Critical Analysis Of The Article “Organized Crime And Illicit Activities In Spain: Causes And Facilitating Factors” By Jennifer Sands
The article “Organized Crime and Illicit Activities in Spain: Causes and Facilitating Factors”, was written by Jennifer Sands and published in the Mediterranean Politics journal in 2007. In this article Sands writes about the prevalence of organized crime within Spain and the factors that influence it. Sands argues that while Spain has many characteristics that make it an appealing environment for organized crime, that the weaknesses and inefficiencies in their institutions and systems also need to be taken into consideration to get a full understanding.
Sands breaks down organized crime in Spain, with there being 471 known organized crime groups within the country during 2005, all with at least three members and 174 groups containing six to twelve members. Looking at the composition of these groups, Sands states that, “Of the 471 groups that the Spanish police were investigating in 2005, 66 (14 per cent) were made up entirely of Spaniards; 120 (25. 5 per cent) were composed entirely of foreigners; and 285 (60. 5 per cent) of the 471 groups were mixed” (Sands 213). Making the crime in Spain often fall into the transnational category. When looking at what types of crime are most prevalent in Spain, Sands states that drug trafficking is a very significant industry. Hashish is one of the most trafficked drugs in the country, with 50 percent of hashish in the world being seized in Spain. The country also accounts for 60 percent of cocaine seized in Europe. Sands also states that the use of violence, intimidation, and corruption helps the groups to carry out these crimes.
Looking at the other facilitating factors for organized crime in Spain, Sands states that there are three main ones; these being the location and geographical characteristics of Spain, the nature of Spain’s industry, and the presence of immigrant communities in Spain. With its short distance to the Moroccan coast, long borders with both France and Portugal, and multiple major international airports, there are many locational and geographical characteristics that make Spain into a natural gateway for drug trafficking in Europe according to Sands. Spain’s industry is largely made up of tourism and construction, which Sands states is very attractive to organized crime groups. This is due to tourism being good for bringing foreign money into the country and facilitating money laundering. Tourism also has the bonus of helping create an environment where it is very easy for the large number of foreign criminals to blend in easily. Adding onto this, the large increase in the number of homes due to construction is allowing more foreigners to purchase homes in the country.
The final factor that Sands says facilitates organized crime within Spain is the presence of immigrant communities. Immigrant communities provide difficulties to law enforcement, due to the linguistic and cultural barriers, as well as the fear of appearing to discriminate against a minority group. The presence of immigrant communities can also be used to explain the high presence of transnational crime within the country. Outside of these factors, Sands states that there is one more variable that can explain organized crime in Spain, being the weaknesses or inefficiencies of the state and its institutions. Sands compares the rise of organized crime in a weakened state such as Spain to similar situations in other countries. This includes the rise of the Sicilian mafia in Italy, the increase of crime in post-Soviet Russia, the growth of yakuza groups in post-feudal Japan, and the Columbian drug industry due to inefficient political and economic institutions. Sands compares this to the rise of organized crime in Spain after its transition to a democracy, and that during this transition it was weakened and allowed the organized crime to put down roots.
One argument that Sands makes is that to fully understand the prevalence of organized crime within Spain, one must consider the weaknesses and inefficiencies found in Spain’s institutions and systems. To start off Sands immediately compares Spain’s situation to past occurrences in other countries in which weakness within a state has allowed organized crime groups to take power. The first example Sands gives is the Sicilian mafia in Italy. She states that, “as land became a marketable commodity after the abolition of feudalism and selling off church lands, the landlords and the gabelloti (the tenants of absentee landowners who soon acquired land in their own right) protected themselves and their property through the use of private violence, which they argue was necessary because the state was weak and ineffective”. After establishing themselves through this private violence the Sicilian mafia was able to expand and increase its power by taking advantage of other opportunities available to them. By increasing in power the mafia was then able to begin filling in holes left by the weak or inefficient state. The next example Sands gives is of post-Soviet Russian, in which the end of socialism brought about an increase in the number of transactions involving individuals with property rights. “The fear of being cheated on and of losing property also increased, which led to a demand for trust and protection”. This opened up the door for private suppliers such as the Russian mafia to provide these protection services, and just like in Italy, the organized crime groups began to fill the holes left by the dysfunctional state institutions.
The third example Sands gives is Japan and the growth of yakuza groups. Just like Russia and Italy, post-feudal Japan had an increase in property rights alongside a weakness of enforcement mechanisms. The yakuza then stepped in to provide these services which the state was failing to provide. The second period in which Japan experienced this weakness was following the Second World War, where Japanese police were too weak to keep order within the public so yakuza groups were able to work freely. The final example Sands gives is the inefficiency of both political and economic institutions within Colombia, that then in turn allowed the drug industry to run rampant as authorities are unable to put any anti-drug policies into effect. Following these examples Sands goes on to compare what has happened in the countries above to what is occurring in Spain.
One difference that can be seen between Spain and the countries above is that while the other countries have domestic crime groups in power, the power of organized crime lies within the transnational groups in Spain. However, Sands states that these transnational groups also seek out weak and inefficient states and institutions where they can fill the holes left behind. The other reason a weak or inefficient state can explain organized crime in Spain is the country’s switch to a democracy. As seen in the examples above, a switch in government creates a transition period where it takes time for new institutions to establish themselves. Organized crime groups can exploit this period, and Sands states that it was seen that the expansion of organized crime in Spain occurred within the years after this transition. Other factors that Sands says can indicate inefficiencies in the institutions and systems are “incidences of political (and other types of) corruption, a lack of political and public attention given to the problem of organized crime, some legal and judicial deficiencies and some apparent complexities surrounding law enforcement and policing structures”.
Overall I believe that Sands argument here is very strong, and she does very well at prefacing the factors that she states influence organized crime in Spain, with examples from past occurrences in other countries. Sands does very well in using examples that directly pertain to what is happening with organized crime in Spain. I do not have any major critiques of this argument, and it was very informative to learn more about how organized crime groups begin and grow in power. The first argument that Sands makes is that Spain is not a country that most people associate with organized crime, even though it is quite prevalent within the country. One reason for this is the lack of literature and empirical studies done in English on crime in Spain, with Sands stating that it is limited to specific chapters in edited books. As said above, Sands also states that in 2005 there were 471 crime groups within Spain that had at least three members, and 174 of those groups had between six and twelve members.
I do agree with Sands in that Spain is not a country that most associate with rampant crime and illicit activities. The only critique I have is that without a comparison about the total number of crime groups within the country with an average or with other countries, it is hard to truly gauge how significant having 471 organized groups is.
Overall this article has greatly expanded my knowledge of crime within Spain, and specifically organized crime. As the author stated at the beginning of the article, Spain is typically not a country we associate with organized crime. I also hope that due to the lack of English material on the subject, that we have either seen an increase since this article was published, or that we will see an increase in the near future.
