Political Vs Human Emancipation

Issues of humanity and human nature are of concern for many philosophers and theorists who altogether attempt to provide solutions to abstract issues. In the examination of political, economic, and civil-social constructs, getting to the root of the issue proves to be difficult as it often suggests radical notions, which society is wary to hear, much less adopt as valuable insight. Both Marx and Nietzsche find that humankind is bound by something preventing the reclamation of the true will of the human spirit, and in this belief, both find that only radical measurements can result in the genuine resolution.

For Marx, the institutions and structures of our material conditions create alienation, oppression, and exploitation which are the chains binding humankind; therefore, an entire restructuring of the existing systems is necessary to achieve any sort of liberation; any reform that works within the confines of the already existing system can never truly solve the issue at hand. For this reason, political emancipation is incomplete in the resolution of these issues, whereas only true human emancipation that can liberate us. Nietzsche also identifies the issues of humanity to lie in a larger phenomena that would require radical change to fix- however, he focuses on a different type of issue, and that is the phenomena of morality and the dualistic value sets that result. Before we can understand either political emancipation or human emancipation, it is imperative to identify the issues from which emancipation is necessary in the first place. That is, freedom of what, from what.

According to Marx, human nature extends from our material surroundings and conditions; the organization of civil society, political society, and economy is therefore the framework from which an individual’s and society’s ideas and morality are born (Marx, Writings on Historical Materialism, p. 107-108). This idea of material conditions determining human nature and ideas is a key theme throughout all of Marx’s work; however, it is the concept of liberation of humankind from the bindings it is held to as a result of a these structures of political, civil, and economic society that is of key importance.

These structures created by society are imperfect; as a result, the formation of society has had to assume certain conditions that, throughout history, has been reflective of a ranked class structure, resulting in the oppression of certain classes by more privileged classes (Marx, The Communist Manifesto, pp. 159). The structure of society, especially in modern history, has therefore resulted in various avenues of human alienation; these conditions have resulted in the degradation of humans; Marx claims that, for emancipation of humankind, we must overthrow these conditions (Marx, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 34). Society has attempted to relieve these deficiencies of our material conditions by creating certain institutions and practices. For Marx, one of these institutions created by humans is religion; he takes issue with religion, because religion, he asserts, is an illusory happiness, a reflection of the “inverted consciousness” of the world-- creating passivity towards the conditions of the status quo (p. 28).

Therefore, in pursuit of emancipation, it is partially religion, but more so these larger conditions, structures, and institutions that humankind need be freed from. In other words, religion is just a symptom of the larger societal issues, such as alienation, that are occuring.

Now that the issues from which human alienation, exploitation, and oppression have been identified, it is possible to transition to political emancipation versus human emancipation. To begin with, it is helpful to examine the old political structure, such as that of feudal times; in such a framework, there was no distinction between civil status (including religion, class, and so forth) from political status-- the two were inherently one (Marx, On the Jewish Question, p. 19). In the modern liberal state, however, such distinctions do exist, and in the progression of the state, is the norm. In Marx’s time, where Jews seek to be treated on an equal level with that of Christians, Bauer’s response is political emancipation- that is, to abolish the religious privileges within a secularized state (p. 4). On the surface, the argument seems coherent; if the state is to hold no official religion, to deny these distinctions, should it not be possible to have every citizen treated with equality? Marx thinks not. To begin with, Bauer identifies the issue of equality to be determinable within the framework of the liberal state. Marx, however, finds the modern liberal state itself to be the issue at hand. In fact, for Marx, the modern liberal state, as part of our material conditions and structures, is itself the framework which has caused the alienation, inequality, and exploitation of certain classes and groups.

Therefore, any political emancipation cannot be complete human emancipation. Political emancipation is only partial emancipation because in its wake, the ‘pillars’ of the structure from which the conditions of human exploitation have stemmed would still be left standing (Marx, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 36). So, what then is the discrepancy between political emancipation and human emancipation? To look at an example of the politically emancipated state, Marx suggests North America; here, Marx pinpoints the weakness of Bauer’s argument. While North America claims to be a state of no religion, in practice, the circumstances of civil society prove this point to be untrue. In Bauer’s analysis, a politically emancipated state may be one where every individual denounces his religion. However, Bauer’s political emancipation cannot be human emancipation because the privilege of faith itself is a universal human right (Marx, On the Jewish Question, p 15). Regardless of the politicized nature of religion (or lack thereof), humankind is sure to continue in these practices, as illustrated in the case of North America. While it may not be institutionalized in the government, religion in North America, as Marx says, is still “fresh and vital” (p. 6).

