Empathy In A Moral System
Frequently morality and empathy are used interchangeably in both formal and informal conversation. This suggests that the two are so closely related that it is a common mistake to confuse the two. Additionally, it is accepted that empathy plays a foundational role in morality. The fundamental belief that empathy is the leading cause of moral behavior is made apparent in political campaigns, the media, medical practices, ethics, law, and many other fields. Empathy does play a vital role in social interaction and in humans’ ability to understand others’ feelings and psychological states. Empathy encourages prosocial behavior such as sharing and caring for others. However, it is apparent that empathy can hinder moral action as well. Likewise, commonly considered good attributes such as perseverance, intelligence, and wit can be used to bad ends.
Immanuel Kant, in his work entitled Grounding Metaphysics of Morals, supports the idea that some attributes are only good if they are connected with good will. He argues, “But they can also become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts of nature and which its special constitution is called character, is not good. ” Empathy, like the aforementioned attributes is a compelling force that is capable of doing much good and harm. Empathy certainly can play a positive and beneficial role for society as a whole, but reason, rather than emotion, should guide action. Reason aspires toward impartiality and equality in a way that empathy cannot. Empathy is not necessary in a moral system. Regardless of race, color, or religion, the simple fact that humans are able to feel empathy fuels the emotional fire necessary to defend the victim wherever or whoever the victim may be. By understanding and sharing feelings, humans become emotionally intelligent and experience others’ feelings as if they were their own. The lack of empathy has often led to psychopathic behavior as individuals demonstrate a callous disregard for the wellbeing of others. mpathy can interfere with equality and morality by introducing prejudice feelings toward in-group members.
Empathy can be felt so deeply and personally that it can lead to preconceived opinions that are not based on reason or actual experience. Several behavioral studies have been done to demonstrate the unfortunate effects of empathy on morality. For example, in behavioral studies where participants are assigned to judge pain intensity on in-group and out-group people, the participants tend to rate the stimuli as more painful when the pain is inflicted on an in-group member. On the other hand, when pain of equal intensity is inflicted on an out-group member, the participants classify the pain as less intense. Though the participants are not deliberately choosing to classify the in-group members’ pain level as more intense, the innate empathic feelings they felt toward the in-group members guide their decisions. The participants followed their innate empathetic feelings in place of reasoning through their decisions. Kant (1797) states, “There lies at the root of such judgments, rather, the idea that existence has another and much more worthy purpose, for which, and not for happiness, reason is quite properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private purpose of men must, for the most part, defer. ” Had the participants adopted Immanuel Kant’s ideology of morality, the participants would have had knowingly disregarded emotional reactions and had a more rational approach to the experiment.
Empathy can interfere with equality and morality by introducing prejudice feelings toward in-group members. Empathy can be felt so deeply and personally that it can lead to preconceived opinions that are not based on reason or actual experience. Several behavioral studies have been done to demonstrate the unfortunate effects of empathy on morality. For example, in behavioral studies where participants are assigned to judge pain intensity on in-group and out-group people, the participants tend to rate the pain as more intense when the pain is inflicted on an in-group member. On the other hand, when pain of equal intensity is inflicted on an out-group member, the participants classify the pain as less intense. Though the participants are not deliberately choosing to classify the in-group members’ pain level as more intense, the innate empathic feelings they felt toward the in-group members guide their decisions.
The participants did not reason through their decisions, but rather followed their innate empathetic feelings. Kant (1797) states, “There lies at the root of such judgments, rather, the idea that existence has another and much more worthy purpose, for which, and not for happiness, reason is quite properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private purpose of men must, for the most part, defer. ” Had the participants adopted Immanuel Kant’s ideology of morality, the participants would have knowingly disregarded emotional reactions and had a more rational approach to the experiment. Reason, rather than emotion, should be relied on to make moral decisions. Because empathy is influenced by biases, a person is more likely to empathize with those who are from similar racial, political, and social circles. Like a spotlight or blinders, empathy can focus one’s attention and feelings of compassion to a single individual or group in the here and now. For example, political leaders have historically lead countries into wars as they intentionally stir feelings of patriotism and empathy. In competitive events, people tend to feel satisfaction and even enjoyment at the sight of the opponent’s suffering.
Rather than feeling distress or offering help due to the suffering at hand, people encourage, applaud, and even pay to see violence inflicted on their enemy repeated. Extreme empathy toward in-groups can result in intolerance, oppression, greed, and a gross disregard for the virtue and value of others. The extreme empathy with regard to political parties today is a topic that is all too relevant as hate spreads across the nation. Abandoning the use of the all-encompassing term “empathy” when in reality more precise concepts are being referred to might help to understand the complex relationship between empathy and morality. Practices such as concern, perspective-taking, showing compassion, and emotional sharing can be closely related to, but not meet the definition of empathy itself. Each of these emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy has a different connection with morality.
Empathy should not be used as an umbrella term when in reality, other practices are being referenced. In humans as well as in non-human animals, empathic concern and prosocial behavior is influenced by the degree of affiliation. Empathic actions are extended more freely and often toward in-group members and less often toward individuals with whom one is unaffiliated. Though humans are capable of and frequently offer aid to strangers, this behavior is viewed as complex and dependent on high cognitive capacities. Rationality alone would not be sufficient to create and sustain a moral system. A source of motivation for good action such as compassion allows for people to care for others, but without feeling their pain. Compassion is sympathetic pity and concern for the suffering of others and allows people to make rational decisions because of the lack of emotional ties that might sway their actions otherwise. There is no significant evidence to cause one to believe that empathy and morality are contradictory or opposed to one another, or to believe that they are strongly complementary. Empathy is not necessary for a moral system as it impairs humanity’s ability to distinguish between what is right and wrong. Empathy can sway one’s beliefs and conscience and can pervert one’s reality and perception of what is right and wrong.
A moral system can thrive independently of empathy as it is founded on other systematic, coherent, and reasonable rules, ideas, and values. Though it is argued that moral progress as a society involves broadening our concern from the family to society as a whole, it is arguably contrary to human nature to feel the same concern toward a stranger as it is a family member or close friend. Nonetheless, with the advancements of technology in favor of prosocial ideas, it could become easier for empathy to be more readily felt and expressed. As strangers have easier access to publicize their lives digitally to people all around the world, humanity can become more closely knit and empathy can be more easily aroused.
