Science: Significance of The Scientific Revolution
Introduction
The main question for the essay “Science” is: what was so revolutionary about the Scientific Revolution in the past? The Scientific Revolution demarcates a period of scientific development which roughly spans the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Over the course of the Scientific Revolution, the structure of science and the nature of scientific discovery underwent a radical transformation; the period oversaw the establishment of modern science and a drastic change in worldview regarding the perception, observation, and interpretation of nature. I propose that the “revolutionary” ideas of the Scientific Revolution can be roughly divided into three main categories: changes in perspective; changes in authority; and changes in scientific methodology. Notwithstanding the immensely influential developments that occurred during the Scientific Revolution, the “revolutionary” qualities of the Scientific Revolution can be debated, as the adoption of the ideas and theories produced during this period took place over many decades it was by no means and instantaneous, unanimous epiphany, which is suggested by the term “Revolution”.
Changes in Perspective
One of the most - if not the most - notorious and important topics of the Scientific Revolution is astronomy. This can be attributed to the massive upheaval in the field of astronomy and cosmology surrounding the acceptance of a heliocentric model of the solar system, displacing the ancient, geocentric model that had been the leading theory for millennia.
Copernicus' heliocentric model of the universe is usually signified as the start of the Scientific Revolution: Thomas S. Kuhn posits that many of the “innovations” of the Scientific Revolution were “by-products of Copernicus' astronomical theory', as “the reconciliation of these other sciences with Copernican astronomy was an important cause of the general intellectual ferment now known as the Scientific Revolution”. Moreover, this revolutionary shift from geocentrism to heliocentrism subsequently engendered a radical change in the perception of the universe, paving the way for the further advancement of astronomy by the likes of Kepler, Brahe, and Galileo. Kuhn reinforces the importance of Copernicus' model on astronomy and the perception of the universe, stating that “the publication of Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium in 1543 inaugurates the upheaval in astronomical and cosmological thought”. Furthermore, the heliocentric model directly contradicted the widely-accepted Aristotelian model of the Universe, forcing either a rejection of heliocentrism or of Aristotelianism to be made, as 'the acceptance of a sun-centred universe would tear to shreds the physical world-picture on which the entire Aristotelian system was based'.
Contrary to this dichotomic analysis, Tycho Brahe developed the Tychonic system, which offered a compromise between the Aristotelian and Copernican models. Brahe proposed an effectively geocentric model, conserving the “places of rest” of the elements in the Aristotelian system, yet with the rider that the planets orbit the sun, so that the system produced the same mathematical results as the Copernican system. Despite Brahe's reluctance to reject the Aristotelian system, he conceded that the supralunary sphere was imperfect, which directly opposes Aristotle's belief that this sphere is incorruptible. Hence, it is no question that the Scientific Revolution produced a “massive change in perspective from an earth-centered (or geocentric) universe to a heliocentric universe”, propagating the reassessment of ancient and traditional natural philosophy.
Changes in Authority
Prior to the Scientific Revolution, Aristotelianism was the supreme authority in natural science. It was only until the new observations and theories of the Scientific Revolution that Aristotelian physics began to be questioned and examined in light of scientific discovery. The revolutionary astronomical theories of the Scientific Revolution began to undermine Aristotelian physics, which culminated in Newtonian mechanics superseding the Aristotelian theory of motion.
Kepler demonstrated that the orbits of the planets were elliptical in his 1609 work Astronomia Nova; not circular, as the Aristotelian or Ptolemaic models of the universe state. Additionally, Galileo Galilei observed the craters of the Moon with his advanced telescope and published his findings in Sidereus Nuncius, disproving the Aristotelian belief in a perfectly spherical and smooth Moon. Also contained in Sidereus Nuncius is Galileo's observations of the moons of Jupiter, drawing similarities between Earth and Jupiter (they both have natural satellites), which opposed the preconceived models of the planets. This was only the beginning of Galileo's iconoclasm, who identified as a Copernican “because it was a useful tool for attacking the Aristotelian physicists”. Galileo's anti-Aristotelian stance was formulated as he realised that his observations and theories did not align with Aristotelian physics, such as his laws on falling bodies, which contradicted the Aristotelian theory of motion.
In addition to this, Galileo's heliocentrism opposed not only Aristotelian scientists, but the Church, too, as the contemporary Catholic Church deemed belief in a heliocentric universe to be heretical, in direct conflict with scripture. Moreover, Peter Dear states that “the Church, as the dominant institution throughout Western and Central Europe, played a major role in determining intellectual priorities: Aristotle came to be interesting because he could be used to illuminate matters of theological interest”. Here, Dear highlights the authority that the Church had over science, and offers an explanation for the reluctance to abandon Aristotelianism: it coincided with Church doctrine. Subsequently, the ultimate rejection of Aristotelianism within science as a result of the Scientific Revolution resulted in the Church's place in science to be reduced. Overall, Bowler and Morus offer a neat summary of the change in authority that occurred during the Scientific Revolution: the 'approach to knowledge [of key thinkers] was based on the interrogation of experience rather than authority. Instead of consulting Aristotle they were consulting their own senses'.
Changes in Methodology
Following Galileo, the end of Aristotelian physics is finalised with the advent of Newtonian Mechanics. Isaac Newton's Three Laws of Motion were explicitly converse to that which Aristotle proposed; rather than the concepts of 'natural' and “unnatural” motion which Aristotle promoted, Newton claimed that bodies were subject to forces. In addition to this, Newton developed his Law of Universal Gravitation, which Fritz Rohrlich describes as “the first great unification of laws into a theory”, uniting the laws of gravitation upon Earth with astronomical observations. Furthermore, Rohrlich professes that “one cannot underestimate the tremendous revelation it must have been for people to learn that the same law of gravitation (of Newton's theory) underlies both the heavenly motions of planets and the earthly motions of falling apple”. Newton's unification highlights the new methodology of modern science, which sought to create models and theories to explain observations made with ever-improving technology.
