Free Will And Moral Responsibility

Introduction

We, as adults, think that we are capable of making rational choices. Unfortunately, we are subordinate to our chemical make-up more than we think. Imagine yourself in the shoes of someone breaking the law, like someone having unwanted desires that they feel unable to overcome. You will most likely conclude, “Well, I wouldn’t have done that”. Acts cannot be understood separately from the biology of the actors. Since you weren’t exposed to the same chemical make-up as they did, is this person responsible about their actions and can you compare your decision to theirs? In this paper I persuade the idea that a 40-year old man (who had his chemical make-up changed due to a brain tumor) is responsible for actions engaging pedophilia that he committed based on his impulses. However, his degree of responsibility and punishment (sentencing) should reflect that he only had the desires and acting on them while he had the tumor. I will present my position by summarizing the case and use Harry Frankfurt view of freedom and moral responsibility.

An article by JAMA Neurology published the case of an ordinary, 40-year old man, who was in a healthy marriage and had no history of sexual assault or pedophilia. He had a preexisting strong interest in pornography dating back to adolescence, but no attraction to children. The man began to develop an “increasing interest” in pornography, especially child and adolescent pornography. He was hiding his activities, because he felt that there were “unacceptable”. Over time he began acting on his impulses and made “subtle sexual advances toward his prepubescent stepdaughter”. He was removed from the home and eventually “found guilty of child molestation”. Despite the option of facing prison, he was unable to overcome his desires and even solicited “sexual favors from staff and other clients” at a rehab facility. The man complained of headaches. The twist on this story is that a brain scanner of the 40-year old man’s brain found a right orbitofrontal tumor. Interestingly enough the patient’s sexual desires and pedophilia disappeared when the tumor was removed. However, a year later his headaches returned, and he secretly started to collect pornography. A magnetic resonance imaging showed tumor regrowth. This case raises the question: Is the 40-year old patient responsible for his actions even though his brain tumor was not his fault?

Frankfurt and Responsibility

In his article, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Harry Frankfurt classifies “a structure of a person’s will” in order to distinguish the “persons” and “non-persons”. According to Frankfurt, there are two orders of desire. The “first-order desires” are “simply desires to do or not to do one thing of another”, whereas “the second-order desires” are “make decisions based upon prior thought” also meaning to have or not to have desires for a desire of the first order. The author identifies a person’s “will” as a first-order desire, that is “effective” and will (or not) move the person “all the way to action”. The desire for their will (first order desire to be effective), Frankfurt calls a “second order volition”. Some creatures, like children and non-human animals, have no second order volitions. Frankfurt calls such creatures “wantons”. As an example, he compares two drug addicts, an unwilling person and a wanton. The unwilling person wants not to want the drug; but his craving is too strong.

In contrast, the wanton is indifferent in his desires about his desire for the drug, he does not care which second-order desire is presiding. After that the author introduces the “freedom of will” as person’s effective desires are free, as far as they can control their desires. Meaning, a person has free will, and they can bring their first order desires into line with their second order volitions. He also defines freedom as person’s actions are free if they come from their desires. Frankfurt calls this “freedom of action”. Frankfurt thinks that a person can have no freedom of action and still have freedom of will, because they might still control their will freely according with their second order volitions, even if they cannot act on their freedom of will. The small child and the non-human animal do not have free will, because they have no second-order volitions, they are wantons. The unwilling drug addict lacks free will for a different reason, he has a second order volition, but it does not control his effective desire. So, was the 40-year-old man a wanton or an unwilling person?

He had the “first-order desire” to have sex. The man knew that his desire was “unacceptable” and later had a “strong desire to avoid prison”. He had the “second-order desire” to make his “first order desire” effective by making “subtle sexual advances toward his prepubescent stepdaughter” and “soliciting sexual favors from staff and other clients at the rehabilitation center” even though he was facing a prison sentence. The man’s actions were free because they came from his desires. He had his “freedom of action”. However, he had no “freedom of will”, because the tumor controlled his desires, not the person himself. In my opinion, he is a wanton, because he is lacking “second order volition”. Wanton or not more questions arise: Is he legally responsible for his actions? What about morally?

In my opinion, the man is legally responsible for his actions. He knew about long-term consequences and still decides to move forward with an illegal act, instead of trying to find help. However, what percentage of that decision was his and what was his tumor’s? Could all his acts be on autopilot just like breathing, or heart beating, or blinking, not run by his brain, but overrun by his tumor instead? The question is whether all of our actions are on autopilot by default or a part of us is “free” to choose, independent of the rules of chemical make-up. The men did not choose or want the factors that formed his brain tumor, so the line between the his “free will” and personal responsibility is blurred. The man was not “free” to want what he wanted to want, because there was the “prior cause” of the tumor, that determined the way that he acted. The doctrine of determinism takes the morally responsibility away from his actions, because they were determined by causes external to his will. The man could not have acted differently. In addition, he should get a lighter sentence than someone who had a “free will” and acted on their desires. It might be difficult to put yourself in other person’s shoes, especially one that has a poor impulse control. But we all have our guilty little pleasures. Chocolate anyone? Do we enjoy the short temptation, or do we have control over whether to act upon them? Are we a “wanton” or not?