Understanding of the Role of Parliamentary Oversight in Enhancing Accountability
Review of Literature
This section provides a conceptual framework of oversight and accountability as a foundation of this research study. It also sets the theoretical foundations in which the parliamentary oversight role in budget accountability is revealed. These elements serve as a point of departure to the study and will be done by reviewing the related literature from previous studies; thus making use of scholarly debate and empirical evidence.
The understanding of the role of parliamentary oversight in enhancing accountability is determined by a clear interpretation of parliament’s role and its connection with accountability.
Oversight and accountability
Generally, oversight signifies the elements of supervision and regulation, while accountability implies some sense of responsibility. Therefore, the connection between these concepts is revealed by a general impression that; it is such responsibility that has to be supervised and regulated.
Oversight is a much broader subject which encompasses the elements of supervision, monitoring, and control of actions by public officials, bureaucrats, and politicians to ensure that they align with the legislation, set standards, goals, objectives, and targets, as well as the codes of conduct. Parliamentary oversight is perceived by Calland, as a mechanism for representative accountability as well as a form of democracy as the parliamentarians speak for the people and they represent citizens’ interests to the executive. Therefore, effective parliamentary oversight secures accountability. Mbete highlighted that parliamentary oversight becomes effective if the parliament executes its duties independently and autonomously and with integrity. It is important for the parliament to exercise its powers within the bounds of the legal framework. Yamamoto defined parliamentary oversight as “the review, monitoring, and supervision of the government and public agencies, including the implementation of policy and legislation”. In budgetary context, the mechanisms for oversight function of parliaments encompass the role of parliamentary committees which includes plenary debates and hearing procedures. It is a parliamentary duty to provide oversight functions to the government/executive. Oliver is of the argument that parliament is a citizen ‘representative body’ which provides checks and balances mainly on financial issues that support effectiveness in decision making, policymaking, and implementation. Therefore, oversight and supervisory roles are aimed at generating effective accountability and sound decision-making and as a way of reproof, rectification, indemnification as well as legal prosecution for criminal behavior, offenses, and corrupt tendencies.
The notions of oversight and accountability have long been studied; there exist volumes of studies to which a huge amount of literature can be critically reviewed. The study by Bovens serves as a landmark for the study of accountability. He maintained a more generalized understanding of accountability, which is a ‘social relation’, embedded within the ‘principal-agent perspective’. It is noteworthy that, the principal-agent approach shapes the dynamics of EU budget accountability and the entire discussion on the general EU budget oversight. In simple terms, the principal oversees and scrutinizes the action of the agency. Accountability is defined as:
“…a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences” Bovens.
Provided with the aforementioned definition, accountability is oversimplified to the notions of ‘account giving’, ‘answerability’, and formal or informal obligation on the part of an actor as well as ‘scrutiny’, ‘holding to account’, ‘questioning and ‘judgment passing’ by the forum. An important realization is that on one hand, a forum oversees and scrutinizes the actor’s actions and on the other hand, an actor has to provide a full account of his or her actions to the forum.
In some instances, the concepts of oversight and accountability are used interchangeably; characterized by ‘holding to account and giving an account’. The notion of accountability gives cognizance of what is being done and who is responsible for the task, with what expenses as well as with what success. It is, therefore, an obligation on the part of public officials and servants to account for their actions to the public. Henceforth, the central argument of this thesis relies on the above interpretation of oversight and accountability, which is analyzed in detail in the later parts.
Oversight and Accountability as a ‘principal-agent relationship’
The principal-agent relationship is an integral perspective surrounding the understanding of accountability. Thus, the approach and its underlying assumptions entirely aid both conceptualization and operationalization of concepts studied. In simple terms, the relationship between oversight and accountability is best understood within the lens of the principal-agent perspective in which the principal oversees and scrutinizes the actions of an agent who acts within the interest of the principal. Analyzing the oversight function of a principal (EP) over the actions of the agency (Commission) is probably the most significant way of revealing the dynamics of EU budget accountability.
Parliamentary oversight and accountability relationship entail that the performance and tasks of a single agency are under scrutiny by another body which requires that the former have “to provide information with regards to its performance and actions, as well as justifying such actions”. Sharman, argues in his report, that the agency (which may be the government or the executive) has to ‘give an explanation’ (annual reports), ‘provide further information if required’; and the parliament reviews the information given, by ‘examining the performance and practices’ Finally, the parliament issue a decision in which they either give measures for redress or may sanction the agency.
Parliamentary oversight instruments.
