Religion And Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Philosophy
Religion’s hold on European socio-political life greatly declined after the birth of nation states and their ensuing separation from the church. The separation was so profound that Rousseau’s “religion of man” seems to dominate the contemporary Western landscape; politics is divorced from religion in current affairs, and the latter is more private and individualistic. Yet from antiquity to the Middle Ages, political theology ruled mankind; God could legitimately govern by way of divine sanction. As Rousseau wrote The Social Contract, the remnants of a not-so-distant past remained. But if he isn’t turning back the clock to the era of investiture controversies and Papal States, what is he trying to reconcile?
Rousseau’s penultimate chapter On Civil Religion may have been an addendum, yet it is clear that a wealth of his arguments in his Social Contract bolsters this conclusion. Throughout the first two books, he fleshes out the general will. It is the foundation of all legitimate authority. As a popular sovereignty, we do nothing more than obey ourselves and “remain as free as before”. Another characteristic that merits close attention is that this general will is not a mere sum total but is the will of all where 'conditions are equal,' thereby benefiting the individuals themselves. Given the general will’s reciprocal nature, Rousseau posits that individuals (as citizens) need the incentive of law to avoid recalcitrance; as we’ve digressed from the natural state, our position in society can easily foment amour propre. The existence of civil society is thus contingent upon the existence of laws that citizens collectively agree upon. Such laws must be universal and shape mores; no individual or subgroup takes precedence over the other. Rousseau adds, “there must be laws to unite rights. . . and refer justice back” and “all justice comes from God; he alone is its source. This is telling: he starts building his case for civil religion from the outset by rooting justice in divine authority. Rousseau’s ideal legislator requires a “superior intelligence,” almost depicting one that transcends human capacities. Rousseau seems to advocate, if not a foreign entity then, one who has a germ of divine power. Since this legislator invents moral code, reasoning must be brought to the fore: “it is this sublime reason, which transcends the grasp of ordinary men, whose decisions the legislator puts in the mouth of the immortals in order to compel by divine authority those whom human prudence could not move. ”
Reasoning runs counter to Rousseau's initial stance on it in the Discourse on Inequality and Discourse on the Arts and Sciences; though problematic, maybe it carries more weight in a society with a social contract. This is especially made clear when he alludes to the success of Moses in promulgating the Decalogue, “The Judaic law. . . still proclaim today the great men who enunciated them”. These tablets of stone form the bedrock of Judeo-Christian tradition. If Moses was able to transmit the Decalogue not only to Israelites but to generations thereafter as well, what does that speak of man and the appeal of the supernatural on him? Rousseau hints at this as a means of ensuring laws are followed. On Civil Religion marries politics and religion once again, albeit, in a different light. Rousseau first outlines the problems inherent in the Christian dogma - the City of God takes precedence over that of materialistic man. He posts, 'a society of true Christians would no longer be a society of men'.
Rousseau fails to realize, however, that the two are not diametrically-opposed; in fact Christianity can coexist with many of the principles he upholds. Rousseau uses this as a basis for his civil religion; he proposes that the two can be reconciled through a newfound profession of faith and sociability that is rooted in our earthly existence and thus our general will. If Rousseau understands natural man to the marrow, he may have been well-versed in the role of psychology in the human condition as well. We can see why he particularly chose religion as his means: despite growing secularism, the role of religion has its roots in moral psychology. Again, we hark back to Moses. Men followed him and lionized the Ten Commandments because of their association with the divine. The same can be said with other Abrahamic prophets. Rousseau knows how religion influences the passions and its position vis-à-vis law. In his Discourse on Inequality, he posits that man is full of passions. Since divine authority played into human affairs throughout most of human history, denouncing this idea would be deemed blasphemous during Rousseau's time. More notably, however, man did not dare to question divine authority because of his underlying fear. Is this fear embedded in our nature?
Rousseau seems to have played with this innate fear, which he knew was alive and well during the Enlightenment. If this fear was powerful enough to make man submit to political theology for a large bulk of history, it must be a potent emotion, is it not? It seems that Rousseau only resuscitates religion back into the political picture as a means to make his social contract come to fruition. However, Rousseau fleshes out the dogmas of his civil religion, noting “the existence of divinity that foresees and provides,” “the happiness of the just,” and “intolerance,” to name a few. Therein lies the problem. These dogmas are not to be taken lightly; not everyone can embrace these as well. If Protestantism gave birth to so many sects because of differing interpretations in dogma, many adherents of Rousseau's civil religion can likewise have their personal reservations with this. He argues to hold the articles 'not as dogmas. . . but as senitiments of sociability' but that violates the very essence of religion. It is at this point where he seems to contradict his ideas on an individual’s right and general will. Rousseau should simply use religion or appeals to divine authority to cement his politics or legislative affairs, no more and no less. Adding dogmas (though only as social 'sentiments') betokens a creation of a new religion that everyone submits to and thus infringes on their will.
By extension, Rousseau underestimates both the power and destruction that the unification of religion and politics brings to civil society. A civil religion is no easy way out; it won't solve the problem. While “religion of man” abounds more in the modern West (with individuals connecting to God within the walls of their ecclesial community), it is crucial to note that this is far from the case in other parts of the globe. A few years ago, I came to a reductive conclusion that the answer to the crisis in the Middle East was simple - “Just don’t implement Sharia law. Religion should be a private practice. ” However simplistic that was, it stemmed from a modern narrow-minded Western lens and an observation that only when politics dovetails with religion does conflict ensue. Jews, Muslims, and Christians intermingled in the Middle Ages, didn't they? Their respective identities were still developed and strengthened in pluralist conditions and acculturation to their surroundings. When politico-religious reaction (infused with polemical language) came into the forefront, as with the advent of the Crusades, they devolved into warring groups. The current quest to resuscitate Islamic law in all spheres of religious and political life similarly strikes a deep terror. Unlike the medieval era, the undertones of post-colonialism make the desire for political ascendancy and even hegemony under (their) religious doctrine more pronounced. It will take a miracle to disentangle religion and politics just as it is impossible to disregard the spiritual element of religion and make it purely practical.
So if Rousseau proposes that one does not have to fully adhere to the dogmas outlined, how will civil religion prove efficient? It is in this light that Rousseau fails to realize that religion, given its effects on human moral psychology, cannot be taken lightly — especially when it converges with a force so seminal as politics. Yes, he acknowledges its utility: tapping into fear can be strategic in ensuring laws are followed. However, this emotion can prove equally destructive. Rousseau’s civil religion is especially problematic if it takes some form in all societies (some nation-states like the USA can prove to be an exception). It cannot be denied that there remains a powerful nexus between religion and politics by way of moral ideology. Even democratic states that crow about their separation from the church have domestic moral (and seemingly irreconcilable) divergences that are rooted in both religious and political affiliations. A wedge may have been driven between church and state but where this wedge lies remains arbitrary in a host of societies. Such ambiguity engenders social instability, far from the philosopher's vision of civil society, and civil religion isn't the way to make it truly cohesive.
