The Extent Of France’s Leading Role: Military Operations Of The Sahelian Zone
Introduction
Nowadays, states’ official political discourse assert that rulers lead foreign policyin the name of the national interest. Defined as the government’s objective and thekey driver of foreign policy decisions, the notion is of a different nature from theindividuals’ interest. Admittedly, the national interest takes into account the interestsof individuals in the extent that governments, in a liberal democracy, are supposed torepresent the interests of their constituents. Yet, if individual interests came to opposethe achievement of the national interest, priority would be given to the nationalinterest, as it transcends individuals goals. This paper will discuss the influence of national interests on foreign aid policythrough the case study of France’s military interventions in the Sahelian band. Frenchpolitical and economic interests to expand security policy in Sahel will be examined.
This paper defined foreign policy as “the transfer of capital, goods, from an country tothe benefit of an other and can be financial aid, military intervention or emergencyhumanitarian”. The French military foreign aid will be further discussed in this paper. It recognizes foreign policy as a tool to serve nationalinterest and subscribes to Mearsheimer’s view of the global order that is beingorganised by a balance of power, in which states are in a constant struggle for(relative) power (1994). This paper expects France, as an established power and old Empire, to provide military assistance towards his former colonies to further its neo-colonial ambitions inorder to face the world power shifts. In terms of structure, this paper will first outline the theoretical framework bydefining the view of Neorealism. The next section will describe the case of France’snational interest in Sahel. The third part will discuss the application of the theory tothe case study. Finally, a short conclusion of the main findings will be provided withinsights into further avenues of research such as the real impact of hegemons’assistance to underdeveloped regions.
Theoretical framework
An overview of John Mearsheimer’s international relations theory outlines thedominant conceptual viewpoint among scholars on national interest’s role in foreignaid policy. In a dog-eat-dog classical realist world, the anarchic international systemwhere there is no higher ruling authority is the causal variable shaping states’ selfinterest behaviour. Inherently motivated by their own survival, they seek to achieverelative gains at the expense of the others and increase their offensive military power, leading to general mistrust and minimal influence of international institutions. (1994).
This paper recognizes power as economic, politic, military and cultural factors, andmeans to ensure hegemon’s dominion over other states. In addition to maintain the balance of power, the greater the power of a state, the moreit can support its national interest. As realism emphasizes the sovereignty of states asdriving principle of the political game, the foreign aid is far from being purelyaltruistic and humanitarian. Schaeder, Hooks, Taylor outlined that ‘foreign aid isperceived as only minimally related to recipient economic development and thehumanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed”.
Case description
After the decolonization, France was seeking to maintain a presence on the continentby building cooperation with its former colonies. According to the French Ministry ofForeign affairs, French aid raises around €10 billion per year since 2015, and focusesmainly to sub-Saharan African countries (59% of the total), half of which are LDC.
The French Development Agency (AFD) has a leading role with 30% of the aiddisbursed towards 19 defined priority poor countries (all former french colonies). However, development and cultural cooperation, although strategic in the long term, have lost weight in the face of military priorities. France’s strategic and politicalobjectives have evolved since the restructuring of its defence policy presented in thegovernment defence White Paper of 1994. Since Rwanda’sgenocide in 1984, France sets up a strategic redeployment towards the Sahelian band: on 2013, France launched “Operation Serval” with 1, 700 soldiers to stop the advanceof jihadists controlling the North, and support Malian troops in the face of the threatof an offensive towards Bamako. In August Serval was replaced by “OperationBarkhane”, extended to the entire Sahelo-Saharan strip and currently the largestexternal operation of the French army, with 4, 500 soldiers deployed (French Ministerof Defense).
According to official statements, French’s foreign military aid pursues a humanitarianand collective peace goal. In 2012, François Hollande announced Paris' willingness toconduct an equal dialogue with its African counterparts: "The times of what was oncecalled fransafrique have passed". The french authorities’position on the Malian intervention refers to the President's petition for militaryassistance in the fight against Islamists and the United Nations Security Council resolution 2085. This paper argues that France's motivations are notreduced to a liberal desire to help, but to protect its own interests in the region.
The ongoing increase of the French military power in Sahel draws the overall patternof France's African foreign policy and reflects the old Empire national interests, in thecontext of globalization and Africa’s diversification of economic partners.
Applications
In the realistic world of rivalries, hegemon’s strategies respond to objectives ofconquest, but also protection of the balance of powers against the emergence of newpowers seeking to overthrow the global order. In his paper, Gregory (2000) arguesthat “in post-colonial Africa, France found an exclusive sphere of influence, on whichto base its claims of grandeur and great power status and also claims of Third Worldleadership”. This rationalist assumption is first supported by the existence ofstrategic resources coveted by France, such as Nigeria’s uranium mining (providing1/3 of France supplies): Areva (French multinational company in the nuclear sector) has addressed a request to the Ministry of Defence on the protection of deposits andthe regulation of conflicts in Mali (80% of French energy is nuclear). Furthermore, since March 2012, Mali has opened access to 20 of its 29 regionsto foreign companies wishing to find oil deposits in the country. The development ofeconomic cooperation is therefore potentially interesting for France.
Secondly, Franceasserts its status as an hegemon through the maintain of a Francophone area, increasing its influence and power on the international stage as the leader of a large4french-speaking coalition. By acting so, France manages to preserve its status quo asan hegemon power. Because states’ primary concern is survival, Mearsheimer claims that they pursueterritorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order over prosperityand protecting human rights (2006). This assumption is supported by France’s effortsto maintain stability in the Sahelian band. In fact, further disruption in the Sahel zone (Mali, Nigeria) could lead to the destabilization of neighbouring countries, such asthe Gulf of Guinea where France has more interests to preserve. Furthermore, theinstability effect could trigger a massive emigration of the Sahelian populationtowards France (as its former colonial metropolis). Sudden flows of refugees wouldhave a devastating impact on France territorial integrity and the autonomy of itsdomestic political order. In their research, Fokina and Bitar (2018) founded an additional factor that supportsFrance's pursuit of its national interest in Sahel: they argue that economiccompetition with external actors over the region, challenges France’s traditionalinfluence and hegemon power. Indeed, Sahel has aroused the interest of major powersinterested in Sahelian resources. China is investing heavily in the region, but alsoCanada and Gulf countries. This renewed interest has been accompanied by a loss ofinfluence of the former colonial powers in the region. In all this upheaval, France mayalso have been tempted to intervene to protect its interests, resulting in increasingmilitary interventions.
Conclusion
Despite official statements of French authorities to pursue collective peace through itsforeign military intervention in Sahel, the hegemon attempts to preserve its exclusivesphere of influence (economics partnerships, francophone area), on which to base itsclaims of great power status. France also seeks to avoid instability in the region inorder to prevent refugees flow that will imbalance its domestic order. Finally, thecountry increases its military interventions to compete against new external actorschallenging his traditional power.
This case study is a relevant example of the influence of national interest in politicalforeign aid. As an established power and old Empire, France provides militaryassistance towards his former colonies to further its neo-colonial ambitions in order toface the world power shifts and protect its interests. On the assumption that France’s military interventions are defined by its nationalinterest, we could wonder if political foreign aids provide a real assistance tounderdeveloped regions in Africa? The effectiveness of official development assistance has been the subject of numerous studies without ever raising the question of the end of aid.
