Application Of Conflict Resolution Theories In The Kashmir Conflict

By the early 1940s, there was a growing sentiment within Muslim communities across India that there needed to be a separate nation for the Muslim community to administer. Concerns arose primarily because Hindus made up 84% of the country’s population at the time, as well as years of cunning application by the outgoing British Empire to “Divide and Conquer”. A key catalyst in the change in the stance of the Muslim League political party was the rise of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah once famously quipped, “Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature”. After 90 years of struggle against a brutal British Empire, Indian freedom fighters finally won independence on August 15, 1947. Two days after India’s independence, the Radcliffe Line was drawn by splitting 450,000 square kilometres of the subcontinent affecting 88 million people.

The Princely state of Kashmir, however, was unique. Even two months after the Radcliffe Line was in place, Kashmir remained independent. Then ruled by a Hindu ruler, Hari Singh of the Dogra dynasty, Kashmir was and still is a Muslim-majority region. The Maharaja had stalled for time by signing a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan, while also maintaining negotiations with India. In October 1947, the Maharaja confiscated weapons from Muslim men who were part of the British Indian Army. The guns were redistributed to Hindu extremist organisations that were in charge of the defence of local villages. Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan saw this as a clear act of aggression from the Maharaja. An alarmed Maharaja asked India for immediate military assistance. The Governor-General of India agreed, under one massive condition that Kashmir must join India. The Maharaja signed a temporary agreement with India on October 26, 1947. Because of the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan in place, the Pakistani government rejected the accession agreement as invalid. Thus, began the first of three Indo-Pak wars, as well as a ruthless religious violence between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs across the subcontinent. During the war, the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru promised a referendum for the people by saying, “The fate of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people”. A UN resolution passed on August 13, 1948, asked both countries to withdraw their troops so that a referendum may take place. Neither of these events ever happened. In 1949, India and Pakistan declared a ceasefire, with the ceasefire line dividing Kashmir. Over the next 70 years, Kashmir has become the most militarized zone on the planet, with human rights violations rife from the Indian and Pakistani armies. Close to 100,000 Kashmiris have died as a result of the three wars and countless uprisings over the last 80 years. Throughout the years, Kashmiri’s faces viscerous episodes of injustice, tortures, killings, deprivations, rapes and inhuman treatments and violation of human rights. Peace building process can be stepped up in Kashmir only when India, Pakistan and Kashmir jointly opt for an effective conflict resolution process. The conflict resolution theories that I would propose in such a sensitive issue would be the theories of mediation, compromise and penalties.

In the 21st century, Mediation is identified as the effective tool for resolving conflicts. Jacob Bercovitch defines mediation, in the international context, as “where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch, 1997). Mediation offers useful solutions to problems posed by ethnic, regional and global conflicts. Its primary aim is to achieve compromise settlement of issues through an acceptable third party intervention resulting in mutually accepted outcomes. Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics and especially more so when it involves the divided Indian sub-continent. Mediation has been tried out by the United Nations in the Kashmir Conflict many times. Both Pakistan and India failed to follow through on the 1948 UN resolution, as it called for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops from the Kashmir valley (Rajan, 2005). While India insisted that Pakistan should completely withdraw before Indian troops would leave, the Pakistani government covertly threw their support behind Pashtun tribesmen. This eventually led to war. The question this experience asks is “Why were there no incentives for the countries to engage diplomatically?”. More importantly, “Why was the UN unable to enforce mediation?”. Because of the Simla Agreement of 1972 between the two nations that prevent either country from approaching mediators on their own and disallows third-party intervention, there can only be negotiations between the countries. Given those conditions, I believe, without trade penalties to act as a severe negative incentive for not engaging in war, mediation will fail.

