The Haitian And Panama Crises: A Policy Comparison
The nation of Haiti has been ravaged by predatory regimes for decades. According to Fishel the states has been terrorized by dictators who employ "thugs" to overthrow sitting regimes, terrorize citizens, and undermine military and police for decades, including Guillaume Sam's regime that snatch power in a coup in 1915 (Fishel 2017). Since then countless coup de tats have caused the deaths, asylum seeking, and resignations of for 40 heads of states between 1804 and 1994 (Fishel). This regime required the occupation of United States military forces from 195 until 1934 (Fishel 2017). Though the occupation allowed for the impoverished nation to gin some stability and establish some form or legitimate national guard, it quickly reverted to its predatory nature after the American occupation ended (Fishel 2017), leaving numerous officials to abandon their offices until Dr. Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier took office in 1957 (Fishel 2017). His regime was no different than the predatory rulers that Haiti had seen before the US occupation. Fishel states, "The establishment of a militia of modern cacos, the Ton-ton macoutes or boogeymen" were used "to offset the power of the regular military and police" (Fishel 2017). Duvalier used his boogeymen to completely control the government, military, and police which created an oppressive state for Haitian citizens. Papa Doc would pass would pass in 1971 and his son Jean- Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier would rule until 1986 when he fled to France (Fishel 2017). Several would take office between 1986 and 1990, but none would be permanent until Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected to office in 1990 (Fishel 2017).
Jean Bertrand Aristide was educated and fluent in five languages (Fishel 2017). Though he was able to secure his bid for office though his large following and Aristide was elected to office in 1990 on the platform supporter by the poor and those who were strongly opposed to Baby Doc (Fishel 2017). He was able to gather the support of the elite mulattos as well. His movement never transitioned into a political party and his time in office would be short lived because of his ability to antagonizing the rich and the military (Fishel 2017). He sought to restructure the military and was able "to obtain the retirements of sic of the top seven commanders in the military" (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992). His dislike like for the military and elites, who he disliked for the privilege and link to power (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992), would lead commander of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, to overthrow his government in Fall 1991 (Fishel 2017). This coup would be the grounds for the Haitian Crisis.
Policy During Crisis: Haiti As soon as Cedras too office, her created a puppet government with Jean-Jacques Honorat as the "head" of state (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992). This would force Aristide into exile and cause the deaths of at least 1,500 Haitians to be killed for any support of the former president of Haiti (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992). Cedras' coup brought on an enormous international crisis as Haitians were fleeing the nation by the thousands to seek asylum. The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted resolutions and appoint a mediator, Columbian diplomat Augusto Ocampo, to attempt to restore Aristide (Fishel 2017). United Nations (UN) secretary general also appointed Argentine Dante Caputo as a special representative to Haiti (Fishel 2017). He was also appointed to try to restore Aristide administration. Each of them tried for months to reason with Cedras, but it was to no avail (Fishel 2017). The UN decide to impose sanctions on the small island nation, but it did not hurt the military or the elites, but it did hurt Aristide original supporters: the poor (Fishel 2017, Canham-Clyne 1992). The United States joined the sanctions and denounced Cedras' coup.
Doyle states: "Until President Aristide's government is restored," said Secretary of State James Baker before the OAS in October, "this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this hemisphere, without assistance, without friends, and without any future" (Doyle 1994). They were also taking on thousands of Haitian refugees who were seeking asylum in Florida. The United States drew up policy that would promote the forced repatriation of Haitian citizens due to the high AIDS rate among the asylum-seekers (Fishel 2017). Though the United States stated that the junta would be treated as "pariah" in system, they instead treated asylum seekers that way. This policy continued from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration (Doyle 1994). Policy that could have helped remedy Haitian Crisis was put on hold to push through policy that would secure the United States borders from economic asylum-seekers. Finally, the United States began drafting policy that would create a joint task force which coordinated with Colonel Pulley was established as the man in charge on land over force that were deployed in conjunction with the Governor Island agreement signed by Cedras and and Aristide.
Commander Butcher would be the commander at sea answering to the Commander in Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet (Fishel 2017). Butcher commander the USS Harlan County, an landing ship, which was supposed to land in Port-au-Prince to take on Cedras' junta (Fishel 2017). The ship did not land as there was a mob attack, orchestrated by Cedras, that kept it from doing so. US Official supported the decision of Commander Butcher to turn the ship around, despite Pulley insisting that it was just a hoax planned by the opposition (Fishel 2017). This was yet another example on the United States failure to follow through on planning and policy in regard to Haiti (Wucker 2004). Before the Harlan County incident, the United State was planning to do a noncombatant evacuation operation, similar to the one that occurred in Panama in the 1980s (Fishel 2017). This plan was scratched, and a forcible entry operation was orchestrated to restore Aristide (Fishel 2017). Instead of drafting a tailored plan, officials found a plan from 1988 that might suit there need but the plan had no guideline for who troops would be used once they arrived on in Haiti (Fishel 2017). There would be multiple changes in policy including document that were to be drawn up by the National Security Council, but the buck would continue to be passed from department to department because of opposition to training Haitian police (Fishel 2017). OPLANS 2370. 2380, and 2375 would be changed time and time again until the Clinton administration finally approved bot OPLANS 2370 and 2380 to be executed with the anticipated deployment on September 10, 1994, three years after Cedras had taken control of the Haitian government (Fishel 2017).
