The Changes In The Military Of USA After 9/11 Attsck
September 11th 2001 changed many aspects of American culture. Nineteen members of the Islamic extremist group known as Al-Qaeda took command of four passenger planes and conducted suicide attacks on three United States targets. One plane crashed into the Pentagon. Two planes struck the World Trade Center towers in New York. Forcing the tower to collapse and killed thousands. It is believed that passengers and crew of the fourth plane attempted to take back control of their hijacked flight. This forced the militants to crash it into a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. After the attacks, many questions arose. Chief among them was how did this happen and what was the United States military going to do about it. The how is easy. There was a systematic breakdown of America’s Intelligence agencies. Many scholars have written of the extremely difficult time the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation have with adjusting and adapting to a world in which there is no Cold War. However, they were not alone because those in congress that are responsible for giving those agencies the needed man power, tools, and other resources did not help.
Terrorism was identified as a significant threat to the United States every year from 1994 to 2001. By 1998 terrorism ranked in the top tier of threats, alongside other transnational dangers such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The U. S. intelligence community became aware of bin Laden in the early 1990s, soon after he had founded al-Qaida, and was aggressively collecting intelligence on him by 1996. After intelligence left the agencies those on Capitol Hill conducted a substandard information awareness campaign. The American people did not care because they were not aware. If the people are not aware then there is insufficient reasons to grant additional funds to issues the people do not care about. What was the United States going to do about it is a question that appears to have an easy answer. Send the troops. Unfortunately, America’s troops were not ready. Besides small skirmishes in the Middle East, Bosnia, and Mogadishu the American military had experienced a quiet period without war. Standards had become relaxed and conducting training was difficult. Budget cuts administered during the Clinton administration made it difficult to procure proper training materials. Units would rather not train than deal with new regulations. Before September 11, the men and women living on those bases guarded them. Military cooks cooked meals and soldier mechanics worked on vehicles. Civilians were part of the military make up but they worked in jobs that dealt with operations and logistics. They were rarely seen or heard. After September 11 that all changed. The military began recruiting more soldiers to fill the ranks and funding was fast tracked to allow soldiers to properly train. A mechanic was expected to know the ends and outs of an engine but also parts of any infantryman’s job as well. Not the expert details one knows from years of battle drills but they were expected to know the basics of shooting, moving, and communicating in an austere environment. Combat operations became everyone’s primary responsibility. This created a gap in services because if the mechanic is doing the infantryman’s job then who is doing the mechanics job. Public procurement officials were tasked with solving this dilemma and created thousands of contracts to fill these gaps. Companies like Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), Lockheed Martin, Haliburton, and Academi (formerly Black Water) have become synonymous with the military. Agents of those agencies cook, clean, run logistics, operations, and fix vehicles. They are extremely good at what they do. So good, in fact many soldiers ask themselves why they joined to be a cook if they can never cook meals.
Why focus on mastering a craft back at home station when the chance of doing it while deployed is close to nil. This creates the questions has the government’s procuring policies and the procuring of labor that once allowed the military to focus on war now become a detriment and helped to hinder the readiness of the military. In the United States, government did its part to advance the interests of its people by providing a social and economic safety net and through the application of technical rationality and public policies to social, economic, and political problems, while major corporations and other businesses provided jobs, health care benefits, and retirement pensions. This is to include military expertise. This paper will refer to Academi by its original name of Blackwater. This is because most literature refers to the company by its original name. Since its founding, the company has undergone two name changes. After some questionable actions in 2010, it changed its name to Xe and later in 2014 to Academi. Blackwater supplies the military with many logistical and operational needs. However, their main export is a privatized army or in unprofessional circles, mercenaries. Blackwater began as a relatively unknown Virginia-based security firm, and the new and controversial world of private military contractors welcomed them with open arms. In 2010, private military companies (PMCs) invoices accounted for more than $50, 000, 000, 000 annually or about a third of the US defense budget for military personnel. Blackwater, the employer of the four Fallujah victims, is the most successful security contractor to have been in existence, but also the most controversial.
In the late 2000s, Blackwater was at its peak. It was enjoying economic and political benefits of outsourcing security and implementing operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and many other smaller countries around the world. Its primary selling point was the ability to train and fight close quarter combat, the protection of US Diplomats, and support to the Department of Defense conducting airlift operations. When not doing one of these three task they helped to secure CIA safe houses and dabbled in the world of corporation risk management. They enjoyed great success but it all came crashing down after reports of abuse at the Abu Gharib prison in Iraq. The media had published 279 pictures and 19 videos depicting detainee abuse. This was corroborated by thorough reports of Major Generals Antonio Taguba, Anthony Jones, and George Fay. Incidents ranged from intentional violent or sexual abuse such as rape, sodomy and indecent assault to incidents that resulted from misinterpretations of law or policy such as clothing removal, some use of dogs in interrogations, and some instances of improper imposition of isolation.