Secondly, compromise is a “settled” resolution that may or may not be the optimal solution sought by either party. While a functional solution may be found, emotional or behavioural issues may remain unresolved. As a result, disputing parties may continue to carry dissatisfaction that could resurface if they come in contact again. Compromise theories between India and Pakistan can face significant roadblocks because of what has already transpired. Notwithstanding the 100,000 Kashmiris that have died, the Kashmir Conflict goes even beyond this point. With nearly 80% of India’s population being Hindu and 96% of Pakistan’s population being Muslim, the theory of compromise hits a roadblock because of the obvious religious element. The question that arises in my mind is, “How can there be an incentive for these countries to compromise then?”. Trade between India and Pakistan should be promoted in order to create mutual dependence. When business and economies are involved, I believe that leaders of nations can look beyond religious sentiment to find common ground.

The theory of Trade penalties or economic sanctions are defined as “the actual or threatened denial of economic relations by one or more states intended to influence the behaviour of another state on noneconomic issues or to limit its military capabilities”. The instruments of influence for applying economic sanctions are often trade, investments and foreign aid. The objective of sanctions is to impact foreign or domestic policy but excludes trade disputes and other economic bargaining objectives. Trade penalties can be useful in reinforcing cooperation. Economic data, however, suggests that the effect of trade sanctions will be felt more by Pakistan rather than India. This is obvious when it can be seen that the size of the Indian economy as of 2018 was NZ$4587 billion, compared to NZ$432 billion for Pakistan. In fact, a single state in India (Maharashtra) has a higher GDP than Pakistan. Given that apparent inequality of power, it is important that there need to be proportionate responses to economic sanctions. For example, if the UN decides to sanction either country, it should be on the basis of the size of the economy. If a sanction on NZ$43 billion is initiated against Pakistan goods that will represent 10% of their economy. For a proportionate response against India, International bodies will need to sanction NZ$458 billion worth of Indian goods. How practical economic sanctions have been in international relations is still up for debate, considering how a study says that only 34% of sanctions historically have led to desirable outcomes (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990).

India and Pakistan are two egoistic countries that have historically confronted one another in interactions that resemble a Prisoner's dilemma. An example of this was both countries engaging in nuclear proliferation in the late 1990s, which escalated into the short-lived Kargil War of 1999. The opportunity for common gain from cooperation comes into play when the gains from the other's cooperation are greater than the costs of one's own cooperation. The Tit-for-Tat theory presented by the American Political Scientist, Robert Axelrod, has presented itself as a suitable conflict resolution mechanism for the India-Pakistan conflict, I believe. Tit-for-Tat is merely the strategy of beginning with cooperation, and from that point on doing what the other player did on the previous move. It was made by a Russian psychologist, Anatol Rappaport, for a computer tournament examining the evolution of cooperation by Robert Axelrod. Tit-for-Tat's niceness means that it is never the first to create trouble, and this property stops it from getting into unnecessary skirmishes. Its retaliation stops either side from engaging in violations. Its forgiving nature helps restore cooperation. Its clarity makes its behavioural pattern simple to understand; and once recognized, it is easy to perceive that the best way of managing Tit-for-Tat is to cooperate with it. The key variable is that India and Pakistan know they will be dealing with each other again and again. In this way, any attempt to endanger the people of Kashmir will not pay. Axelrod showcases an interesting instance of the 'live and let live' system which rose amid World War I trench warfare. Soldiers on the front-line regularly tried not to shoot to kill – as long as the other side didn’t. What made this possible was the static nature of trench warfare, where the same small units confronted each other for long periods. Snipers on both sides would regularly fire a few shots at walls, to exhibit they could do more harm if they wished. These exhibitions helped police the framework (Axelrod, 1981). Under the right conditions, cooperation based upon reciprocity can develop even between enemies such as India and Pakistan.

Reciprocity requires the ability to recognize and retaliate against a defection. But retaliation can escalate quickly. If one nation defects, a Tit-for-Tat strategy will respond with retaliation, but if the other nation does the same in response, the result would be an unending echo of retaliation. This is particularly true when India and Pakistan have completely different perceptions of what has happened in Kashmir over the past few decades. A better strategy than Tit-for-Tat 'might be to return only nine-tenths of a tit for a tat'. Additionally, efforts to restructure the relationships may never get off the ground. Even successful arrangements are subject to decay. Mutual cooperation through compromise can be achieved between India and Pakistan if the future is sufficiently significant relative to the present time period. With a larger shadow, cooperation themed on reciprocity is stable. The shadow of the future can be enlarged by making the interactions more lasting and more frequent (Axelrod, 1981). Regarding theories of mediation, international institutions may have a significant role since these institutions can moderate India and Pakistan. If both countries are worried about repercussions, this reduces the chance of violations during the peace-making process. Through economic sanctions/trade penalties, international bodies can create expectations that a violation will be dealt with harshly. International bodies could help to encourage cooperation by making it both more attractive to gain a good reputation by shunning the country that repeatedly violates the peace.

