The Ambiguous Status Of Slavery In Scotland: Baptisms And Black Christians
The very nature of slavery as ambiguous was significant in ensuring the continued enslavement of persons in Scotland. Ambiguity was not a tool in the sense that it could be positively utilised to enforce slavery, nor was it a custom that proactively implemented slavery as an institution. Instead, ambiguity bred uncertainty and passivity in the general population, which meant that slave owners could skew public and judicial perception in their favour and remain largely unchallenged for holding slaves. As such, we must not overlook the importance that ambiguity – as a unique social phenomenon – had on facilitating the holding of persons as enslaved in Scotland.
Notably, the issue of whether baptisms functioned to emancipate slaves caused a large anxiety regarding the status of enslaved individuals in Scotland. Christian justifications were initially important in enforcing slavery throughout the colonies and without legislation to guide those back home; it was unclear where the law stood regarding baptised slaves.
This proved particularly controversial in eighteenth-century Scotland, which was a highly religious society. Slaves presented the argument that undergoing a baptism emancipated them, on the basis that Christians could not be subject to slavery. Although the argument may have been reasonable, Ian Whyte points out that “… this did not necessarily provide a passport for freedom for black slaves”. This is evident when we consider the fact that slave owners refused to accept that baptism might affect the status of a slave. Nonetheless, despite their firm position that baptism did not rescind slavery, many slave owners were hesitant to baptise their slaves, which indicates their uncertainty as to the actual results of a baptism.
Because of the popular – even if incorrect – belief that baptism freed from slavery, slave owners could make use of this uncertainty by simply preventing their slaves from being baptised in order to continue holding them as slaves. In this sense, ambiguity functioned to facilitate the continued practice of holding certain individuals as enslaved.
This uncertainty may have originated from inconsistencies surrounding the nature of the ceremony within the colonies. Drescher notes that baptisms always functioned to free slaves in St Helena but did not do so in Jamaica beyond 1715. Likewise, North and South Carolina denied that baptism resulted in freedom, whilst Georgia and Pennsylvania believed that it did. Furthermore, many colonists were of the opinion that African and Indian slaves were entirely incapable of Christian salvation by virtue of their race, whilst the rules of the East India Company conferred that Christianisation functioned to liberate them both physically and spiritually.
With domestic slavery being inspired and partly legitimised by colonial slavery, the varying opinions on baptism throughout the colonies translated to uncertainty as to its effects back at home. Furthermore, because many Scottish judges acknowledged the commercial and colonial interests vested in slavery, it is possible that they chose to avoid clarifying their opinions on the effects of baptism in Scotland to prevent any disruption of the legitimacy of the institution as a whole.
Both the Scottish and English Parliaments remained silent on the issue of whether baptisms freed from slavery, and without legal tract, there was debate as to its effects in Scotland. The 1729 Yorke-Talbot opinion provided some insight on the issue when it stated that baptism did not affect the status of a slave, but this was strictly English precedence and had no legal standing in Scotland. Regardless, the opinion proved popular in the north, even forming part of the legal argument presented by a slave owner in Sheddan v. Montgomery. However, because the decision was ultimately inconclusive, and because there are no other Scottish court documents dealing with it, we cannot confirm whether the Scottish courts would have validated the opinion.
The question of whether baptism freed slaves proves further controversial when considered in the context of court testimonies. Cairn’s points out the fact that black slaves were able to testify in trial if they were Christian. This may have suggested to some that their new faith had conferred freedom upon them. Black slaves were generally unable to give evidence in court and in the few instances that they could, there were numerous restrictions. For example, it was a requirement that they be put under torture. In contrast, free persons could testify in trial without any impedances whatsoever. In this context, Black Christians were able to testify in trial in a manner less like slaves and more like free persons. That Black Christians were awarded the same privileges as free persons may have reinforced the belief that baptism freed them. However, with an absence of legal material to confirm the factual position of Black Christians, this phenomenon further confuses the juridical status of slaves.
Drescher makes the interesting distinction between voluntary and involuntary baptisms as having an effect on the status of a slave. Involuntary baptism was the idea that baptism without the consent of the master had no effect on the legal status of a slave, but where the master baptised the slave, this was a traditional proclamation that the slave was newly free. Indeed, we can see a technique by which slave masters could control the juridical status of a slave. By simply denying a baptism, the master could deny any religious-based claims of freedom by the slave.
The lack of clarity governing the emancipation of slaves arguably played a role in preserving ambiguity and allowing the holding of enslaved individuals to continue. Cairns points out that the general absence of legislative material governing slavery in Scotland meant that it was unclear how to manumit – or free – slaves. The standard form of manumission at the time was believed to be a ‘deed under seal’, however, Cairns cites the manumission of Scipio Kennedy, whose freedom process contrasts with the standard form of release. Kennedy’s manumission did not come in the traditional form of a ‘deed under seal’ document; instead, he had his freedom confirmed by undertaking a contractual obligation, and becoming a salaried employee, which only a free person could do.
This document did not expressly manumit Kennedy; rather, it consisted of him doing certain things that he could only do if he were a free person. The essence of his freedom here is implied, in that he could not do these things if he were a slave, meaning either the contract was void, or that Kennedy was no longer a slave. Importantly, respectable government officials validated this document, thus validating it as a legitimate form of manumission and recognising Kennedy as a newly free man. Without expressly answering the questions of whether Kennedy was a slave, or whether slavery even existed in Scotland, this document attained the freedom of a slave in a way that both highlights and avoids the issue of the ambiguous condition of slavery in Scotland.
An interesting comparison can be made between Kennedy’s position and that of baptised slaves in that both were afforded certain privileges that at least warranted an argument for their freedom. As previously mentioned, black Christians could testify in court in a manner that only free persons could. Likewise, Kennedy was able to enter an obligation that only a free man could. In both instances, we see a formally recognised process – baptism and manumission - that, to some extent, elevated the status of the slave to that of a free person, by granting them certain privileges that were unavailable to slaves. In the instance of black Christians, granting them these privileges did not necessarily imply their freedom, however, in Kennedy’s case, this clearly implied freedom. This inconsistency in treatment further highlights the Scottish confusion surrounding the condition of slavery.
On one hand, the obscure process of manumission may have functioned to reinforce slavery, as it meant that slaves could not be precisely sure how to attain their freedom, thus making it more difficult for them to evade enslavement. On the other hand, because both documents seemed to effectively confer freedom, it can be said that slaves had an increased chance to attain freedom. However, because it is unclear how popular this style of manumission was, and whether the bulk of the population were even aware of it, it is impossible to state just how likely this was to confer freedom in practice. Conversely, because the manumission process was obscure enough to warrant interpretation, it is entirely possible that slaves had a wide range of unspecified disposals available to secure their manumission; although these would have been informal and unrecognised, and ultimately of dubious efficacy.
The subject of manumission presents another insight as to how the holding of enslaved individuals was potentially preserved. The existence of a manumission process positively affirms the existence of enslaved persons in Scotland. That a person could be formally freed from the condition of slavery necessarily meant that they must have been held in a position of slavery in the first place. The example of Scipio Kennedy clearly exemplifies this; for him to undertake the obligation, it had to be clear that he was no longer a slave. Additionally, because the choice to use manumission procedures were at the master’s discretion, their ability to hold individuals as enslaved was enforced as well as legitimised.
Kennedy’s unconventional manumission process dealt with the issues arising from the ambiguous nature of slavery. It provided answers to unclear questions, like whether slavery existed, and whether Kennedy was a slave. It mediated these qualms without committing itself but still providing clear proof of freedom if necessary.
