Factors Affecting The Variation Of Nuclear Proliferation Or Nonproliferation
Security guarantees
The likelihood of nuclear proliferation is to a great extend determined by the interactions between a state, its allies and its adversaries. This interaction is built upon security guarantees or likewise a state’s credibility. Security guarantees are intended to accomplish two goals: deter adversary states from advancing WMDs by negating all offensive gains achieved when acquiring WMDs and convincing allies therefore reducing their proliferation intentions. The level of an ally’s commitment to protection is crucial to nonproliferation. If a powerful state has the ability (and desire) to mitigate threats on its allies, the ally is unlikely to peruse nuclear capabilities. “This effect would make states that possess a powerful ally less likely to go nuclear. ” Of seven Warsaw Pact members only one, Romania, tackled nuclear proliferation pertaining to the state of the world by the 1970s. Though, both Soviet allies in East Asia, China and North Korea, perused nuclear proliferation.
The Soviet Union’s ability and willingness to protect an ally can explain this pattern. “Soviet credibility was greatest in the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), weaker with respect to Romania, and weakest in East Asia. ” This variation corresponds with the Kremlin’s allocations of resources and attention. Large military investments in the Warsaw Pact’s Northern Tier and East Asia showed Soviet willingness to defend them. Leaving Romania with less in turn pushing them towards nuclear proliferation.
International institutions
Appeals for the prohibition of WMDs have existed since nuclear weapons were invented. However, is the creation of an international norm to abolish the development and possession of WMDs foreseeable? Some scholars are saying yes, as over the last decade some indications have emerged. For example, on July 7, 2017, the United Nations adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Norms are based upon a shared understanding and raise collective expectations among state actors involved. The main actors involved in norm creation are often nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or intergovernmental organization (IOs) as they have influence over states. Using the TPNW as a case study to exemplify just how significant the treaty is towards a nuclear weapons free world. The nuclear ban should be seen in the much broader context of “global resistance to injustice and oppression. ” WMDs are components in larger systems of militarism, capitalism and patriarchy. “The nuclear ban has offered to the world: an act of resistance and hope; an example of creating change in the face of powerful opposition. ” This meaningful change is coming from the bottom, by means of NGOs and IOs. In another case study, the European Union’s (EU) efforts to prevent Iran from developing WMDs, the opposite conclusion is found. For years the EU worked as the lead in trying to convince the Iranian government to halt their nuclear program. It was not successful. “While the EU could in theory still convince Iran to give up the bulk of its nuclear program, the odds are that Iran will not concede. ” Although it should not be dismissed as a complete failure. The EU took the lead and it is unlikely that any other regional organization could have.
Humanitarian initiatives
Increasing attention to the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of WMDs has graced the international community. Shifting the discussion away from state security to a humanitarian perspective frames the purpose of WMDs negatively. Ultimately, questioning the acceptability of WMDs. Establishing a stigmatization of WMDs is the goal, and the approach draws similarities from previous “humanitarian disarmament initiatives to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. ” A humanitarian approach is used to increase nonproliferation. By changing how WMDs are viewed, “this approach aims to introduce doubt for policy-makers and military commanders about their established views of a weapon’s usefulness and legitimacy. ” When accepted policies are doubted room for change appears. However, change has been met with dismissal from some of the large nuclear powers such as China, Russia and the United States. These states refused to attend international conferences exploring the subject, one in March 2013 in Norway and secondly February 2014 in Nayarit.
Supporters of the humanitarian initiative stress its international scope which in the end will make it more successful. “Most of the NGOs, think-tanks and university programs that make up the ‘non-proliferation complex’ are centered in and on the US and are politically and financially dependent on nuclear-dependent states or US foundations. The founders of the humanitarian initiative sought out a need. Reframe political actions by delegitimizing WMDs.