A parliament is a citizen ‘representative body’ championing the interests of the public, and its major responsibility is to ensure public accountability and executive/ government transparency. Thus, parliamentary oversight is commonly referred to as ‘political scrutiny’. In any democratic society and institution, parliamentarians are vested with key legislative powers to scrutinize the executive actions as provided in the regulatory and legal provisions. The powers of parliament vary; from law-making, policy, and program monitoring to overseeing government spending and approving budget implementation. However, parliamentary oversight can also be in the form of ‘administrative oversight’ which includes carrying out assessments, investigations, and questioning of the government/executive through oversight mechanisms such as a committee system, parliamentary questions, and debates. Such tools serve as the ‘modes of inquiry’ upon which the parliament executes its duties. The effective use of these parliamentary oversight tools guarantees accountability; henceforth, the success or failure of these tools to deliver depends on the following key elements: the type of tools the parliament employs; the institutional structure and capacity of the Parliament; the political atmosphere in which the parliamentarians operate; the political capacity, will and commitment of the Committees; regulatory framework and legal powers, and information availability.
The key roles of parliamentary oversight include prevention of power abuse and bad conduct by public office holders, controlling and regulating management and spending of public funds and resources, protecting of public interests; ensure that government officials act in compliance with the legal provisions; ‘thus holding public officials accountable’. A number of scholars agree on the various instruments upon which parliaments exercise their functions; with the common ones being that:
“Parliament can simply ask the government for information; can request for further clarification; can obtain information from sources outside the government and can express its views to the government and the public. Consequentially, parliament often has a constitutional power to remove the office holders in the executive branch when the latter no longer seems to be performing its proper function”.
Deriving from the more general aforementioned tools, more specific parliamentary oversight tools commonly used include committees, plenary session hearings, and establishment of commissions of inquiry, sessions of questioning as well as interpellations.
The committee system is the primary oversight tool which the legislatures engage. The oversight mandate is always executed within the committees since it is within the Committees that other tools rely on. It is within the parliamentary committees that the hearing procedures, debates, and questioning of the executive or government are conducted. However, parliamentary committees vary in terms of their functions and responsibilities. Griffith (2005), distinguished committees into five distinct categories, namely, legislative review, public accounts, estimates, standing, and specialized oversight committees. These committees serve different functions, hence in this context, the standing committees are of key importance. Standing committees perform a significant oversight function in public institutions' policy departments, ranging from budget, agriculture, health, development, environment, etc. Such committees serve as drivers for providing best practices for the government and the executive regarding the execution of their roles. Therefore, the parliamentary Committee system serves as a platform for the utilization of oversight tools in which the executive and government agencies can present information to the parliament, defending their actions before the parliamentarians.
The Plenary questions and interpellations are common tools extensively employed by parliamentarians with whom questions are presented to the executive body, agencies, and members concerned. Such a tool is mostly used when the parliament requires information; presses the executive to take an action; demands for clarity and justification of the executive position; and wants to reach a compromise with the executive.
Auditing is a significant administrative tool for ensuring public budget accountability by the executive to the parliament and to the public at large. It is the role of audit institutions to scrutinize public accounts, verifying compliance, checking for errors, abuse of funds, and incorrect spending in the executive annual financial accounts. Friedberg and Hazan argue that audit institutions offer a very significant contribution to the oversight function of the parliament as they provide the parliament with reliable, detailed, comprehensive, and objective annual reports with information regarding the executive expenditure and how the implementation was conducted. It is important for audit institutions to perform their role independently and without executive interference.
Henceforth, budgetary oversight is perceived to be the most significant oversight function by parliaments as the public budget has a direct bearing on the citizens unlike in policy and decision-making areas. It is the citizens’ money that has to be accounted for. According to Friedberg and Hazan, the parliament performs two fundamental roles in the budgetary process, which are; giving approval to the proposed budget and scrutinizing how the budget has been implemented through the aforementioned oversight mechanisms; with the latter role as the most critical one as much as issues of accountability is concerned. Therefore, it is within the interest of the parliament to hold those responsible for budget implementation accountable.
Accountability and three elements/phases.
Accountability consists of three elements: information, discussion, and consequences; in which the agent provides information to the principal; then the discussion follows as the principal would want to question the behavior of the agent based on the information given; and this result into a consequence or eventually, the imposition of a sanction to the actor by a forum. Various scholars have consistently agreed that the understanding of the principal-agent approach’s notion of the interaction between an actor and forum revolves around three elements; information, discussion/debate, and consequences/sanctions/decision. These elements give some practical sense in understanding accountability and they are key to the measurement of accountability.
The Information phase is probably the first and foremost stage in which an agent/actor is required to give ‘an account of his conduct and behavior towards the accountability forum’. In this case, the agent has to produce some records with descriptions, explanations, narrations, or statistical calculations regarding his actions to the forum. Following information provision is the discussion/debate stage which can be conducted formally or informally and in the form of a debate or a hearing procedure. In such a scenario, a forum may seek more clarifications from the actor concerning the information given; and as such the forum may require more information from the actor by posing written or oral questions. Finally, in the consequence/decision phase, the forum decides on the measures to take with regard to the actor’s conduct. Henceforth, the forum may impose punitive measures or impose sanctions in the event of a more serious breach of an.
