International Operations To Combat Somali Piracy
Around 2008 the international community began a more aggressive approach to combat piracy, which grew ever more expansive and proactive in the years following. According to The World Bank, in 2008 the UN Security Council passed 13 Resolutions to support anti-piracy operations aimed at the Horn of Africa. One of the most significant resolutions was the 2008 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 (from here on UNRES 1851).
UNRES 1851 was a significant resolution aiming to counter piracy in and around Somalia. The resolution itself expanded upon previous resolutions concerning piracy in Somalia (Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1844, and 1846) as well as responding to TFG requests for international support in combating piracy. UNRES 1851, according to Alessi and Hanson, “authorized states with navies deployed in the Gulf of Aden to, with the permission of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, take action against pirates and armed robbers within Somalia”. The language of the UNRES 1851 is very specific in that a State must receive explicit permission from the Somali government (TFG) in order to operate and which is granted for a period of 12 months. UNRES 1851 also authorizes international actors, with the permission and capacity to do so and providing operations remain in accordance with international law, employ naval forces and military aircraft in order to combat piracy off the Somali coast. Additionally, UNRES 1851 created the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in January 2009 with mandate to “address military and operational coordination, capacity building, judicial issues, shipping self-awareness and public information related to piracy” in addition to “facilitate coordination of the 60 countries and 20 international organizations working to prevent piracy.
Another international, although African led, initiative was the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct which was tasked with the implementation of initiatives demanded by UNRES 1851 and The World Bank. Further international programs have included, “the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Center, and the Indian Ocean Commission Anti-Piracy partnership program”.
International naval operations have also been affected by UNRES 1851. Following this resolution, North American Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), United States of America (U.S.), missions have been deployed to the Gulf of Aden. The EU mission to Somalia is conducted under the European Union Naval Force Somalia via Operation Atalanta, NATO via Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151). According to the NATO website, in 2008 NATO reacted to UN overtures for assistance in combating pirates with Operation Allied Provider (2008), Allied Protector (2009), Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016) and NATO support for the U.S.-led CTF151 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016). Other individual State initiatives have included states such as India, China, Russia, Australia, and as we will see later, Japan.
The World Bank reports that over 40 States are involved in some capacity through operations listed above in order to counter piracy. In 2011, Nelson and Fitch report approximately 30 States as having maritime missions conducted in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Nevertheless, I surmise that 2011, witnessing the peak of pirate attacks, was especially difficult for maritime forces. Nelson and Fitch assert that, because the pirates operated much further than traditionally was the case, “the high-risk area includes more than 1.1 million square nautical miles of ocean. Given that this vast area is patrolled by approximately 25 naval vessels, each vessel is faced with the daunting task of patrolling, on average, 44,000 square nautical miles”. From this we can envision the daunting task faced by international navies.
One may ask, since pirate operations, “begin and end on land”, what has Somalia, or the international community done in terms of ground-based operations? Indeed, one reason for the success of the Roman General Pompey in his operations against the Mediterranean pirates was his utilization of both maritime and terrestrial (Army) forces. Nelson and Fitch propose that the Western nations have been reluctant to involve ground forces due to their experiences in Somalia in 1993. Moreover, they state that Somali citizens themselves are rather averse to foreign military boots on the ground.
The European Union’s Operation Atalanta was tasked with onshore operations however limited these missions to helicopter operations and have avoided deploying ground forces. Furthermore, Nelson and Fitch averred that although African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) could technically combat pirates, AMISOM has primarily focused on Al-Shabab. Internally, both Puntland and Somaliland created domestic forces tasked with combating the pirates; however, despite some success and desire to rid themselves of the pirates, they lack the resources to do so. Undeniably, in order to fight the pirates there must be resources, something which Somalia clearly lacks. However, in the case of Somalia there is a catch to sending kinetic weapons or providing training in order to combat piracy – “the United Nations Arms Embargo on Somalia, Resolution 733 (1992) and 1844 (2008), prohibits not only the delivery of weapons to Somalia, but the provision of technical assistance or training of a military nature without UN approval”.
