, even an attempt to statistically correct for demographics within the educated subset would fail; there will always be some feature of that group rendering it biased, including, for example, sexual frustration – a feature difficult to control for.

This “epistemically distorting feature […] that travels with education” even in the corrected group is precisely why an epistocracy will not work. Ultimately, Estlund implies that epistocracy is inferior to democracy, though he clarifies that his argument is not in favor of democracy but simply in opposition to epistocracy. In some way, his argument is not unlike Churchill’s: democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others, including epistocracy. In Estlund’s defense. Estlund argues that the Demographic Objection disqualifies a small educated subset from ruling more wisely, so epistocracy won’t work. I find that while Estlund provides a strong theoretical foundation for the Demographic Objection, he fails to substantiate the educational flaws which produce such disqualifying characteristics. I find that unequal access to and stratification within education produces the epistemically-damaging characteristics that Estlund cited within the educated population.

Ultimately, I claim that education itself is inherently unequal, and thus the educated demographic will always lack particular perspectives essential to effective governance. Access to education, at least in the United States and in states with public education systems, varies widely by neighborhood. If one lives in a relatively poorer neighborhood, he or she will have access to a school with less funding. That student, therefore, will likely go to a school with underpaid teachers and reduced access to academic resources like tutoring, enrichment programs, and technology. The effects of economic segregation between neighborhoods produces an educated subset most likely drawn only from more affluent neighborhoods and districts. The result is likely an educated subset with lack of perspective on issues of neighborhood poverty and school funding mechanisms – issues that cannot be ignored by voters, particularly those with disproportionate voting power. Individuals with disabilities, including physical and cognitive impairments, may also lack access to education. Often, ill-funded schools are underequipped to provide the necessary support for individuals with disabilities. These students are often left behind and are almost invariably less likely to succeed by no fault of their own.

This is not to say differently-abled individuals are necessarily uneducated; my point instead is that there is a much higher likelihood that a school cannot provide the essential accommodations to them, particularly if we consider the previous problem of funding. As a result, differently-abled individuals are far less likely to be represented in the educated subset. Governmental policy on disabilities, including legal workforce accommodations and rights to school support services, will likely be low-priority and perhaps even completely ignored by an educated subset that carries weighted vote influence. Stratification within education functions in a similar way. When students arrive at school, they are typically “tracked,” a term for the differential placement into certain classes and career trajectories. Certain “tracks” may receive disproportionate attention and resources, particularly if they are more likely in the eyes of school administrators to succeed – whatever that may mean. These tracks include groups such as “gifted and talented” students, STEM students, or students with high parental involvement.

Any person not in one of these “preferred” groups suffers at the expense of well-supported students. The resulting educated subset lacks the perspective of these non-preferred individuals, such as those with strengths in liberal arts (like philosophy) or those whose family and residential situations are complex and/or traumatic. Epistocrats, therefore, cannot be expected to fully represent different academic abilities, interests, and family types; voters with such homogenized points of view are inherently uninformed and unrepresentative. An epistocracy cannot function effectively because of the inherently damaging features that accompany the wise demographic – a concept David Estlund articulated in his piece, Why not epistocracy? I argue, in affirmation of Estlund’s Demographic Objection, these inherently damaging features are a result of unequal access to and stratification within education. The result is an educated populace which lacks key perspectives related to inclusivity, welfare, and justice, no matter how much we try to correct for these statistical shortcomings. Because education is inherently unequal, we can never expect the educated subset to fully represent historically marginalized perspectives when casting their votes. Epistocracy, as a result, cannot be a representative form of governance, and we are left with democracy by default: the worst form of government, except for all the others.