The Analysis Of Arguments Hobbes And Rousseau Make On Human Nature
Political theorists, in considering Man as the basic unit of political systems, have attempted to systematically account for the fundamental nature of Man as bases of their theory. Thomas Hobbes applies this approach to formulate the problems necessitating the institution of government from the state of nature – an amoral, pre-political state where Man exists as an autonomous individual. In this state of nature, human nature – the set of rights, instincts, feelings and resulting behaviour that apply universally to all human beings – is fully operative. Jean Jacques Rousseau uses Hobbes’ theory and concepts as a frame of reference, redefining Hobbes’ concepts and refuting his assertions to provides political alternatives that are grounded on differing views of human nature. Both thinkers concur that the state of nature descends into what Hobbes calls a “solitary, poor, brutish and short” existence (70) and Rousseau admits “the human race [will] perish unless it change[s] its manner of existence” (148). To end the vicissitudes of the state of nature, they suggest that all men enter into a Social Contract, relinquishing their natural powers and liberties to a Sovereign which in return provides them with safety and security.
This essay will relate the arguments Hobbes and Rousseau make on human nature to the Sovereign’s grasp of coercive power and its political legitimacy under the Social Contract. By highlighting the differences in their ideas on human nature, the source of the frictions encountered in comparing their politics can be clearly elucidated. Firstly, by inspecting views on Man’s natural disposition to his fellows, each thinker’s view on the limits of the Sovereign’s power can be contrasted. Secondly, exploring their differing views on Man’s natural liberty reveals contrasting commentaries on what constitutes legitimacy being the Sovereign’s normative right to rule, which is distinct from the obedience it receives from the coercive power it wields.
On the way Man relates to others in the state of nature, Hobbes posits a selfish demeanour, while Rousseau disagrees, suggesting that Man is naturally compassionate. Firstly, Hobbes describes Man as naturally selfish for personal gain, safety and reputation; these being positional goods which are relatively perceived through comparing to that of another’s (70). Secondly, Man is equal in mutual destruction, where “the weakest has enough strength to kill the strongest” (68). Therefore, a power struggle emerges over competition for positional goods, where Man can only enjoy security which comes from his own strength (70). However, Rousseau refutes Hobbes’ supposition that “because [M]an has no idea of goodness, he must be naturally wicked” (140). Instead, Rousseau believes that Man is naturally compassionate which “supplies the place of laws, morals, and virtues with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice” (139).
For the sake of Man’s self-preservation and contentment, Hobbes proposes a Social Contract where all men consent to giving power to a Leviathan with absolute control over legislation and coercive power to enforce laws (50). What necessitates the Leviathan’s absolute power is Man’s selfishness and equality of mutual destruction. Therefore, by wielding absolute power, it can guarantee that harming another’s person or misappropriating their property is a far more hazardous enterprise than obeying laws. This arrangement guarantees the safety and security that men entered into the Social Contract for.
Before the Social Contract, Rousseau describes the development of private property to alter Man’s natural state, thus rendering his contrasting account of Compassion a useful offence against Hobbes’ thought, but less relevant to his own Social Contract (142). While Hobbes finds it essential that the Leviathan is “not itself subject to the civil laws” and possesses inalienable rights to its position (52), Rousseau challenges the lack of a right to rebellion against the Leviathan, stating that “universal silence is taken to imply the consent of the people” (152). Under Rousseau’s Social Contract, individuals submit power under the general will, in which every individual’s will is collectively articulated with all others’ in the law. Every man simultaneously constitutes the general will and is subjected to the Sovereign’s coercive powers, unlike the subjects of the Leviathan.
Furthermore, Rousseau denies the Leviathan’s rule by power alone as justifiable, since “force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers” (145). Therefore, Rousseau suggests that for the Sovereign to perform its duties on legitimate grounds, its rights have to be justified on grounds other than might. How, if not by power, can Hobbes argue for the Leviathan’s legitimacy? Furthermore, how does Rousseau himself justify the legitimacy of his government under his Social Contract?
