The US Bioterrorism Defense Program

Most recently the corona virus and other outbreaks have become challenging to contain. Enigmatic in origin and coupled with scientific advances in biological warfare it is quickly outpacing the discipline of detection and preventive measures, threatening the nations of the world. Germ warfare is no longer just a futuristic nightmare, it is a very real danger to all of us. With that said it warrants the question; can we stop the threat of biological weapons?

National Biodefense Strategy

The US Bio Defense Program is a synergy of programs intended to increase transparency, increasing communication and efficiency of information flow. More formally and recently branded in recent years as the National BioDefense Strategy. The National Biodefense Strategy refers to all levels of government collectively with private enterprise and concerned contributors, in the United States to carryout activities associated with biodefense. The exploration of this strategy consists of seven principles which is quite robust and makes room for disconnect and possible single points of failure.

Vision

The vision of this strategy is not only first and perhaps the most vital of all seven. The vision is to effectively prevent, prepare for, respond to, recovers from, and mitigates risk from natural, accidental, or deliberate biological threats. No doubt a vision would not be without historical significance. There has been historical context to present concerns about biological weapons and the potential for bioterrorism. However a vision is only a starting point. A vision cannot capture every aspect or variable. It is dependent on stakeholders to paint a common picture.

Purpose

A deliberate purpose, which brings together and puts in place for the first time, a single coordinated effort to orchestrate the full range of activity that is carried out across the United States Government to protect the American people from biological threats. In theory this is ideal; however it is definitely open to interpretation. Coupled with interpretation is the fiscal issue that history has indicated is a key player in decisions and using available systems and even reverting to old practices that can degrade a program. Consider the Comanche helicopter project which was cancelled and the Army was forced to keep the AH 64 as the single attack helicopter in its inventory. In this case the Comanche was supposed to relieve assets and act as a dual asset helicopter with both recon and attack capabilities. I highlight this because a purpose will change according to fiscal parameters. So we can deduce that a purpose is relative and not a clear-cut concept across agencies.

Threats and Consequences

Threats and consequences identified as “Naturally Occurring Biological Threats” such as infectious diseases, deliberate and accidental biological threats. The use of biological weapons or their proliferation. There are prevalent misconceptions such as the general consensus that biological warfare is exceptionally dirty and atrocious form of warfare that was propelled by the fear of the uncertainty and not facts. Prioritization of theoretical threats leaves room for error. It is safe to say that threats are tangible, terrestrial forms. However as with any warfare an opportunistic adversary may exploit a carrier of a virus and simply put them on an airplane and propagate the virus. It may look like a simple case of the flu, but by the time the jig is up an adversary has laid the foundation for an opportunistic attack. All the while the focus is on monitoring military chemical munitions and government laboratories and facilities.

Biological Risk Management

Biological risk management is interpreted as requiring an understanding and an assessment of all biological risks. This principle is fallible and is as broad as the universe. A more focused approach would benefit the strategy as a whole. This principle may consider the primary objective of biological warfare attack is man, either directly, or in-directly through limitation of food supply, or in some instances by destroying domestic animal transportation. It is by default antipersonnel but not anti-material warfare, in that housing, buildings, factories, and other structures, and even the soil itself remain intact, and can be made useful. Priority of focus is required and if history is an indicator, it will take an attack to identify and highlight where the focus must be in order to manage risk. In theory this is all relative to probability and thus fallible, but it is a start.

Assumptions

The assumptions principle is perhaps the most concerning, acknowledged as assumptions which include; biological threats are persistent, biological threats originate from multiple sources, infectious diseases do not respect borders, multi-sectoral cooperation is critical for prevention and response, a multidisciplinary approach will help prevent disease emergence, science and technology will continue to advance globally. Assumptions accounts for the uncertain as well as the probable to include historical and the ever changing adversary. The variables with assumptions run the gamut. Political, ideological, uniformed armies, guerillas, religious factions and domestic terrorism. The uncertainty makes it almost certain an attack will take place and the target will be caught off-guard.

Governance

Governance is a dedicated mechanism, housed within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to coordinate federal biodefense activities and assess the effectiveness with which the National Biodefense Strategy’s goals and objectives are being met. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is charged with coordination and assessing both domestic and international efforts. This is a daunting task because the agency will have to reach out to international and foreign agencies to compile and paint a picture of activities in real time. In order to provide valid data at any given time the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services must have priority when requesting data.

Goals and Objectives

Goals and objectives principle has five goals associated with objectives creating a layered risk management approach to countering biological threats and incidents. This is a tall order when you consider the outlined Goals. Enable risk awareness to inform decision-making across the biodefense enterprise. Ensure biodefense enterprise capabilities to prevent bioincidents. Ensure biodefense enterprise preparedness to reduce the impacts of bioincidents. Rapidly respond to limit the impacts of bioincidents. Facilitate recovery to restore the community, the economy, and the environment after a bioincident. The goals speak of risk, prevention, preparedness, and response. We have assets in place domestically. The projection of these assets to explore and assess a given incident is merely a response and silmutaineously an objective; it is cause for concern when consideration is given to the current state. The coronavirus has caused due concern and in response, citizens are being recalled from Asia. The concern lies in the possibility of introducing the virus to the continental U.S.. Which is in opposition to the objective to promote measures to prevent or reduce the spread of naturally occurring infectious diseases. It is a fine line to walk and may have political undertones that may override the principles of the National Biodefense Strategy.

Conclusion

Currently the corona virus and other outbreaks have become challenging to contain. Delving in to the origins along with scientific advances in biological warfare it is quickly eclipsing the discipline of detection and preventive measures, threatening the nations of the world. Germ warfare is no longer the subject of a Hollywood work of fiction, it is a very real danger to all of mankind. Stopping the threat of biological warfare is a daunting task that will require acute attention and precise reactionary measures to stave off an incident of true terror. Failure and success will be measured by aggregates of casualties. A percentage with regards to the current 7.7 billion souls which eclipses the 1600 casualties of the coronavirus as of the writing of this paper. Needless to say the measure of success is relative.

References

1. President of the United States. (2018). National Biodefense Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-support-national-biodefense/
2. Guillemin, J. (2006). Biological weapons: from the invention of state-sponsored programs to contemporary bioterrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
3. Normount Armament Co. (1969). Military biology and biological warfare agents. Forest Grove, OR.