International action has, as we have seen, included a number of individual States and collective organizations. Interestingly, all of the literature reviewed in the above two sections did not mention Japanese actions once or Japanese participation in international efforts. This is surprising as Japan has taken upon a greater role in many counter-piracy operations. Because Japanese trade volume is so maritime dependent, the activities of Somali pirates in these waters required Japan’s intervention to ensure the vitality and safety of these shipping lanes and preserve the Japanese economy.
Writing for Eurasiareview, Farhaoui summarizes Japanese concerns in these Persian Gulf developments as dating back to the 1980s. During this decade, some Japanese merchant vessels were attacked and casualties were reported. In response, the Government of Japan declined physical intervention but did provide financial support for the establishment of a “reconnaissance system” deployed in the Gulf region. By 1992, and with the passing of major domestic laws such as the Peace Keeping Operations Law (PKO Law), Japan was able to widen its region-specific lens (Asia-Pacific) to include the Indian Ocean and Arab region as a whole within its strategic scope. Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States Japan deployed a contingent of Self-Defense Force personnel to the Gulf region in 2003 under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) which was followed by a 2005 monitoring mission of Japanese sea lanes in the Indian Ocean.
Exactly what is Japan’s stake in the security of the Gulf of Aden? According to The Cabinet Secretariat of The Government of Japan’s March 2016 annual report (2015): “Japan depends, 99.6% of its trade volume, on maritime transportation, therefore, the navigational safety is the key for the daily life of its people as well as for its economy. The Gulf of Aden is one of the vital shipping lanes for Japan, since 13% of the world container cargos and 740,000 exported vehicles…from Japan were transported through the Gulf of Aden in 2015.”
In response to a 2008 Japan Seamen Unions demand for security, Japanese counter-piracy operations began in March 2009 under Article 82 of the SDF Act in order to protect Japanese interests in the waters around Somalia. The Government of Japan shortly thereafter deployed two JMSDF destroyers and two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. Franz-Stefan Gady writing for The Diplomat, states that “According to Japanese Defense Minister, General Nakatani, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) conducted 728 counter-piracy operations and escorted more than 3,800 commercial ships since 2009. In addition, JMSDF aircraft flew more than 1,568 maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions”. Furthermore, Gady notes that Japan has been operating with CTF151 since 2009 and for three months beginning in June 2015 CTF151 was commanded by JMSDF Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito.
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes other significant actions taken for the purpose of counter-piracy: “enacting ‘Act of Punishment and Countermeasures against Piracy’, which criminalizes acts of piracy and enables Japan’s naval vessels to protect any ship from pirates regardless of her flag”; supporting of the CGPCS and Resolution 1851; assisting the Djibouti Coast Guard; amongst other actions such as financing, significant aid, and humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, The Cabinet Secretariat The Government of Japan Annual Report 2015 states that in order to provide for security on board Japanese flagged ships traversing the “pirate infested waters”, the “Act on Special Measures Concerning the Guarding of Japanese Ships in Pirate-Infested Waters” (enacted November 13, 2013) allows Japanese flagged ships to host Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) .
This Annual Report also notes other operations such as “Joint Counter-Piracy Exercise with EU NAVFOR”, “Joint Counter-Piracy Exercise with Naval Forces from CTF151”, Joint Counter-Piracy Exercise with the Pakistan Navy” as well as join exercises with Turkey and the Republic of Korea as other counter-piracy operations. Japan also maintains a base in Djibouti, operational since June 1, 2011, which hosts two JMSDF P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and around 200 personnel with counter-piracy as its operational purpose. As of 2017, according to Gady, the Japanese stated that they will continue their anti-piracy operations into 2017. Therefore, one can easily see that Japan has taken many large steps, and continues to due so, in order to support international activities in countering pirate operations in and around the Gulf of Aden. The continuing operations by the JSDF highlight the importance of the security of its maritime traffic and trade to the Japanese economy and citizens.
