The Use Of Military Force In An Irregular Warfare Environment
Introduction
Since the overthrow of the dictatorship regime of Major General Muhammad Siad Barre in early 1991, Somalia has been in a constant state of conflict creating a vacuum allowing extremists and criminals to rule key regions of the country. Due to its uncertain future and constant conflict, many Somalis fled to nearby countries, mainly Kenya and Ethiopia, creating a humanitarian disaster for the entire region. The country has taken some major steps toward creating a stable government through the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, but there is quite a bit of work left to do. With its rising influence in the region and worldwide, the Al Qaida aligned Al Shabaab (AS) terrorist organization continues to prolong the peace process that many Somalis want. In this essay, I will outline how the United States (US) has been supporting the government’s effort to stabilize their country through military, diplomatic, and humanitarian assistance pulling from the lessons the world learned in the early 1990’s. In addition, I will outline where the US can use more military force in this irregular warfare (IW) environment to aid in the overall accomplishment of providing regional stabilization.
Body
The fall of the regime in 1991 set in motion a series of events that would define the country of Somalia as we view it today. Immediately following the collapse of the central government, criminal organizations and warlords began to control the narrative and total unrest ensued. The US government, seeing this as a vulnerable situation, began to deploy US troops to the region to provide humanitarian aid and limited scale raids in an effort to help stabilize the region. These efforts eventually failed largely due to the fact that there was no government in place to take control and no plan for long-term assistance in standing up a recognized security force. Those failures came to a head in 1994 and the US military were ordered to withdrawal due to the deteriorating situation. Throughout the next 19 years, the lessons learned from those dark years in the country’s history were put into use with the formation of the TFG and other entities whose goals are to stabilize the region. In early 2013, the US formally recognized the Federal Government of Somalia as a legitimate government. Due to its commitment to regional security, the US supports the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the National Security Forces (NSF) of Somalia by providing training, shared intelligence, and weapons to the NSF. In addition to the above stated support, the US has committed over $1 billion of monetary support in the year 2015 to enhance the capabilities of the government forces. This military and monetary support is critical to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven to international terrorist organizations.
Although the US Embassy in Somalia officially shut down in 1991 the US never cut diplomatic ties to the country. Dialogue between the US and Somalia continued through the US Embassy in Kenya. In July 2014, Somalia officially re-opened its embassy in Washington DC further enhancing its diplomatic relationship with the US. Through this diplomacy, the US has been able to provide much needed humanitarian assistance to a country very susceptible to extreme drought. Through government organizations like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the US and the TFG has been able to positively influence the population creating a greater gap between terrorist organizations and peace. With all of these pieces in place, Somalia appears to be a country headed in the right direction, however, organizations such as AS continues to threaten the stabilization process by holding key population centers in the country. Since this is the case and defining IW as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations, it can be concluded that the conflict falls into the IW category. The US military is uniquely positioned to operate in this complex environment.
Supporting Efforts
When most people hear the term “military force” they envision a ground and air campaign characterized by kinetic engagements against an opposing force. While this is true in the conventional aspect of the term, it is not always the case. Specifically in an IW environment like Somalia, military force can be characterized from conducting limited scale raids to providing humanitarian assistance to regions that normally cannot be accessed by traditional agencies all the while conducting these operations alongside the host nation forces. Activities such as foreign internal defense (FID), stability operations, and counterterrorism (CT) supported by intelligence/counterintelligence operations can have an enormous impact on success in Somalia.
Conducting FID allows the NSF and AMISOM to gain valuable training and resources in a real-world environment. The use of advisors conducting joint operations will show the population the commitment their own government has to their well-being and security. It also allows the government the ability to extend its reach into territories with the full support of the US military. This would allow areas heavily influenced by AS and other criminal organizations to be influenced by the government, thus further stabilizing the region and allowing follow-on stability operations to commence. Since the country is highly susceptible to drought and famine, stability operations would allow for humanitarian aid and critical infrastructure to reach areas previously unable to be influenced by the government. The employment of the United States Special Operations Command and other government agencies conducting CT operations will only add the nail to the coffin in routing out and destroying AS. Conducting limited scale raids assisted by host nation forces to disrupt the AS command and control can be an effective tool in providing security by targeting the enemy leaders directly. These strategies can only be effective if conducted jointly and concurrently.
Conclusion
Somalia’s geographic location makes it a critical component to stabilize the region. The central government has been working hard towards peace but international terrorist organizations continue to threaten the peace process thus creating an IW and complex environment. The use of military force in this environment can be used to benefit the region if utilized carefully in addition to utilizing the lessons learned from the failed period of 1991-1994. Between conducting activities such as FID and stability operations in conjunction with the support from agencies such as USAID and the US State Department, the population is targeted and influenced while conducting CT operations can make the area safer by targeting the enemy’s command and control. No singular activity will lead to success without the employment of all strategies working concurrently. It is my belief that only then will we begin to see the strategic geographic region come to be stabilized.