The Origins Of The World War I: Preferred Instigators

Approximately a century after the World War I or (WWI) ended, the country that was responsible for the causing the first large-scale war has never been definitively identified. This ambiguity has made the WWI a topic for research for many historians, and much evidence has been discovered. The evidence available has led various historians to develop differing opinions concerning the instigator of the WWI. The conflicting perspectives on the topics can be explained by the biases often introduced in the some of the sources that render the researcher unable to accurately recreate the events and, more importantly, the motivations for the actions. David Lloyd Gorge argues that the WWI occurred after countries were drawn into war by circumstances accidentally.

This argument implies that none of the participants can be solely responsible for the events leading to the outbreak of war. Notwithstanding, Fritz Fischer posits that Germany should bear the most of the blame for the war. Fischer's explanations suggest that all participants contributed to the beginning of the war. These conflicting the ideologies concerning the WWI are the primary motivation for this research. It is an evidence-based study that aims to provide a viable solution to this dilemma. Firstly, the study analyses Germany's role. Secondly, it analyses Austria-Hungary's role. Finally, an absolute position is established based on the evidence. A comparative analysis of Germany and Austria-Hungary’s role in starting the World War I reveals that Germany should bear the most blame.

Role of Germany

Germany, for a long time, held the idea of conquering Europe, which can be theorized as the ideology that led to the plotting of a European takeover where the use of arms was inevitable. The Germans formed the Triple Alliance in 1882 that shows their desire to establish their dominance in Europe, which is evident in the contents of the treaty. In article two of the treaty, the response to France, which appeared to be an immediate threat, is outlined followed by the response to any non-signatory Great Powers in articles three and four. Based on the contents of the treaty, the desire to dominate Europe was evident in Germany’s actions. In the extended version of the treaty signed in 1912, European dominance was still evident but was no longer the primary goal since dominance outside Europe was alluded to in articles 6-11.

This revised treaty was signed barely two years from the start of the Great War and is further evidence of the superiority complex that the Germans and, by extension, its allies desired to conceptualize. The formation of the Triple Entente can be assumed to be a reaction to the threat posed by the Triple Alliance. John Rohl agrees with this idea as he explained that Germany’s intention was “to conquer Europe as a prelude to even further global expansion. ”Germany’s intention of European dominance and, later, world dominance must have elicited the defensive response from other Great Powers. Consequently, the need to retain and maintain sovereignty may have set the stage for global conflict.

With their intentions clear, the Germans required an ideal opportunity to begin their excursion regardless of the looming threat of a large-scale war. The Germans had an opportunity to lessen the tension between them and Russia in July 1914 at a meeting at Petrograd. M. Sazonow and M. Cambon tried to convince Herr von Jagow and other German political representatives that if they withdrew their support from Austria-Hungary, then the Russians would not pull in the French into the conflict. [footnoteRef: 6] The Germans intentionally squandered this chance to stop the Great War by merely withdrawing their support for the Austria-Hungary, yet it was a viable option since Serbia was not a Great Power. Therefore, they still reserved the decision to distance themselves from the conflict but chose to participate. Moreover, the Foreign Office at Berlin had predicted that the Great War was inevitable and was likely to begin in 1916, but by that time Russia would be prepared, thus, triggering the war in 1914 was to their advantage. This evidence illustrates the German’s knowledge of the repercussions of their actions. Germany wanted to go to war and win and, therefore, ensuring that they found their enemies unprepared would improve their odds of waging a short and victorious war. Germany's opportunism suggests they desired conflict to erupt because the conditions were favorable and aligned with its aim of establishing European dominance.

Beside Germany’s reluctance to resolve the conflict when presented with the opportunity, they encouraged Austria-Hungary to take the warpath in reaction to the assassination at Sarajevo. The Imperial Government pushed Count Berchtold to go to war against the Serbians despite the risk of a world war. It is difficult not to blame Germany for the First World War considering the extent to which they influenced Austria-Hungary’s government into a violence-oriented solution, yet they were well aware of the fragility of peace that was complicated by alliances. Moreover, the Germans declined British requests for meditation on the remaining two issues concerning the ultimatum in the week before the beginning of the war despite Count Berchtold’s willingness to accept Serbia’s response. In this case, the Germans appear to be impeding any attempts of the other Great Powers at avoiding war. Equally important, the Germans ensured war by sending an ultimatum to Russia citing military mobilization, which ended negotiations, thus, forcing Czar to take military action. Russia’s ultimatum to Russia was followed by a declaration of war that ensured a peaceful settlement would not be reached. If the Germans had not put the Russians on the defensive, there would still have been time for a peaceful resolution to be reached. Since negotiation was no longer possible, Austria-Hungary had no other option than to go to war. The actions of Germany in continually undermine the negotiations puts them at fault for beginning the First World War.

At this point, the war was already inevitable, but the scale to which the war would take place was still manageable if the military tactics used by the Germans would restrict the conflict only to the already active participants. The Schlieffen Plan that was modified and implemented in the Great War had assumed the French would be the first to violate Belgium’s neutrality as part of their strategy to take on Germany. Belgium strategic position made its occupation an integral part of German’s attack strategy, but this was complicated by Belgium’s reluctance to take a side during the war. Moltke decides to take control of Liege through a surprise attack barely days after the war begun.

