The Type of Tsardom That the Last Rulers of Russia Adopted
Three episodes serve to illustrate the type of Tsardom that the last rulers of Russia adopted. On 26th December 1825, the Decemberist Revolt took place in an attempt to protest against Nicholas I assumption of the Throne. The rebellion, however, was poorly organized and easily suppressed. For the first time new ideas, contesting the absolute prerogative of the Romanovs, were debated within Russia, which marked a return to Muscovy tradition. The motto “autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality”, expressed the principles which applied to a new system of society, in which suppressing liberal thought, controlling the universities, increasing censorship, persecuting religious and national minorities, and strengthening the secret police were enacted by the Tsar to protect their divine rights. Where intellectual life was in ferment, the revolutionary movement took form. With Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol a golden age in literature began, and new ideologies and new opposition arose. Nicholas had created a “state of spies”, people lived in paranoia; neighbors had become enemies and corruption was rife. Nicholas’ obsession with absolute obedience and precision was only a façade as corruption and confusion lay behind the curtain of discipline. His era of the throne further alienated civilians from the sovereign autocrats. He played the game of War incorrectly (e.g. His attempts to dominate the Ottoman Empire led to the disastrous Crimean War 1853–56) shattering the myth of Russia ever becoming a leading world power during the period of the Tsars. Similar forms of the ruling were also seen with Paul I, whereby his reign was just as tyrannical as his personality. Paul’s paranoia led the Russian court to turn into a vicious circle of spies and sycophants who readily informed upon one another. Punishment for transgressors was severe: flogging, branding, and being banished to Siberia were regular sentences for anyone who crossed Paul's administration. He forbade many insidious practices which had crept into the Russian military, such as the children of officers occupying paid positions and officers using personal carriages. He also cracked down on the absenteeism and desertion rife amongst the officer classes. Though Paul’s reforms were, in theory, positive, they had a negative effect on morale, and officers and ordinary soldiers alike resented the changes. Paul’s domestic policies were eclectic, the nobility, for instance, were required to dress in military-style and anyone caught wearing the popular French fashions of the day risked being publicly stripped and forced to conform. Paul banned the import of foreign literature and harshly punished bureaucrats or army officers who performed poorly. The Tsar's retreat to Muscovite tradition created a regime which was predominantly one of militarism and bureaucracy, their era of the throne further alienated civilians with the sovereign autocrats leading to a snowballing growth of opposition domestically and internationally. Under the reign of Nicholas, I, and Paul I, the seed to catastrophe was planted, and the collapse of the Tsars was inevitable.
The second episode is that of the reign of Alexander II, Defeat in 1856 and the subsequent Treaty of Paris was a humiliation for Russia, shattering the myth of Russian military might be established in 1815 and forcing a complete reassessment of Russia’s social and economic structure; modernization in Russia became inescapable. The Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 opened the possibility of Russian development on western European lines, socially, economically, and politically, and the subsequent reforms (most importantly in education with the regard to the development of opposition) of the 1860s marked the first steps towards this. Alexander's intentions can be found from a letter to Russian nobility in March 1856, in which he expressed: “I called the attention the attention of the leaders of the Moscow Nobility to the necessity for them to occupy themselves with improving the lives of the serfs, adding that serfdom could not continue forever and that it would therefore be better if the transformation took place from above, rather than below”. The planning of this discourse is noteworthy, the discourse was articulated on that month the Crimean war finished which had obviously outlined that Russia's situation as a significant force was compromised should it keep on depending on a serf-based armed force. This is reminiscent of the intentions in liberation, not mirroring some liberal perfect against the framework as such. Additionally, the crowd is noteworthy, the Tsar realized that notwithstanding quickened monetary decrease of the honourability because of changes, influence on such an issue was fundamental. This directs the Tsar's intense tone representing the case as a 'necessity' and that change is unavoidable in spite of their supposition. Generally, the source recommends that Alexander II perceived the requirement for change and was set up to focus on it proposing that he was a Petrine Tsar and was available to change inside the Tsarist administration. Ultimately, as with other reforms of alexander II, the emancipation may be seen as creating many problems as it solved, although it did, on the whole, bind ex-serfs to the tsars. All the other reforms had limitations and failed to satisfy all those who demanded reform. Thus, opposition developed despite reforms and alexander felt it necessary to retreat from his earlier liberal position to autocracy. It is notable, however, that immediately before his assassination, he was considering the introduction of limited constitutional change in the form of the loris Melinkov proposals. These may have produced a constitutional monarchy, but the assassination of alexander effectively ended this possibility, at least for the short term. Overall, despite Alexander II attempts to revolutionize the autocratic system, and implement a Petrine system, his reforms failed to gain momentum. The new openness encouraged by these reforms aroused expectations which the Tsar would never be able to satisfy, particularly given his still deep-rooted belief in autocracy. His reforms created as many problems as it solved.