Blackwater was later found responsible or complicit in several of the incidents of abuse that occurred. Afterwards much of Blackwater’s contracts were nullified. Many questioned how was the U. S. government blindsided by these actions and how did Blackwater earn contract after contract because Abu Gharib was not the first incident. The answer lies in the breakdown of military contract rewarding process. The military traditionally has used three types of procurement process: sole source procurement, single source, procurement under an existing multiple award contract, and normal procurement. Sole source and single source procurement often are confused with one another because of the similar sounding names. Sole sourcing is when a company needs a particular good or service and after a thorough review, it is discovered that only one vendor offers what it needs. The vendor is then offered a contract without having to compete. Single sourcing is the act of choosing a single vendor, offering a contract although other vendors offer the same service or goods and avoiding the competition. Actions like this are rare and must be documented very well by the government. Procurement under and existing multiple award contract is known as contract bundling. The Office of Management and Budget (2008) characterizes multiple award contracts as two or more procurement requirements for goods or services previously provided or performed under separate, smaller contracts into a solicitation of offers for a single contract that is unlikely to be suitable for award to a small business concern (OMB).
Normal procurement is the process of using all phases of the procurement process. According to Curry (2017), the benefits from a robust contracting plan are common globally and result from maximizing the benefits of full and open competition. A well-constructed solicitation that results in homogeneous proposals to facilitate selection of the optimal contractor, and management of pre-proposal communications to ensure equal treatment of prospective contractors and the avoidance of protests and fraudulent activities. At the onset of rewarding contracts, there were no issues. All contracts passed the Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Process. The government’s pre-solicitation and all other aspects of the process was conducted with no outstanding irregularities. In the beginning there were multiple companies awarded contracted to do the same with the only difference being those task would take place in different countries. Problems began once Blackwater was able to qualify itself for single source contracting. They did this by offering multiple services cheaper than their competitor’s offers. The law favors the bidder with the lowest price and does not allow previous relationships with certain suppliers/operators and their former experiences to affect the outcome of the procurement process. This does not mean the law is unfaultable. Throughout the procurement process, due to the effect of the interaction among the components of the public procurement system, certain actions with significant negative effects on its optimal operation may occur.
Some of those negative effects stemmed from single sourcing a preferred DOD method during the height of the War on Terrorism. Single sourcing contracts is a symptom of what eventually led to the erosion of the risk mitigation processes and the contracting plan. As well as the readiness of the United States military. Kendrick (2015) explains risk mitigation serves to reduce the probability or impact of a threat and the corresponding tactic is to enhance the plan to pursue opportunity, making the potential benefits more likely or more helpful. However, risk mitigation is not a cookie cutter process that can be used throughout all aspects of a government contract. Yet, the government would like to treat it as such. Organizing and training the team to follow a disciplined, repeatable process for conducting risk management is critical, since major program decisions during the program life cycle need the support of periodic assessments. Experienced teams do not necessarily require extensive training, but team members should review lessons learned from earlier programs. DoD does not believe that all members of the contracting team need to be trained on important aspects of the procurement process. DoD would rather some members be professionally trained and then train other members. Those that received training from other members are to conduct the checks and balances needed for vendors executing contracts. If someone needed, more expertise they would then turn to meticulously filed folder or three ring binder that contains lessons learned from past procurement officials. As an example, imagine making a copy of a copy and so on. Repeated over and over and in time no one can understand what is on the copied piece of paper. Actions such as these lead to complacency.
Complacency was the primary contributing factor for the overall break down of the procurement process. Complacency allowed Blackwater to no longer have to compete for contracts. It was easier for procurement officials to make contracts single source. Easier for DoD to establish a contract administration strategy and easier to evaluate criteria. Through this process, the need to pick the contract that best served the government’s needs was voided because paper work established Blackwater as being the best hire. The military has an issue with using the same systems repeatedly without change. If a company is conducting an airborne operation, someone will use a prior accepted risk matrix or risk analysis. The only changes made will be the date. It will be submitted for approval to the chain of command and approved. An airborne operation deals with hundreds of soldiers jumping out of an airplane. Usually landing onto a piece of land, that is one kilometer by a half kilometer. If done properly risk matrix and analysis should take upwards of three hours to obtain the required paperwork but usually all it takes is 10 minutes. This is the nature of DoD in all aspects of military life.