In the same way, an inspection of legitimacy brings one to an underlying aspect of human nature: natural liberty. Upon this point, Hobbes and Rousseau define natural liberty and the extent of the rights that proceed from them differently. Hobbes asserts that it entails the “absence of external impediments” to Man’s actions, to the troubling extent that “every man has a Right to everything; even to one another’s body” (72). At first glance, Man’s natural liberty under Rousseau looks similar as Man’s “unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting” (151). However, he limits this notion, stating that “no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right” (145). Additionally, Rousseau defines the limit of the natural liberty (and duties thereof) of Man from convention, where he argues that ties outside the basic requirements of nature (like preserving familial ties beyond the natural law of self-preservation) are conventions (145). These very conventions “form the basis of all legitimate authority among men” (145).
By first turning to Hobbes’ account of legitimacy, Rousseau’s position against it can be clearly understood. The Leviathan’s legitimacy is established when men exercise their natural liberty in renouncing their rights and confer on it the authority to exercise its will on them through legislation and coercion, on the promise to provide security and stability to them (50). Therefore, it is accorded the normative right (and not just obedience by coercion) to limit Man’s behaviour, punishing him when he breaks the laws it sets (51). Through this, Hobbes implicitly denies the possibility of Man enjoying the same freedom under the Leviathan as in the state of nature. Furthermore, given the Leviathan’s inalienable rights to its position, this can lead to the troubling possibility that it abuses its license to legislation and coercion, rendering life in certain fundamental aspects worse than in the state of nature.
Rousseau anticipates this very problem and accordingly denies Hobbes’ account of legitimacy on two grounds. He pronounces the willing act of transferring one’s natural liberty and the Leviathan’s performance of its promises as illegitimate. Rousseau considers renouncing one’s liberty as surrendering the rights and duties of humanity, which is incompatible with human nature (146). Furthermore, he considers yielding to force as “an act of necessity not of will”, and by limiting the peoples’ wills through coercion, the Leviathan cannot be considered legitimate (144). To Rousseau, a legitimate government must uphold Man’s safety while avoiding infringement upon his will.
To preserve the liberty of individuals, Rousseau accounts for legitimacy by reconciling the will of the Sovereign with that of the individual through the general will. In obeying laws, people obey their own wills through the general will and thus retain their liberty, which Rousseau now terms “civil liberty” (151). This Social Contract is enacted by convention and is not an immutable fact of nature. Additionally, the general will is grounded on the common interest of society and distinguished from the “particular will” of individuals, where one “may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject” (150). The general will intervenes such that offenders are “forced to be free” from their passionate tendencies which act against the general will and impede their freedom (150). With this arrangement, Rousseau’s Sovereign manages to protect individuals’ property and person while still preserving their liberty and admits that only on the “common interest that every society should be governed” (151).
Therefore, through elucidating the assumptions of human nature posited by each thinker, one is equipped to deconstruct the anatomy of each thinker’s politics for deeper analysis of the critical frictions that arise between them. One can note the links drawn by each thinker to his particular Social Contract; from Hobbes’ accounts of human nature to the construction of his Leviathan, and Rousseau’s accounts of Man’s liberty to how it is preserved in the general will. To set checks on Man’s natural selfishness, liberty, and his equality of mutual destruction to others, Hobbes opts for a Leviathan, and justifies its use of power with the consent of the people. Rousseau regards this account as fundamentally incompatible with his own views on human nature and denies both the absolute power and legitimacy of the Leviathan. Instead, Rousseau ensures that under the Social Contract, no Man is above the law and to retain his natural liberty, adopts the democratic idea of the general will.
Bibliography
- Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan, in Modern Political Thought, pp. 43-64, and The Leviathan (Norton, 1997), pp. 68-72, 79-80, 122-124, 176.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, and The Social Contract, in Modern Political Thought, pp. 133-154.