The third episode is that of Nicholas II and Alexander III, who both marked an autocratic rule based on Muscovy. Despite the fact that Alexander II could have permitted Tsardom to advance. His successors, in embracing an exacting Muscovite way to deal with Tsardom, proposed that such advancement would not occur. Both Tsar's techniques were authoritarian, paternalistic, and frequently deficient in contrast with their antecedent. Alexander III implemented and broadened dictatorship and Nicholas II looked to proceed with this. Alexander III took a course towards the halfway liquidation of his dad's changes. He didn't expect to take part in discourse with the resistance, doing everything to obliterate the progressive development. An open letter from Leo Tolstoy to the Tsar in 1902 represents the repressive tools used by the Tsar in order to maintain order: “The prisons are overcrowded with convicts and political prisoners. At no time have religious persecutions of Jews been so cruel as they are today. In all cities and industrial centers, soldiers are employed and equipped with live ammunition to be sent out against the people.”. The occasion of this source (1902) is significant, as the previous year was fuelled heavily by political motifs of the new urban middle class and working class e.g. the first working-class political parties were established in Russia in 1901. The tone is contemptuous but has underlying themes of fretfulness. Themes of fretfulness are illustrated by Tolstoy’s description of soldiers being “sent out against the people”, alluding to the inevitable signs of civil unrest. Whereas tones of contemptuousness are addressed through his depiction of a lack of religious and political freedom “At no time have religious persecutions of Jews been so cruel as they are today.”. The source illustrates Nicholas’ commitment to an autocratic rule based on the Muscovy tradition as well as his reluctance to accept change. However, it is important to not take this source at face value due to Tolstoy’s personal beliefs in Anarchism as well as his belief that the aristocracy was a burden on the poor, his opposition to private land ownership, and his rejection of traditional institutions e.g. marriage; therefore Tolstoy’s remarks may be exaggerated simply because of his values and belief of the entrenched aristocracy within Russia, limiting the validity of the source. However, as the evidence suggests, Nicholas II during his reign failed to resolve the fundamental challenges that the country was facing in the beginning of the 20th century. The consequences of the Tsar’s actions were disastrous, eliminating Tsarist blood, rendering Tsardom a piece of complex history, which sets precedent for other monarchies on why their footsteps should not be followed.
The second factor to consider in answering the question is the impact of opposition. Historian Orlando Figes makes an argument suggesting that the Romanovs were “retreating to the past, hoping that it would save them from the future”. Contrasted to the more liberal belief of Western political culture, the Romanov’s political repression was undoubtedly recessive. the repression drove rivals of the Tsarist state to more radical ideas, e.g. if Lenin’s brother Aleksandr hadn’t been executed by the Tsars on May 8th, 1887, the Bolshevik revolution may not have occurred in the way we recognize today. However, this is not to dictate the idea that the Romanov’s survival would have been granted if he wasn’t executed, their downfall would have occurred in a different manner. Arguably, the last two Tsars (Alexander III and Nicholas II) and their fixed dictatorial manner, paired with their rejection to reform of Russian society, made their downfall inevitable. Subsequently, a dispute between a promptly more educated, urban, and intricate society, and an antiquated autocracy that would not accept its political power, became inevitable. It is valid to suggest that, the opposition had stemmed from the need for reform, which is illustrated in Milyukov’s lectures on the need for reform (1905). In these remarks, he describes the urgency of political reform in Russia: he states “Yes, the impelling forces are there and they are twofold: the material crisis and the political disaffection… Russia is passing through a crisis; she is sick and her sickness is so grave as to demand an immediate and radical cure. Palliatives can be of no use, rather, they but increase the gravity of the situation. To pretend that all is right in Russia, except for a few “ill-intentioned” persons who are making all the fuss, is no longer ridiculous, it is criminal.”. His use of emotive language such as referring to Russia as “sick” emphasizes Milyukov’s dissatisfaction with the Tsarist system as well his anticipation for a revolution to be the “immediate and radical cure”. The source clearly points to the prevention of progress stemming from the politically timid nobility and wealthy bourgeoise, referring to the situation as a “crisis” in need of a “radical cure”. The inevitability of reform is reinforced several times highlighting the importance of the issue. Milyukov also infers that old values are being challenged due to the lack of cooperation on behalf of the Tsars leading to political and material dissatisfaction, he states that it is “it is no longer ridiculous, it is criminal” to “pretend that all is right in Russia”. According to Orlando Figes, Milyukov returned to Russia during the Russian Revolution of 1905 in many ways as a foretaste of the conflicts of 1917. However, it is necessary to be cautious about this source as Milyukov was a strong critic of the system, and yearned for power himself, hence the reason behind his finding of the Constitutional Democratic party. These features do limit the objectivity of the source.