The failure of the procurement process is a symptom but not the disease that led to its failure. The issue lies with those at the top not expecting more from the men and women they command. The issue is that the procurement process is no longer the primary job of the army contractor but has been outsourced to those required to learn by on the job training (OJT). Such as infantrymen, cooks, and helicopter mechanics. This speaks to the culture of DOD. However, it can be changed and must change in order to be prepared for new challenges awaiting the DoD. The people are more aware of how their tax dollars are spent and politicians have made government accountability apart of their stump speeches. There are four ways the military, more specifically the army, can fix this problem. It can stop or dramatically reduce noncompetitive contracts. Over the last five years, there have been hundreds of thousands – if not millions – of noncompetitive contracts awarded by the US federal government. This accounted for approximately $644. 8 billion in government spending.
Reducing those contracts would immediately allow soldiers to accomplish the task they willingly enlisted for. This in turn would build the morale and cohesion of the army and ensure a finer product of men. Cohesion, specifically the affective, emotional bonds between soldiers, has been found to be a key component of combat motivation. Another method would be to increase the number of skilled personnel. According to Stark (2013), Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 51C is a career field established in December 2006 to meet the army's continuously increasing need for contingency contracting officers, and is viewed as a critical asset. The army is currently recruiting NCOs (Non Commissioned Officer), in both the active and reserve components, who are interested in reclassifying to MOS 51C and meet the requirements (US Army). This is a new MOS and appears to have promise. Only issue is the army has not advertised the MOS as it does its elite combat MOS such as Green Berets, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, 75th Rangers, and 160th Special Operations Air Regiment (Night Stalkers). 51C is barely known about and for that reason many NCO do not apply for the training. Each year the army graduates at least 1200 new Special Operation Operators while 51C may graduate 100. In order to increase the amount of soldiers trained and improve the contracting and procurement process the Army will have to invest in educating the force of the benefits of becoming a Contracting Officer. People join the military to travel the world and experience new and exciting things. This MOS offers all that and some.
A third way to fix the issue would be to change DOD’s acquisition structure. Before new equipment or tools are purchase, it must go through a rigorous evaluating phase. This is called the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE). During this phase, new equipment is tested in controlled environments and then in the field in austere conditions. After it is evaluated and it has been deemed valuable to the warfighter DOD will begin the next step in the procurement phase of taking bids. This is the longest phase of the procurement/acquisition cycle. Some goods have been known to take up to seven years before being approved and distributed to soldiers. This is of no fault of their own the NIE has had to contend with many debilitating factors. They have contended with sequestration along with a government shutdown, necessitating more scrutiny over how funds are spent. All have contributed to the increase amount of time goods stay in this phase. Fortunately, the army has reduced its presence in Iraq and soon will be out of Afghanistan. These two actions will dramatically cut the amount of time equipment stays in the testing phase. It would also get modern equipment to soldiers adding another reason negating the use of contractors. Contractors do not have to wait for new equipment. If their companies deems it worthy then they may buy it. Most contractors that work for companies like Blackwater buy their own personal protective equipment and the company will reimburse them or write it off as a business expense. It is upgrades in personal protective equipment, which makes contractors attractive to the military. This is an expense the military does not have to compete with. It cost to supply a soldier with body armor, ballistic glasses and gloves, and boots that will not wear out after months of hiking in the mountains of Afghanistan.
Lastly the Department of Defense should follow tighten its rules. Officials who were involved in a procurement exceeding $10 million may not become employees or consultants of the contractor for one year. . In theory this sounds good except the average time it takes to be released from the military is one year. Rules such as these allow for fraud, mismanagement of funds, and quid pro quo. Repeatedly there are instances of a senior ranking soldier enacting new regulation and afterwards that soldier will leave the military and take a position with the company won a highly lucrative contract. Such as Bobby Ray Inman, a retired navy admiral who held several influential positions in the U. S. Intelligence Community. He is a member of the board for Blackwater. Lester Lyles is a retired four-star general on the board for KBR. KBR has multiple contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not just military some prominent individuals in government have also benefitted from loose acquisition rules. Vice President Dick Cheney had substantial stock in Haliburton before being elected to Vice President. After taking in office Haliburton’s government contracts increased substantially. According to Rosenbaum (2004), the company rose to seventh-largest military contractor in 2003 from 22nd-largest in 2000 (NY Times).
These suggestions may not fix all problems with the how DOD conducts contract operations but they will allow the acquisition process a chance to heal and become stronger. They will infuse the military with new thoughts and ideas of how to handle acquisitions while also ensuring that the personnel are knowledgeable and competent. Primarily this will allow the military to be proficient at the jobs enlisted men and officers volunteered to do. The military’s readiness will increase along with soldier’s enthusiasm, comradery, and desire to be a part of a well-managed fighting force.