Although Moltke’s action was critical to establishing a winning strategy it had dire political implications. Herr von Jagow explains that the decision to violate Belgium’s neutrality was justified because it provided the most convenient way to attack France with the highest efficacy before Russia’s mobilisation. Belgium was collateral damage of Germany's efforts to attack rapidly its enemies that had an advantage in their high number of troops. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg did not agree with the decision to invade Belgium because he understood that the invasion would result in Great Britain (GB) attacking Germany. Undoubtedly, the German’s knew what their invasion would cause but could not risk losing its only advantage in the war to scale down the conflict. The inclusion of GB in the war increased the expected casualties and destruction. In consequence, Germany caused what was likely going to be a localized war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia into a regional war involving the all-European countries.

Role of Austria-Hungary

Conversely, Austria-Hungary can be held responsible for creating the stalemate by the contents of its ultimatum to Serbia. Austria-Hungary developed rather excessive demands of the Serbian government, which made reaching an amicable solution difficult. The demands made by Austria-Hungary would imply that the Serbian government would lose most of its power because the demands dictated the how the country would be ruled in favor of the interests of Austria-Hungary.

The harsh demands posed a direct threat to the sovereignty of Serbia. In consequence, it was not expected that the Serbian government would have accepted the demands in the nature in which they were presented. It is possible that the Austro-Hungarian government developed these demands knowing that the Serbian government was not going to accept the ultimatum. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian government may have used the ultimatum as a means of gaining public support when they employ the military action in Serbia. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Austro-Hungarian government had public opinion in their favor, which was imperative that they maintain because engaging in war without this support was undesirable. Jovan Jovanovic attempted to warn the Austrians of the plot to assassinate the Archduke. Before the events of June 28, 1941, the Serbian government had already shown that it did not desire the assassination to take place because it would put the nation at risk of war. Notably, the readiness of Serbia to avoid conflict was undermined by Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum.

The German's military might and consequently the power of the Triple Alliance made Austria-Hungary to handle the issue with Serbia from a position of dominance, which may have caused reckless decision-making resulting in the First World War. The protection offered by Austria-Hungary’s membership in the Triple Alliance encouraged her to make excursions without much hesitation. The safety provided by the knowledge of support from both Germany and Italy may have caused the Austro-Hungarians to misjudge the situation for an opportunity to expand her territory. On its own, Serbia could not defend itself from an attack by Austria-Hungary. This vulnerability suggests that the Austro-Hungarians may have viewed this tension as an ideal opportunity to take over Serbia in light of their poor relationship. The confidence of Austria-Hungary in pursuing dominance over Serbia was fortified by the response of Wilhelm Ⅱ to the letter for Emperor Francis Joseph where he assured to provide the necessary support if required. Before the situation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia escalated, they had received the unwavering support of the Germans and, by extension, Italy. This support may have caused the Austro-Hungarian government to forego the opportunity to reach a peaceful settlement because of the belief that they would successfully wage war if a need arises. The blind belief in the Triple Alliance strength caused the Austro-Hungarian government to overlook the importance of a peaceful settlement due to the beneficial nature of any outcome with war appearing as a means to an end.

The Serbian government did not deny that their citizens were involved in the plot, but Austria-Hungary perceived justice in a manner to suggest that it was being denied, thereby, creating the context for the First World War. The Serbian government held the position that they could not be held responsible for the actions of its citizens and that liability was only in its response to resolving the issues that had arisen from these actions. The Serbian government willingly took on the leading role in investigating the crime that occurred in its jurisdiction. However, the Austro-Hungarian government did not recognize these efforts and approached the situation as if the Serbian government had refused to participate in resolving the issue. This decision established the basis for the events that unfolded next leading up to the Great War. The reaction of the Austro-Hungarian government decided whether there would be a basis for tension build up between the two countries and, consequently, their respective allies. It follows that the blame for the start of the Great War be put on Austria-Hungary because she was responsible for creating the necessary conditions for Germany to carry out its plan for global domination.

Germany and Austria-Hungary are the most preferred instigators of the World War I. There is evidence showing that they both contributed to the commencement of the Great War. However, the evidence is not equal for both parties. Austria-Hungary appears to have been played a less significant role in causing the war when compared to Germany. Austria-Hungary is likely to have posed control over the events for a minimal period for her to receive any meaningful effect on the war. Immediately after the assassination, Austria-Hungary could have avoided the war by cooperating with Serbia to resolve the issues that arose. Soon after the assassination, the Germans cleverly took over control of the decisions made despite the Austro-Hungarian government appearing to be in control. The Imperial government provided advice to Austria-Hungary, which she accepted. The decisions under the advice of the German government were not focused on safeguarding the interests of the Austria-Hungary but advancing Germany’s world domination agenda. The Germans provided biased advice to Austria-Hungary. Again, they possessed the desire to dominate Europe and expand their influence beyond the European borders. Thereupon, the Germans are to be blamed for starting the Great War.

18 May 2020
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