However, despite the fact that I strongly acknowledge that opposition played a considerable amount in the certainty of the Romanovs, I also came to acknowledge that the increase of opposition was spontaneous, which could have been contained had the Tsars responded in like manner. A key instance being the shock of the February Upheaval, which took the progressive parties both in a state of banishment and in the capital. Lenin's forecast proves the spontaneous idea of the insurgency and dishonors the arguments that the fall of the Romanovs had gotten inescapable because of the factor of an 'Outsider Bolshevik' or opposition; he stated 'we more seasoned men perhaps won't live to see the coming transformation'. Indeed, in Lenin's expectation, he states insurgency was still 'coming' which perhaps owes more to his confidence in the Marxist hypothesis, than in his valuation of the Russian condition at that point. Perhaps, if the Tsar still maintained the backing of the most oppressive tool, the military, the opposition could have been contained. This is demonstrated in the uprising on 23rd February 1917 (International Women’s Day) was the first occasion when the Tsar's military showed hesitance to suppress protesters. This was enormously basic, as it showed cracks of powerlessness in the previously iron-fisted tsarist system, and in the absence of intense repression, 200,000 workers from numerous social backgrounds joined the demonstrations. As a result, until the Tsarist system had lost the support of its military as an apparatus of repression its destruction was never ensured. therefore, the Tsars played a larger part in their downfall than the opposition ever did.
The third and final factor that I will assess in relation to the question is war. I believe it will be inaccurate and deceiving not to classify war as another potential defining moment on the way towards the unavoidable destruction of the Tsarist system; however, I believe that war fuelled negative side effects (e.g. internal opposition) due to inadequate leadership from the Tsars themselves, and was not the main cause of Tsardom’s inevitability. This is illustrated in the upset of February 1917 which was propelled by the same factors as the 'unrest' of 1905. Nevertheless, in 1917 these factors were upgraded by, widespread discontent with the leadership of the war, which was seemingly elevated by the humiliations suffered in WWI as well as the Russo-Japanese War. The contentions of Trotsky on the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese war provide further evidence for my argument. The mortifying Russian misfortunes during war implied the Russian individuals lost trust in the military and the Tsarist political framework and brought to the surface the distress present in quite a bit of Russian culture; it is no incident that the notorious fights of 'Bloody Sunday' on ninth January 1905 happened only weeks after the Russian humiliation at Port Arthur. The 'train' of war collided with Russian history again in 1914, and the epic social and monetary strains it forced on a scarcely modernized Russia could be contended to have made the fall of the Romanovs inescapable. Nicholas II's choice to assume responsibility for the Russian armed force in 1915 may be contended to be the vital minute as to the Romanovs' ruin, as it implied he recognized himself legitimately with the Russian annihilations that followed, leaving himself open to criticisms from his military and his people. Moreover, this choice cut the Tsar off from data about the circumstance in the capital, which would demonstrate exorbitant for the Tsars in February 1917, when, from his home office in Mogilev, the Tsar massively underestimated the seriousness of the situation in his capital 500 miles away and ill-advisedly sanctioned the use of force on his people. The choice additionally implied that from 1915-6 the Russian government was left in the hands of the lamentably German Tsarina Alexandra and her confidence healer Rasputin, a man whose impact and consequent death seriously harmed the picture of the tsarist system. Then again, had the Russian armed force vanquished the Germans in the war (and it had a veritable chance of doing as such with its underlying hostile in August 1914, and afterward again in June-July 1916) the Tsar would have increased a tremendous ubiquity help and could possibly have followed the way of his partner Britain towards a genuine protected government. Despite the heavy consequences of war e.g. Russia’s annihilations and the declining financial issues at home - as long as the tsarist system held its nerve and held the faithfulness of the military, it would be near on unimaginable for nonconformists to mount a test sufficiently topple the system.
In conclusion, the inevitability of Tsardom can certainly be attributed to the Tsars themselves. Although certain Tsars e.g. Nicholas II and Alexander III played a greater role in the grave-digging of the Tsars due to their belief in Muscovy tradition, which consisted of their restrain for reform etc, it is safe to attribute some blame to all Tsars, including the ill-fated Alexander and those who ruled before him. As stated by Figes previously, “the Tsars were retreating to the past, hoping it would save them from the future”. The Tsars were reluctant to incorporate reform due to their entrenched belief in autocracy. Subsequently, a dispute between a promptly more educated, urban, and intricate society, and an antiquated autocracy that would not accept its political power, became inevitable. Although it is justified to claim that war and opposition were both significant factors in the collapse of Tsarism, I believe it is more accurate to classify both factors as a catalyst rather than the main factor for the Romanov Dynasty’s inevitability. Where Historians such as Figes and Kochan and Abraham differ is not over what is an indisputable fact of the timing of the abdication, but over the balance of importance of long-term events. As suggested in the introduction of the essay, there is some common ground amongst historians, but the balance of probability is that Tsardom would have at some stage collapsed, given the inherent conservatism of Tsardom which was increasingly dissonant with the developments taking place in Russia.
