Hybrid Warfare In The Context Of Bangladesh

“If it be not now, yet it will come – the readiness is all. ” – William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 5, Scene 2a. BD Air Force - Forces Goal 2030 plans to make the BD Air Force a technologically advanced, well-trained and well-equipped force that can deter any threat. These plans emphasize strengthening air power and air defence capabilities. The BD Air Force has purchased 16 Russian-made Yak-130 training and light attack aircrafts and 16 F-7BG light attack fighter jets from China in addition to a number of radar systems from China and Russia. A new contract has been signed that will see China deliver 23 units of Hongdu K-8W intermediate training jets to the BD.

Probability of Surfacing the Hybrid Threat

Future conflicts are likely to be hybrid in nature combining all the relevant components. A response mechanism in the absence of a deep understanding of a hybrid threat would make it even more difficult to respond to the hybrid threat. Thus, the preconditions that would provide empirical evidence of a HW for BD could be the following.

1. Acts of Criminality - These are parts of the coercion to alter the will of the people so that they do not resist the so called people’s movement. Acts of criminality are undertaken against the security forces and even against the general people to create a support base by coercion if the support does not come willingly. Nation must remember that today’s criminal is tomorrow’s terrorist.
2. Erosion and Subversion of Established Institutions of Governance - HW can only become effective if the institutions of governance collapse and there is an erosion of its functioning. This allows hybrid threats to create a space for the effective usage of all elements of hybrid war.
3. Simultaneity and Multi-modality of Application of Hybrid Capabilities - HW is effective if all components are employed simultaneously in same battle space. Internal subversion is triggered to control and deny space to the state institutions. Effectiveness of HW is in internal subversion and this is a major reason for the destabilisation of a nation. Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan have literally imploded, purely because of internal subversion and fragmentation of society.
4. Information War - HW becomes even more persuasive and unpredictable with an information war. It creates the perception of success, decides the scales of victory, and acts as potent tool for a misinformation campaign against the established governments. In the digital era, media becomes one of the most potent tools of the information war.
5. Cultural and Structural Violence - Cultural and structural violence justifies the wrongs as right. It reduces the space for reconciliation and depicts the entire HW as a war for a just cause. A state can handle direct violence but it is very difficult to handle cultural and structural violence.
6. Non-state and Irregulars Acquiring Conventional Capabilities - Hezbollah, Syrian Democratic Forces and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have acquired conventional and sub-conventional capabilities. It is not possible to acquire such capabilities without state patronage. Thus, such groups pose a serious threat of HW when combined with other tools of war. Terrorists those are active in BD are getting support in irregulars and regulars form across the border.
7. Grey Zones - Grey zones and ungoverned territories allow criminals and non-state actors to gain a foothold in a target nation to enable other elements of HW to destabilise the state. Though a classical grey zone does not exist in BD but the south-eastern parts of BD commonly known as Chittagong Hill Tracks (CHT) have been experiencing the insurgency in the country. BD has seen three cycles of insurgency related to instability.

The first cycle was marked by an ideologically-backed ethnic conflict for self-determination that started just after independence and continued till the late 1980s. The second cycle continued till the Government of BD succeeded in signing an accord on 2 December 1997. From 1998 till dated, in the third cycle although the armed conflict has reduced significantly but different unresolved issues of peace accord kept the CHT in turmoil. This is perilous because it can pave the way for the beginning of a hybrid threat in the north-eastern states. What is equally worrying is the nexus between criminals, drug traffickers, insurgents, and the state patronage of our adversaries who provide ideological and material support from across the border. Insurgents enjoy safe havens or grey zones across international borders. There is some degree of subversion among the population in some areas. The components of modern instability (corruption, poor governance, unemployment, uneven distribution of wealth, poor development, and ethnic fragmentation) do exist and these create the space for hybrid elements to spread the network.

Dealing with HW

HW is nebulous in nature; the course it takes is difficult to define. Even those who orchestrate this warfare can lose control over the outcome. It has the potential to transform into conventional war and multiple sub-conventional wars. HW is not purely military matter; it is a war against a nation, a society, a culture, and its people. To deal with this emerging threat a whole of nation approach is required. A fragmented approach, in the absence of a common operational plan, is unlikely to achieve the desired results. Various operations are being executed under different ministries and there is no single central authority that is responsible and accountable for the execution of a comprehensive and integrated response. Therefore, a military response only will be inadequate and a poor idea to pursue. The response requires a strategy and synergy between military and non-military partners and other law enforcement agencies. A combined endeavour can only make BD prepare to deal with HW. But our military is still inadequately prepared to deal with the hybrid threats. A survey result reveals that about Only, 49% of respondents have little idea about HW, where 46% have not heard anything about this trend, other 5% of interviewed individuals cannot elucidate whether they know anything about HW or not.

Another survey shows that approximately 74% of respondents consider HW as a threat for our country, while 9% deems the opposite of it. The percentage of individuals who do not have a formulated answer to this specific question, speaks for to be around 17% of respondents.