Matters of International Relations can be broken down into numerous stages. Doing it this way makes reciprocity a stronger tool. If both nations can know that an inadequate move by the other can be solved with retaliation in the following stage, then both can be more confident that the process will work out as anticipated. One way to break down interaction is to promote a common market that allows for the free flow of labour, capital and goods. The adoption of such a free market by India and Pakistan may be the cornerstone for cooperation. The major issue that has plagued the innocent people of Kashmir in the battle for their sovereignty has been the clash of two egoist nations – India and Pakistan. Through the use of mediation by international institutions and a combination of compromise and trade penalties to punish violations, I believe the Kashmir conflict can be resolved. I also believe that cooperation can be reinforced between India and Pakistan by adopting the game theory situation of a Prisoners' Dilemma to show that a diplomatic strategy based on reciprocity such as “Tit-for-Tat”, can be remarkably effective. I believe that such an approach rewards cooperation over the long run and punishes unlawfulness, while also monitoring behaviour.

Empathy essentially means to walk a mile in the other person’s shoe. The term “empathy” was coined by Titchener in 1909. It is defined as the “process of humanizing objects, of reading or feeling ourselves into them” (Hakansson, 2003). It is the capacity to understand what the other entity is feeling, from their point of reference. India and Pakistan are not the victims of this conflict, in the strictest sense of the word. The people of Kashmir, who have never been given a chance to decide their fate are the people that I have the most sympathy for. On both the Indian and Pakistani sides of Kashmir, there have been human right violations, committed by the armies of both nations. Reports of forced disappearances, encounter killings, rapes, mutilation and torture are rampant in the valley. At the same time, I believe that the decades of conflict between India and Pakistan stemmed from the weaponization of religion by the British Empire during their colonial days. In order to “Divide and Conquer”, the British would segregate and side with particular religious communities, as they saw fit – driving a wedge deep in the psyche of the Indian subcontinent. In a proxy war between two major religions, it is difficult to allow yourself to give any leeway, in fear of outraging the majority in your own country. Essentially the Kashmir Conflict, I believe, is a war caused by brutal repression of the masses after centuries of cultivating hate in the name of religion. Although these are highly successful tactics in achieving vast empires, this is the aftermath of those policies – decades of war and unrest.

As an Indian, the Kashmir Conflict has long been a thorn in my psyche. I have grown up being told that Kashmiris are not to be “trusted” and that Pakistan is the sworn enemy of our nation. Through cricket matches and regular border skirmishes, you could always see the passion for hating on each other. As I have grown up, however, I have an equal amount of empathy for both India and Pakistan. I see now that both nations are merely “fractured” children of the brutal British Empire’s sickening policies for division and manipulation. My anger is directed toward the cunningness of that empire and the horrific rule of my people. My compassion, however, lies strictly with the people of Kashmir, who have been raped, tortured and killed for a conflict they never asked for. Today, I do not encourage it but, I can also empathize with the militancy movements that have sprouted in Kashmir, which I believe is simply a form of rebellion. I really want the situation to change, from India and Pakistan engaging in talks and trade. As the two countries realise that they are brothers in arms, I hope they both leave Kashmir alone and allow the region to decide its fate. Regional cooperation can emerge between India and Pakistan by using the principles of compromise, mediation and trade penalties. However, no progress can be made unless each country adopts a diplomatic framework based on reciprocity, such as Tit-for-Tat. The fact remains that even India and Pakistan that are jealously guarding their sovereignty and protecting their power can create new and better arrangements. For the sake of the people of Kashmir, I hope that common ground can be found.

References

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