The plans were communicated through the proper channels and the hurdles of the plan not being known to member of the Haitian IWG were removed, the American public was briefed on the situation and the operation was scheduled to be carried out on September 19, 1994 (Fishel 2017). Before the United State could even intervene in the Haitian Crisis, officially, Former President Jimmy Carter had parachuted in as a request of Cedras to see if there was room to negotiate the restoration of Aristide (Fishel 2017). By the end of the September 18, 1994, Jimmy Carter combined with the notification that Cedras received that the 82nd Airborne was in bound, Cedras agreed to step down and the regime was overthrown (Fishel 2017). Former President Carter's accomplishments were confirmed and the order to de elope a new plane to address the Haitian regime as friendly was made. Ambassador William Swing touched down and an officer assigned to the embassy greeted him. This visual was would come to known as the Inter-vasion of Haiti (Fishel 2017). Policy in Haiti must be look upon as policy for show being that the United States had no interest or gains to be made in regard to Haiti until the refugee crisis began. Many criticized the United States government for their refusal "fused to sever diplomatic ties with Haiti, for example, and failed to freeze the personal financial holdings of Haitians involved in the coup" (Wucker 2004). But they successfully creation policy to protect their borders against those who were seeking asylum.
The United States relaxing the sanction was not the best course of action either. Though the United States looked as if it was constantly creating policy in regard to Haiti it made several missteps. The first of those was putting money into the elections that happened shortly after Baby Doc left the nation (Wucker 2004). The democracy was extremely weak at this point and the potential for it to revert to a predatory state was likely (Wucker 2004). The United States never really fostered democracy in the region because it was so preoccupied with Post-Cold War politics. Even after the United States entered the Haiti and created the Multi-National force and reinstated Aristide as president there was still only one goal: "to hold an election and go home" (Fishel 2017). The United State was repeating mistakes that it had made for and so did Haiti regardless of the United Nations teams that were on the ground, and still remain there even today (Fishel 2017, Wucker 2004). The United States changed their policy and action regarding Haiti several times regarding OPLANS (Fishel 2017). There was no unique policy planning regarding Haiti most was taken from plans that were made regarding other crises and disputes (Fishel 2017). Haiti was a unique situation being that the state was and had been predatory for decades and had the possibility to return to that same condition even after policy was implemented but it was because the US wanted so badly to avoid war. More aggressive policy should have been taken toward the actual regime rather than the people who were already suffering.
Conclusion: Different Policy, Different Outcomes In comparison Haiti was handled differently than Panama and the outcomes are representative of that. Though Operation Just Cause in panama was short and sweet, the nation did begin the transition to democracy (Furlong 1993). The gentle sanction placed upon the on the nation did not ease the issues within the nation because the United States was not the nation's only stream of income (Robinson 1989). The only option after Noriega rose to power was war because of the threat and destabilization that he caused but it was put off for as long as possible because adequate attempts, though engineered to be as calm and unnoticeable as possible, were made. There was coordination among it forces that were on land and at sea, they answered to one commander, and were in support of the mission on land (Fishel 2017). Woerner was given the necessary power to attempt to foster the democracy in Panama in order for the United States hegemony to remain intact (Sanchez 2002). Elaborate Maze was commissioned especially for Panama so that success would be guaranteed whether the plan's phases were carried out in succession, simultaneously, or otherwise (Fishel 2017). This careful planning came from the United States familiarity with the region, the interest and economics involved, and knowledge of the dictator and his forces. The policy was strategic. The same cannot be said for Haiti. The United States did really take on the Haitian crisis as a primary concern.
There were preoccupied with the Russia and other conflicts abroad. The United Nations took on the primary consideration of the Haitian Crisis. They, along with the OAS, sent ambassadors to reason with the Cedras regime, this allowed for them to learn about the leader and reason regime so that they could make informed decision about the policy to enact regarding the crisis (Fishel 2017). The Haitian sanctions were harsh and only hurt those who were already poor, but the United States made no effort to freeze the assets of those who contributed to the coup (Wucker 2004). The cooperation that was mandated by the Goldwater- Nichols Act that was seen in panama was not seen here, neither was the military support of the mission in Port-au-Prince was not even close to that of the cooperation that Woerner had in Panama (Fishel 2017). Most of what the United States did was in respond to actions by the UN and to protect it border. Policy was not unique constructed for the delicate situation in Haiti as it was in Panama and the only reason for that is that the United States interest were not promoted or undermined in Haiti on the scale that they were in Panama.
The Fishel text taught in Chapter 1 that the United States operates on ever shifting balance that is rooted with in the realist paradigm (Fishel 2017). The Realist paradigm dictates that nations are concerned with power and that the policy is dictated by human nature. This hold true when comparing the cases of the Haitian Crisis and the Panama Crisis. The United States was preoccupied with power and interest in these situations. The United States knew that it had to keep the neutrality of the Canal sot that they could continue to gain revenue from it. The also had to keep hold of panama because the control of the canal only added to the United States power and influence in the region while insuring that its hegemony remained. Haiti simply did not provide any gains in regard to power and influence and that why policy was not carried out in the same matter. The purpose of national security policy is to promote and protect the rights, freedoms, power, and interest of the United States. Beyond the policy to protect the United States' borders, US officials did nothing to promote and protect democracy in Haiti.