Moreover, the theories, laws, and systems developed during the Scientific Revolution often had a strong mathematical foundation. This was a novel feature of modern science, as natural philosophy was previously believed to be superior to mathematics (mathematics was viewed as a merely practical tool used by accountants and tradespeople), and it was only until prominent figures such as Kepler, Galileo, and Newton incorporated mathematical analysis into their scientific work that the powerful synthesis of science and mathematics was truly understood. Kuhn claims that “some Renaissance scientists, like Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler [have drawn] a new belief in the possibility and importance of discovering simple arithmetic and geometric regularities in nature”, further describing this new mathematical perspective as 'un-Aristotelian', representing a definite transition from Aristotelian natural philosophy to modern science, grounded in mathematical relationships. The place of mathematics within science was firmly ratified in Newton's renowned Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (first published in 1687), wherein Newton presented his laws of motion and gravitation, showcasing his revolutionary new calculus and the mathematical principles that lay behind his physical laws.
Moreover, Newton championed empiricism within science, epitomised by his maxim 'Hypotheses non fingo' ('I frame no hypotheses'). Newton's message is that science should not attempt at positing reasons for the occurrence of physical phenomena (which is more akin to the methodology of ancient natural philosophy), but to derive and deduce theories and laws from empirical data. For example, Newton does not provide a reason why massive bodies gravitate towards each other, he only elucidates the underlying law of gravitation. Likewise, Newton's empiricism is a direct continuation of Galileo's approach to scientific discovery; Newton being greatly influenced by Galileo in general, too. Writing of Galileo's attraction to Copernicanism, Peter Dear contends that “the chief arguments in favour of Copernicanism were astronomical rather than cosmological: that is, they were the arguments of a mathematician, concerned with reducing the apparent motions of the heavens to order, rather than those of the physicist, concerned with the nature of the heavens and the explanation of their movements”. This comment on Galileo's attitude towards scientific arguments greatly resembles Newton's “Hypotheses non fingo”, which is not concerned with “the nature” or “the explanation” of phenomena.
Valuing empirical data and observations over metaphysical theory signified a paradigm shift in scientific methodology, coinciding with the heightened sophistication and precision of the scientific instruments being produced during the Scientific Revolution. The most famous example of technological innovation leading to scientific discovery is Galileo's development of the telescopic lens, which allowed him to observe the surface of the Moon in great detail, the moons of Jupiter, and the phases of Venus. Kuhn maintains that
“in Galileo's hands the telescope disclosed countless evidences for Copernicanism”, here expounding the new methodology of modern science: a proposed theory based upon observations, which is further supported by future, new evidence. Kepler's defence of Copernicanism follows a similar method: he defined the mathematical relationships of his Laws of Planetary Motion; he produced the “Rudolphine Tables” in 1627 based upon his theory and improved instruments; these new astronomical tables produced more accurate results than the old, inaccurate 'Alfonsine Tables', calculated with Ptolemaic methods.
The Term “Revolution”
While the field of science was radically changed during the Scientific Revolution, I consider the term “Revolution” to be potentially problematic or inaccurate, particularly in the typically historical sense. By this, I mean that the Scientific Revolution does not have many of the crucial hallmarks that are associated with historical revolutions such as the French Revolution and even the Industrial Revolution, for example. Unlike other revolutions, the Scientific Revolution was a gradual process, rather than an abrupt paradigm shift. This is clearly demonstrated by the hesitant adoption of heliocentrism, and it is even dubious as to whether Copernicus really believed in a physically heliocentric universe, rather than an Instrumentalist tool for astronomical computation, as Andreas Osiander suggests in his preface to “De Revolutionibus”. Moreover, it is easy to assume that the Scientific Revolution and modern science are atheistic, yet this is not necessarily the case: Copernicus was a canon of the Catholic Church; Kepler believed that he could understand God's creation via science; Newton's scientific work had a strong theological influence. Thus, the division between science and the Church that occurred during the Scientific Revolution was specifically a break from the Church as an institution, rather than a break with religion.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding this, it is correct to consider the term “Scientific Revolution” as referring to a time of great intellectual upheaval, yet the 'revolutionary' status is questionable. Bowler and Morus conclude “that cataclysmic as the intellectual changes of the Scientific Revolution might arguably be, they are not unique in history. Other changes in worldview have been just as momentous. The term 'revolution' itself has been exposed as problematic”. Therefore, overall, I believe that the development of scientific thought, authority, and methodology that took place during the Scientific Revolution was truly revolutionary (in terms of the magnitude of the intellectual changes and their influences), yet with the compromise that the Scientific Revolution does not strictly have the characteristics of a revolution in the historical sense.
Bibliography
- Kuhn, T.S. (1957). The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.1-44, pp.123-184, p.219.
- Shapin, S. (1996). The Scientific Revolution. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, pp.65-118.
- Bowler, P.J. and Morus, I.R. (2020). Making Modern Science: A Historical Survey. 2nd edn. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, pp.25-57.
- Rohrlich, F. (1987). From Paradox to Reality: Our Basic Concepts of the Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.27-32.
- Dear, P. (2001). Revolutionizing The Sciences: European Knowledge and Its Ambitions, 1500-1700. Hampshire: Palgrave, pp.65-79.
