Utilization Of Mission Command Principles In The Chipyong-Ni Battle

In middle of 1950 began the Korean War that continued until 1953. It wasn’t long until things started looking bad for the U.S. and United Nations forces. They had been pushed back to the lower part of the Korean peninsula and needed to reorganize quickly. It was at the point Colonel Paul J Freeman was given his orders by General Mathew Ridgway to hold a crucial key location called Chipyong-ni. COL Freeman was currently in command of the 23rd Regimental Combat Team (RCT) that consisted of about 4,500 American and French ally troops, which included less than 2,500 infantry. The operation only lasted three days with the first attack the night on February 13th 1951. This operation is considered one of the turning points for the Korean War. COL Freeman leadership gave the needed time in order for U.N. forces to resupply and reorganize to make a counter attack pushing back into Seoul.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.” Mission command was doctranalized as the military's method of command until the early 1980s, years after COL Freeman’s hold at Chipyong-ni. However, that does not take away COL Freeman’s culminated utilization of mission command principles. It shows how such methods were being used by outstanding leaders before being put into a formal writing and COL Freeman’s understanding of leadership. Army doctrine defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” COL Freeman exemplified the necessity of at least four mission command principles such as cohesive teams through mutual trust, a shared understanding of the battle field, provided a clear intent and accepted well thought out risks.

Building a team and sharing mutual trust is something that takes time and must be maintained. COL Freeman created this shared trust before the battle of Chipyong-ni. The 23rd RCT had a victory a few days prior at the Twin Tunnels southeast of Chipyong-ni. It lowered the effectiveness of the regiment but a victory nonetheless, pushing the Chinese further back and allowing his unit to occupy Chipyong-ni. COL Freeman often talked to his Soldiers in areas like the mess hall or while marching to new locations. This allowed him to have insight on how his troops were doing directly from their mouths. This is crucial in not only showing the Soldiers that investment their leader has for them but also help leadership to manage their Soldiers properly. On the night of 14 February COL Freeman had been wounded by mortar shrapnel. Despite this he continued to stay with his men until reinforcements with the main army arrived a couple of days later. The Soldiers respected the Freeman for sticking with them through the suffering and his commitment to victory. This mutual trust of Soldiers knowing their command were doing everything possible to win and command trusting their Soldiers to fight without waiver was crucial to defending against a outnumbering force.

Just like mutual trust, creating a shared understanding takes time and is perishable if not maintained through communication about the situation, problems, and potential solutions. COL Freeman ensured all units had established a good line of communication at Chipyong-ni. He knew the battle field would be in constant change and reinforcing the line on a moment’s notice was critical. His commanders mirrored his confidence for success and that trickled down to the Soldiers. Company commander Beckford Sawyer stated that “There was never doubt in our minds. We knew we were going to succeed” and recalled COL Freeman saying ‘we’re surrounded, but we all stay here and fight it out’. There was buy in from every level of the regiment that understood what was at stake. They needed to take care of each other and fight their way out. COL Freeman understood the constant change of the battlefield and would reassess the battlefield with his staff in tow while soliciting feedback when required.

COL Freeman was commanding a force of 4,500 Soldiers that included a coalition of United Nations troops. If there was one thing he had to make sure his regiment had to understand, it was his intent. “The commander’s intent becomes the basis on which staffs and subordinate leaders develop plans and orders.” Without his staff and subordinate commanders understanding the goal of this operation, they would have been severely limited in their decision making. Even worse they could have done something that went completely against the end state. COL Freeman could not be at every defensive line to make decisions. A number of accounts have been given that show his troops down to the newest troop understood what they were fighting to achieve. One of the ways COL Freeman did this was his consistent battlefield circulations to talk to his commanders and encourage Soldiers directly. These were done not only prior to but also during active fights. This can relate to his trust of the Soldiers standing strong and his Soldiers knowing their leader was confident in their ability to hold the lines.

One of the hardest factors to consider during times of battle as a commander are the risks associated with decisions that could possibly end up losing lives. “When considering how much risk to accept with a course of action, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission against the perceived benefit.” After COL Freeman had first arrived at Chipyong-ni he realized his unit was under manned in order to occupy the hills surrounding the small village and cross roads. Ultimately he had to accept the risk of giving up the high ground in order for him to keep his line well reinforced and a reserve to assist with any weak points in the defensive line. This prudent risk’s reward later was evident to have seemingly outweighed the risk. COL Freeman was able to utilize close air support and his perimeter security to equal the playing field with his out numbering adversary. By utilizing his reserve until absolutely necessary, he was able to capitalize on opportune times that caused large numbers of casualties for the enemy.

Eventually when support from the main army reached Chipyong-ni, COL Freeman made his final orders and boarded a medical helicopter for evacuation. However, his staff was capable of making a crucial decision for a flanking that helped secure a key hill. Being a prime example that his subordinates had a well understanding of the battle field and what had to be done to meet the intent even with their leader gone. Success at the Chipyong-ni is widely considered the pivotal point of the war that helped the 8th Army regain its morale. It gave GEN Ridgway needed time to reinforce lines and prepare the military for a counter attack. Having a unit so ingrained with each other through trials of Twin Tunnels and a strong understanding of their importance to the rest of the UN forces was showcase for what is needed to accomplish the mission while taking necessary risks for rewards of success. COL Freeman showed the utilization of mission command principles for institutes to study for years to come.