The practice of religion, even if the state is to adhere to no single religion, is a force that will continue so long as civil society remains in the throes of alienation, exploitation, and oppression. According to Marx, the strong presence of religion in North America testifies to the fact that religion implies a “defect” of which “the source. . . must be sought in the nature of the state itself” (p. 6). This ties back with the aforementioned proposition that religion is only a symptom of the issue, whereas the structures of our society itself (in this case, the modern liberal state) are the matters from which humankind requires emancipation. Moreso, political emancipation, in this context, is merely the removal of distinctions (in this case, religious distinctions) from the public to the private realm (p. 10). While the state, then, may not recognize these variations on a political level, the divisions that result from religion are sure to continue.

Any political elevation of distinctions, for Marx, does not actually get to the root of the problem, as he explains with the example of the property qualification in North America, because it means the issue at hand is only being presupposed, (p. 8). If the issue is only presupposed, it goes to follow that the issue remains. For Marx, then, human emancipation is the true resolution of these matters. Human emancipation is to abolish an individual’s alienation of oneself, alienation of his or her species-being, to reclaim his or her “abstract [citizenship]”, and to remove the distinction between an individual’s social force and political power; once these conditions are fulfilled, because “only then is human emancipation complete” (p. 21). This idea of humankind reclaiming some former condition is not unique to Marx. Nietzsche, too, is concerned with the suffering of society- and its possible alleviation.

For Nietzsche, the issues binding humankind are similar but have distinct differences. For example, Nietzsche is very interested in the psychology and culture of humans as it progresses to morality, whereas Marx focuses on larger material structures and conditions. To flesh out what Nietzsche finds to be binding individuals, it is helpful to see his example of a freed individual: the sovereign individual. Like Marx, Nietzsche believes that humans are born into a flawed structure; his focus, however, is the moralities and value sets of different societies. It is these moralities, and what each culture valorizes, which results in the schism of an individual from his or her free nature. Moralities for Nietzsche serve a purpose- the classification of experiences and actions into dualities such as good and bad, or good and evil, are useful to a society which is trying to alleviate its own suffering.

For example, slave morality will look something like this: the lamb will call the bird of prey evil, and itself good, to understand why it was condemned to its suffering (to be the prey, that is) and because of its resentment towards the bird of prey (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality: The First Treatise, p. 24). This is an example of a morality- but it is not the inherent truth of the scenario. The truth is that the lamb is not good or bad, just as the bird of prey is not good or evil; inherently, existence and suffering is all meaningless, and there are no moral facts (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality: The Second Treatise, p. 44; In Class Discussion, October 3, 2018 ). However, we are not free standing individuals- we are all born into morality set forth before us- and it is one confined by dualities that muddy the truth. The sovereign individual, on the other hand, is freed of these frameworks. The sovereign individual has the ability to create meaning for himself; he is not bound by morals, but rather can act of his own free will (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality: The Second Treatise, p. 36).

However, the sovereign individual is rare to come across. In the pursuit of the will to power, people throughout time have assumed other methods, one of which concerning Nietzsche is asceticism. The origin of ascetic practices, and the meaning of them, provides additional insight into the concept of liberation for Nietzsche. Asceticism itself provides liberation from the meaninglessness of suffering that plagues humanity, by providing something that before was lacking- and that is meaning (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality: The Third Treatise, p. 117). If the suffering has no meaning, humanity is tempted towards nihilism and even death, because there is no purpose of continuation. Suffering, for the ascetic, brings redemption and it is therefore in of itself valuable and meaningful. Unlike Marx, however, Nietzsche’s views can be classified as more pessimistic. While Marx seems to suggest that human emancipation is possible, Nietzsche recognizes that the sovereign individual is not only rare, but even in his circumstances, human nature would persist: that is, the human propensity to suffering.

For Nietzsche, it seems inescapable that there is something in our nature where not only do we enjoy inflicting suffering on others, but we even enjoy inflicting suffering on ourselves, so long as we are provided with a meaning to it (p. 117). The difference between Marx and Nietzsche, in this respect, is that whereas Marx mostly evaluates the issues of humanity as arising from an external source (implied by his word choice, such as oppression, exploitation, and so forth), Nietzsche does not think suffering is the actually issue from which humankind can be liberated. While much more could be said for both Marx and Nietzsche’s interpretations of human emancipation, this is just a concise overview of the larger points. Political emancipation is just an example of an attempt to solve humanity’s larger problems- however, in Marx’s evaluation, it is lacking because the structure of the conditions that create the issues in the first place are to remain intact with such a solution. On the other hand, human emancipation, for Marx, requires a total restructuring of our systems.

While Marx believed there can be emancipation from alienation, oppression, and domination that result from material conditions, Nietzsche believes humankind is bound by certain inescapable chains (such as the propensity to suffering). However, for Nietzsche, a certain human emancipation is possible if one is able to surpass the frameworks of morality set forth before him and become a sovereign individual. In all, the two philosophers have their differences. However, they do share an overarching theme, which is that the issues of humanity and its nature can only be solved by radical measures.