Critique On Michael Lynch’S Method Game Theory
Skeptics are always arguing the value of reason, and more specifically state that arguments about fundamental epistemic principles simply have no end, and can’t be challenged by noncircular reasons. In Michael P. Lynch’s book, In Praise of Reason, he offers up his own answer for this problem with justifying certain epistemic principles over others. Lynch’s solution is explained through his “method game” where seemingly the same humans on our planet right now will be transferred over to a “parallel Earth” but could end up being completely different people in an almost odd reincarnation type idea. The game has three rules:
- We will eventually live on this parallel Earth,
- We have no knowledge of who will be on this Earth,
- Plays don’t know which principles will be true, which methods and sources of belief formation will actually be reliable.
This essay will discuss why Lynch’s method game is rather too simple and falls short in delivering us his promised way of justifying one set of epistemic principles over another.
First, it should be pointed out that Lynch’s method game is not that bad, and offers a solid methodology for selecting epistemic principles in this imaginary world. When our own fundamental epistemic principles are challenged, and we cannot back them up with epistemic reasons, Lynch offers a way out by using practical reasons. The inhabitants of this imaginary world do not know the social position they will hold, and do not know which epistemic principles will be true, so in a world with epistemic and social equality, all of the people involved will choose the most logically fair and practical principles that can be justified through a common point of view. Going along with this idea of a common point of view, Lynch explains how these inhabitants will choose the epistemic principles that are in their self-interest to favor, and since everyone is on the same level socially, they will apply to everyone. Lastly, Lynch states, “We should privilege principles that recommend methods and practices that are repeatable adaptable, intersubjective, and transparent. ” This is a very fair point because he just basically described how modern day science works. Theories are made public and put through harsh, intense, and subjective cross examinations and critiques by anyone and everyone who wishes to challenge them, and this can be beneficial in highlighting possible flaws and negative aspects.
Although it has its merits, Lynch’s method game falls short on providing the best procedure for justifying one set of epistemic principles over another. Lynch’s game seems to only scratch the surface of the skepticism argument, and only offers very shallow answers. When it comes down to trying to resolve the deeper epistemic disagreements, it only looks at arguments pragmatically, which is mostly a primitive or computerized way of thought and justification. In this game, the inhabitants choose specific epistemic principles because they are pragmatically justified though their own point of view and self-interest. By doing this, people are not debating or thinking what is objective truth or good or valuable, but rather they’re opinions only derive from looking each situations circumstances and factors. Lynch himself even acknowledges the objection that this game only provides practical reasons. He replies by saying these reasons have epistemic consequences, and that being committed to an epistemic principle makes us stop looking into its truth value and from then on will consider the method reliable and base further beliefs off of it. So if this game is saying that it is rational to commit to a principle, then it implies that we can hold on so tightly to it, that it will blind us and not allow us to realize how unjustified all of our future beliefs or actions will be that stem off of that one principle.
Lastly, Lynch admits that the method game doesn’t give us a reason to believe any particular principle is true, and it is not meant to. Lynch explains how the game is simply meant to give reasons for committing to those principles. This is a good statement to keep in mind because it is Lynch basically saying that it is basically impossible to give epistemic reasons for fundamental epistemic principles to a skeptic, or anyone else who simply doesn’t believe or doubts those principles. Lynch is completely avoiding that entire aspect and has decided to come at the problem from a completely different angle, and just focus on something that he can do, which is to convey reasons for committing to principles, instead of arguing for the actual principles themselves.
At the surface, Lynch’s “method game” appears to be an insightful and interesting approach to trying to answer the epistemic relativism argument from skeptics. The game offers a pragmatic approach to picking epistemic principles that is also based on people’s self-interest. However, when one tries to dive deeper into this game and ask more serious questions, the method game does not have any answers for them. The game is simple, and can only offer practical reasons and choices to problems and arguments being faced by the inhabitants of the parallel planet, and Lynch understands and admits this. Lynch’s method game does deliver on its promise to provide a procedure for justifying one set of epistemic principles over another, but falls short in providing a compelling argument for preferring a particular set of epistemic principles, and the argument against epistemic relativism.
